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ABSTRACTS

Social Revolutions and Mass Military Mobilization

By T. SKOCPOL

Despite their limited accomplishments in promoting economic development, the authoritarian regimes brought to power through social-revolutionary transformations—from the French Revolution of the 18th century to the Iranian Revolution of the present—have excelled at conducting humanly costly wars with a special fusion of popular zeal, meritocratic professionalism, and central coordination. Revolutionary elites, whether communist or not, have been able to build the strongest states in those countries whose geopolitical circumstances allowed the emerging new regimes to become engaged in protracted and labor-intensive international warfare.

Science and Sovietology:

bridging the methods gap in soviet foreign policy studies

By J. SNYDER

Specialists in the study of Soviet foreign policy increasingly feel torn between the positivist culture of political science departments and the holistic traditions of the Soviet area-studies programs. In fact, these approaches are largely complementary. Examples taken from literature on Soviet security policy and on the domestic sources of Soviet expansionism show how positivist theories and methods can be used to clarify holist (or traditionalist) arguments, to sharpen debates, to suggest more telling tests, and to invigorate the field's research agenda.

Left-Libertarian Parties:

explaining innovation in competitive party systems

By H. P. KITSCHELT

Since the 1960s, new left-socialist or ecology parties have appeared in approximately half of the advanced Western democracies. These parties have a common set of egalitarian and libertarian tenets and appeal to younger, educated voters. The author uses macropolitical and economic data to explain the electoral success of these left-libertarian parties. While high levels of economic development are favorable preconditions for their emergence, they are best explained in terms of domestic political opportunity structures. There is little evidence that these parties are a reaction to economic and social crises in advanced democracies. The findings suggest that the rise of left-libertarian parties is the result of a new cleavage mobilized in democratic party systems rather than of transient protest.

Neorealism and Neoliberalism

By J. S. NYE, JR.

The classic dialectic between Realist and Liberal theories of international politics, as expressed by Robert O. Keohane, ed., in *Neorealism and Its Critics* and Richard Rosecrance in *The Rise of the Trading State*, can be transcended. Neither paradigm singularly explains international behavior: Realism is the dominant approach, but liberal theories of transnationalism and interdependence help to illuminate how national interests are learned and changed. Keohane and fellow critics argue that Neorealism—articulated definitively in Kenneth Waltz's *Theory of International Politics* (1979)—elegantly systematizes Realism, but concentrates on international system structure at the expense of system process. Focused tightly on the concept of bipolarity, Waltz's theory tends toward stasis; the unit (state) level unproductively becomes an analytical "dumping ground." As a Neoliberal counterpoint, Rosecrance's argument does not go far enough. In the tradition of commercial liberalism, he argues that an open trading system offers states maneuverability through economic growth rather than through military conquest. He tempers his argument with Realist considerations of prudence, but fails to clarify Realist-Liberal links in his theory, or to explore fully the connections between power and non-power incentives influencing states' behavior. A synthesis of Neorealism and Neoliberalism is warranted: a systemic theory using the former to analyze at the level of structure, the latter more often at the level of process.

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State, Social Elites, and Government Capacity in Southeast Asia

By D. K. CRONE

The signal performances of Southeast Asian countries in attaining economic growth and political stability are frequently explained by cultural and policy factors. Recent research suggests, however, that the role of the state is extensive and central to economic and political goals. The present approach to the comparative evaluation of state capacities attempts to account for the variations and nuances of the performance of Southeast Asian states. The structure of political support and available means of social control provide relatively greater capacity to state elites in Singapore and Malaysia, and less capacity to state elites in the Philippines and Indonesia; Thailand is an intermediate case.

A View from Zaire

By P. BOYLE

This review of recent books on Zaire examines how the changing salience of the issues of ethnicity, class, and the state exhibit shifts in academic perspectives and especially in perceptions of how best to account for and articulate the characteristics of political life in contemporary Zaire. The authors' views on the dynamics of class formation within a situation of increasing socioeconomic inequality and state decline raise questions about how or to what degree the Mobutu regime has managed to institutionalize a kind of "authority" and "political order" over the past twenty years. The case of Zaire challenges the meaning of "institutionalization" because the most clearly identifiable practices in Zaire have centered on finding efficient means for appropriating whatever political and economic resources are at hand.

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SOCIAL REVOLUTIONS AND MASS MILITARY MOBILIZATION

By THEDA SKOCPOL*

"THE changes in the state order which a revolution produces are no less important than the changes in the social order."[1] Franz Borkenau's insight, published in 1937, has become the central theme of more recent comparative studies. "A complete revolution," writes Samuel P. Huntington in *Political Order in Changing Societies*, "involves ... the creation and institutionalization of a new political order," into which an "explosion" of popular participation in national affairs is channeled.[2] Similarly, in my *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China*, I argue that in "each New Regime, there was much greater popular incorporation into the state-run affairs of the nation. And the new state organizations forged during the Revolutions were more centralized and rationalized than those of the Old Regime."[3]

Huntington has developed his arguments about revolutionary accomplishments in critical dialogue with liberal-minded modernization theorists, while I have developed mine in critical dialogue with Marxian class analysts. Modernization theorists and Marxians both analyze revolutionary transformations primarily in relation to long-term socioeconomic change. These scholars also highlight the contributions of certain revolutions to liberalism or to democratic socialism—that is, to "democracy" understood *in opposition to* authoritarian state power.

The classical Marxist vision on revolutionary accomplishments was unblinkingly optimistic. According to this view, "bourgeois revolutions"

* This essay is a revised version of a paper originally presented at the thematic panel, "Attacking the Leviathan: States and Social Conflicts," at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association in Washington, DC, September 3, 1984. During the process of revision, I benefited from comments and criticisms by the members of the 1986-87 Harvard CFIA Seminar on International Institutions and Cooperation, and by the members of the 1986-87 Workshop on Politics and Social Organization in the Harvard Department of Sociology. The suggestions of Jeff Goodwin, Marta Gil, and John Hall were especially helpful.

[1] Borkenau, "State and Revolution in the Paris Commune, the Russian Revolution, and the Spanish Civil War," *Sociological Review* 29 (January 1937), 41-75, at 41.

[2] Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 266. Chapter 5 in its entirety is also relevant.

[3] See Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China* (New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 161.

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clear away obstacles to capitalist economic development and lay the basis for historically progressive but socially limited forms of liberal democracy. "Proletarian revolutions," in turn, create the conditions for classless economies and for universal social and political democracy, accompanied by the progressive "withering away of the state." The first modern social revolution to be accomplished in the name of Marxism, the Russian Revolution of 1917, obviously belied this vision, however, for it established a communist dictatorship that ruled in the name of the proletariat while actually exploiting workers for purposes of crash industrialization, and imposing a brutal "internal colonialism" on the peasant majority.[4]

Reacting to the Stalinist denouement of the Russian Revolution, liberal-minded theorists operating within the broad framework of modernization theory have offered their own view of the accomplishments of revolutions. Theorists as disparate as S. N. Eisenstadt and Michael Walzer agree that the only salutary revolutions have been the mildest ones—the least violent and the least suddenly transformative of preexisting social and political relations.[5] In contrast to such supposedly liberal revolutions as the French and the English, the more severe and thoroughgoing revolutions boomeranged to produce totalitarian dictatorships—more penetrating authoritarian regimes—rather than democratization as these modernization theorists understand it.

Modernization theorists, moreover, tend to view the political aspects of the revolutions as inefficient and probably temporary aberrations in the course of socioeconomic development. An ideologically committed vanguard may rise to central-state power—and perhaps stay there—through the mobilization and manipulation of grass roots political organizations such as militias, workplace councils, or neighborhood surveillance committees. From the perspective of modernization theorists, however, this kind of revolutionary political mobilization—known either as "the terror" or as totalitarianism, depending on whether it is a phase or an institutionalized outcome in any given revolution—is both morally reprehensible and technically inefficient for dealing with the practical tasks that modern governments must face.

Converging on what might be called a realist perspective, analysts like Huntington and myself have reached different conclusions about the political accomplishments of revolutions. In the realist view, a special sort of democratization—understood not as an extension of political liberalism

[4] This characterization comes from Alvin Gouldner, "Stalinism: A Study of Internal Colonialism," in *Political Power and Social Theory* (research annual edited by Maurice Zeitlin) 1 (1980) (Greenwich, CT: JAI Press), 209-59.

[5] Eisenstadt, *Revolution and the Transformation of Societies* (New York: Free Press, 1978); Walzer, "A Theory of Revolution," *Marxist Perspectives*, No. 5 (Spring 1979), 30-44.

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or the realization of democratic socialism, but as an enhancement of popular involvement in national political life—*accompanies* the revolutionary strengthening of centralized national states directed by authoritarian executives or political parties.

Briefly put, this happens because during revolutionary interregnums competition among elites for coercive and authoritative control spurs certain leadership groups to mobilize previously politically excluded popular forces by means of both material and ideological incentives. Popular participation is especially sought in the forging of organizations that can be used to subdue less "radical" contenders. New state organizations—armies, administrations, committees of surveillance, and so forth—are at once authoritarian and unprecedentedly mass-mobilizing. In some revolutions, especially those involving prolonged guerrilla wars, this process works itself out prior to the formal seizure of national-state power; in others, especially those in which inter-elite struggles are fought out in urban street battles, it tends to occur during and after that seizure. Either way, the logic of state-building through which social revolutions are successfully accomplished promotes both authoritarianism and popular mobilization.

In the realist view, moreover, the strengthened political and state orders that emerge from social-revolutionary transformations may perform some kinds of tasks very effectively—certainly more effectively than did the old regimes they displaced. But which tasks? Perhaps because we have argued with the modernization and Marxian theorists, Huntington and I tend to explore the accomplishments of revolutionary regimes in such areas as maintaining political order during the course of socioeconomic transformation, enforcing individual or collective property rights, and promoting state-led industrialization. Yet I would argue that the task which revolutionized regimes in the modern world have performed best is the mobilization of citizen support across class lines for protracted international warfare.

There is a straightforward reason why this should be true: the types of organizations formed and the political ties forged between revolutionary vanguards and supporters (in the course of defeating other elites and consolidating the new regime's state controls) can readily be converted to the tasks of mobilizing resources, including dedicated officers and soldiers, for international warfare. Guerrilla armies and their support systems are an obvious case in point. So are urban militias and committees of surveillance, which seem to have served as splendid agencies for military recruitment from the French Revolution to the Iranian. Moreover, if revolutionary leaders can find ways to link a war against foreigners to

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domestic power struggles, they may be able to tap into broad nationalist feelings—as well as exploit class and political divisions—in order to motivate supporters to fight and die on behalf of the new regime. Talented members of families that supported the old regime can often be recruited to the revolutionary-nationalist cause, along with enthusiasts from among those who had previously been excluded from national politics.

Whether we in the liberal-democratic West like to acknowledge it or not, the authoritarian regimes brought to power through revolutionary transformations—from the French Revolution of the late 18th century to the Iranian Revolution of the present—have been democratizing in the mass-mobilizing sense. The best evidence of this has been the enhanced ability of such revolutionized regimes to conduct humanly costly wars with a special fusion of popular zeal, meritocratic professionalism, and central coordination. Whatever the capacities of revolutionary regimes to cope with tasks of economic development (and the historical record suggests that those capacities are questionable), they seem to excel at motivating their populations to make supreme sacrifices for the nation in war. That is no mean accomplishment in view of the fact that the prerevolutionary polities in question excluded most of the people from symbolic or practical participation in national politics.

In the remainder of this brief essay, I will illustrate the plausibility of these arguments by surveying two groups of social revolutions in modern world history. First, I will examine the classic social revolutions that transformed the imperial-monarchical states of Bourbon France, Romanov Russia, and Manchu China, probing their accomplishments in relation to the expectations of the liberal, Marxian, and realist perspectives just outlined. Then I will discuss a number of the nation-building social revolutions that have transformed postcolonial and neocolonial countries in the 20th century. I shall pay special attention to the ways in which the geopolitical contexts of particular revolutions have facilitated or discouraged the channeling of popular political participation into defensive and aggressive wars. Whether "communist" or not, I argue, revolutionary elites have been able to build the strongest states in those countries whose geopolitical circumstances allowed or required the emerging new regimes to become engaged in protracted and labor-intensive international warfare.

Can one make rigorous statements about the geopolitical circumstances that affect revolutions in progress, and that are in turn affected by them? Revolutionary outbreaks do seem to make wars more likely because domestic conflicts tend to spill over to involve foreign partners, and because revolutions create perceived threats and opportunities for other

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states. Beyond this, however, no glib generalizations are possible; for example, more sweeping revolutions do not automatically generate greater wars or stronger efforts at foreign intervention. As we are about to see, the geopolitical contexts of social revolutions in the modern world have varied greatly; so have the intersections of domestic state-building struggles with international threats or conflicts. At this point in the development of knowledge about these matters, the best way to proceed is through exploratory analyses and comparisons of a wide range of historical cases.

Social Revolutions and War-Making in France, Russia, and China

The word "revolution" did not take on its modern connotation of a fundamental sociopolitical change accompanied by violent upheavals from below until the French Revolution of the late 18th century.[6] This etymological fact appropriately signals the reality that the French Revolution (unlike the English, Dutch, and American) was a *social* revolution, in which class-based revolts from below, especially peasant revolts against landlords, propelled sudden transformations in the class structure along with permanently centralizing changes in the structures of state power. In *States and Social Revolutions*, I group the French Revolution for comparative analysis with the Russian Revolution from 1917 to the 1930s and with the Chinese Revolution from 1911 to the 1960s. The French Revolution, I argue, was neither primarily "bourgeois" in the Marxist sense nor "liberal" in the modernization sense. Nor was the Russian Revolution "proletarian" in the Marxist sense. Rather, the French, Russian, and Chinese revolutions, despite important variations, displayed striking similarities of context, cause, process, and outcomes.

All three classic social revolutions occurred in large, previously independent, predominantly agrarian monarchical states that found themselves pressured militarily by economically more developed competitors on the international scene. Social revolutions were sufficiently caused when (a) the centralized, semi-bureaucratic administrative and military organizations of the old regimes disintegrated due to combinations of international pressures and disputes between monarchs and landed commercial upper classes, and (b) widespread peasant revolts took place against landlords. After more or less protracted struggles by political forces trying to consolidate new state organizations, all three revolutions

[6] Karl Griewank, "The Emergence of the Concept of Revolution," in Bruce Mazlish, Arthur D. Kaledin, and David B. Ralston, eds., *Revolution: A Reader* (New York: Macmillan, 1971), 13-17.

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resulted in more centralized and mass-mobilizing national states, more powerful in relation to all domestic social groups, and also more powerful than the prerevolutionary regimes had been in relation to foreign competitors. In particular, all three social revolutions markedly raised their nations' capacities to wage humanly costly wars.[7]

The differences in the outcomes and accomplishments of the French, Russian, and Chinese revolutions are not well explained by referring, as a Marxist analyst would do, to the greater role of bourgeois class forces in the French case or to the unique contributions of proletarian revolts to the urban struggles of 1917 in Russia. Nor can one explain the different outcomes, as the modernization theorists do, by suggesting that the milder, less violent, and less thoroughgoing the revolutionary conflicts and changes, and the briefer the rule of an ideological vanguard, the more efficient and liberal-democratic the revolutionary outcome. None of these revolutions had a liberal-democratic outcome, and none of them resulted in a socialist democracy. Instead, the differences in the essentially mass-mobilizing and authoritarian outcomes and accomplishments of the French, Russian, and Chinese revolutions are in large part attributable to the international geopolitical contexts in which the conflicts of these revolutions played themselves out. They are also attributable to the political relationships established, during and immediately after the revolutionary interregnums, between state-building leaderships and rebellious lower classes. One feature that these three social revolutions have in common is that all of them enhanced national capacities to wage humanly costly foreign wars.

The French Revolution has typically been characterized as a modernizing liberal-democratic revolution or as a bourgeois, capitalist revolution. In terms of economics, it is difficult if not impossible to show that the French Revolution was necessary for the "economic modernization" or "capitalist development" of France: the absolutist old regime had been facilitating commercialization and petty industry just as much as post-revolutionary regimes did.[8] Politically, moreover, analysts tend to forget that the end result of the French Revolution was not any form of liberalism, but Napoleon's nationalist dictatorship, which left the enduring legacy of a highly centralized and bureaucratic French state with a recurrent tendency to seek national glory through military exploits.

[7] Thorough elaboration and documentation of this conclusion appears in Jonathan R. Adelman, *Revolution, Armies, and War: A Political History* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1985), chaps. 3-11.

[8] For fuller discussion and references, see Skocpol (fn. 3), 174-77.

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The political phases of the French Revolution from 1789 through 1800 certainly included attempts to institutionalize civil liberties and electoral democracy, as well as the important legalization of undivided private property rights for peasants and bourgeois alike. Moreover, the fact that the French Revolution created a private-propertied society rather than a party-state that aspired to manage the national economy directly left open space for the eventual emergence of liberal-democratic political arrangements in France. At the time of the Revolution itself, however, democratization was more emphatically and enduringly furthered through "careers open to talent" in the military officer corps, through mass military conscription, and through the more efficient pressing of the state's fiscal demands on all citizens.

From a European continental perspective, the most striking and consequential accomplishment of the French Revolution was its ability to launch highly mobile armies of motivated citizen-soldiers, coordinated with enhanced deployment of artillery forces. The Jacobins from 1792 to 1794 began the process of amalgamating political commissioners and *sans-culotte* militias with the remnants of the royal standing armies.[9] Even though they did not find a way to stabilize their "Republic of Virtue," the Montagnard Jacobins fended off the most pressing domestic and international counterrevolutionary threats. Yet their fall was not the end of military mass-mobilization in France. Napoleon consolidated a conservative bureaucratic regime and came to terms with private property holders (including the peasant smallholders) and with the Church (including the local priests so influential with the peasantry). Then he expanded the process of French military mobilization, deploying citizen armies of an unprecedented size and a capacity for rapid maneuver.[10] The enhanced popular political participation and the messianic sense of French nationalism and democratic mission unleashed by the Revolution were thus directed outward. Before their eventual exhaustion in the unconquerable vastness of Russia, French citizen armies redrew the political map of modern Europe in irreversible ways and inspired the emergence of other European nationalisms in response.

Russia and China both experienced thoroughgoing social revolutionary transformations that resulted in the rule of communist-directed

[9] S. F. Scott, "The Regeneration of the Line Army During the French Revolution," *Journal of Modern History* 42 (September 1970), 307-30.

[10] Adelman (fn. 7), chap. 3; Theodore Ropp, *War in the Modern World*, rev. ed. (New York: Collier Books, 1962), chap. 4; Alfred Vagts, *A History of Militarism*, rev. ed. (New York: Free Press, 1959), chap. 4; John Ellis, *Armies in Revolution* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974), chap. 4.

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party-states. These social revolutions occurred under Leninist party leaderships in the modern industrial era, when the model of a state-managed economy was available; and both occurred in countries more hard-pressed geopolitically than late 18th-century France had been. The authoritarian and mass-mobilizing energies of the immediate postrevolutionary regimes, both in Soviet Russia and Communist China, were mainly directed not to *imperial* military conquests as in France, but to the promotion of national economic development, which was deemed to be the key to national independence in a world dominated by major industrial powers. Even so, in due course both of the new regimes demonstrated greatly enhanced capacities (compared to the prerevolutionary era) for successfully waging international war.

From the modernization perspective, the Russian and the Chinese revolutions were tyrannical and antidemocratic: they were more violent and transformative than the French Revolution, and ideological vanguards stayed in power both in Russia and in China. (By contrast, the Montagnard perpetrators of the Terror fell from power in France.) The Soviet regime, however, through the Stalinist "revolution from above," became more coercive and inegalitarian than did the Chinese Communist regime after 1949. Modernization theory cannot explain the contrasts between the Russian and Chinese new regimes. The civil war interregnum of the Chinese Revolution, stretching from 1911 to 1949, was much more protracted than the brief Russian revolutionary civil war of 1917-1921; and in practice, the Soviet regime probably built directly upon more structures and policies from Russia's tsarist past than the Chinese Communist regime did on China's Confucian-imperial past. Nor do the contrasting revolutionary outcomes make sense from a Marxian perspective: the Russian Revolution was politically based on the urban industrial proletariat, and thus should have resulted in practices closer to socialist ideals than the peasant-based Chinese Revolution.

The somewhat less murderous and less authoritarian features of the Chinese Communist state after 1949—at least from the point of view of local peasant communities—can be attributed to the guerrilla mode by which the Chinese Communist Party came to power. The party could not achieve national state power directly in the cities; instead, it found itself faced with the necessity of waging rural guerrilla warfare against both the Japanese invaders and its Kuomintang competitors for domestic political control. Nationalist appeals helped the Chinese communists in the early 1940s to attract educated middle-class citizens to their cause. Attention to the pressing material and self-defense needs of the peasantry in North China also allowed the communists to gain sufficient access to the

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villages to reorganize poor and middle-class peasants into associations that would support the Red Armies economically and militarily.[11]

After 1949, the Chinese communists were able, by building upon their preexisting political relations with much of the peasantry, to carry out agricultural collectivization with less brutality than the Bolsheviks.[12] Simultaneously, the relatively favorable geopolitical context of postrevolutionary China, situated in a world of nuclear superpower balance between the Soviet Union and the United States, allowed the Chinese communists to place less emphasis upon creating a heavy industrial capacity for mechanized military forces than they might otherwise have done. Their limited resources sufficed, however, to establish an independent Chinese nuclear capacity, symbol of major-power status in the post-World War II era.[13]

Communist China was able to pursue economic development policies that stressed light industries and rural development as well as some heavy industries. Meanwhile, the party could also infuse peasant-based, guerrilla-style military practices inherited from the revolutionary civil war into standing forces that could intervene effectively in the Korean War and make limited forays against India and Vietnam. As Jonathan Adelman has argued, performance of the People's Liberation Army in the Korean War battles of 1950-51 was "simply outstanding" compared to the "disastrous" Kuomintang military performance against the Japanese in the 1930s and 1940s.[14] The Revolution, Adelman concludes, had "created a whole new Chinese army."[15]

By contrast, the Soviet regime consolidated under Stalin's auspices took a much more brutal stance toward the peasant majority. Essentially, it substituted an autocratic dictatorship for a mass-mobilizing revolutionary regime. The Bolsheviks originally claimed state power in 1917 through political and very limited military maneuverings in the cities and towns of Russia, and they initially abstained from efforts at nationalist military mobilization. Most of the Russian populace acquiesced in their rule simply because of the exhaustion brought by Imperial Russia's defeat in World War I. The Russian revolutionary civil war of 1917 to 1921 was

[11] Mark Selden, *The Yenan Way in Revolutionary China* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971); Ellis (fn. 10), chap. 4.

[12] Thomas P. Bernstein, "Leadership and Mass Mobilisation in the Soviet and Chinese Collectivisation Campaigns of 1929-30 and 1955-56: A Comparison," *China Quarterly* 31 (July-September 1967), 1-47. Bernstein characterizes Chinese collectivization techniques as "persuasive" in contrast to the more "coercive" Soviet practices. Subsequent to collectivization, however, the Chinese "Great Leap Forward" did devolve into considerable coercion by cadres against peasants.

[13] Franz Schurmann, *The Logic of World Power* (New York: Pantheon, 1974), part II.

[14] Adelman (fn. 7), 139. [15] *Ibid.*, 144.

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won by the deployment of urban guards and conventionally structured standing armies. Peasants were involved only as reluctantly coerced conscripts.[16] The one major foreign adventure of the fledgling Bolshevik regime, the invasion of Poland in 1920, ended in military defeat. In fact, the new Russian regime was fortunate that World War I had defeated or exhausted its major foreign opponents. For new-born Soviet Russia did not conform to the pattern of most other social revolutions: its central authorities were not in a good position to channel mass political participation into international warfare. Instead, they turned toward deepening internal warfare—against the peasantry and among elites.

After 1921, the Bolshevik regime lacked organized political ties to the peasant villages, which had made their own autonomous local revolutions against landlords in 1917 and 1918. Stalin rose to power in the 1920s and 1930s by convincing many cadres in the Soviet party-state that Russian "socialism" would have to be built "in one country" that was isolated and threatened economically and militarily by Western industrial powers. The crash program of heavy industrialization was alleged to be necessary not only to build Marxian socialism, but also to prepare Russia for land-based military warfare. The peasantry became a domestic obstacle to Stalinist policies when it refused to provide economic surpluses at exploitative rates. Stalin's subsequent bureaucratic and terroristic drive to force peasant communities into centrally controlled agricultural collectives succeeded only at a terrible cost in human lives and agricultural productivity; the political reverberations in urban and official Russia helped to spur his purges of the Soviet elite in the 1930s. The Stalinist consolidation of the new regime was thus initially a product of conflicts between an urban-based party-state and the peasantry, played out in a geopolitically threatening environment—though *not* in an environment in which direct national mobilization for international war was either necessary or possible.[17]

It is significant that Stalinism evolved into a *popular* mass-mobilizing regime as a result of the travails of World War II.[18] When the invading Nazis conducted themselves with great brutality against the Slav populations they conquered, Stalinist Russia finally had to mobilize for a total international war. Despite the setbacks of the first few months, the Soviet

[16] Ellis (fn. 10), chap. 5.

[17] Background for this analysis of Stalin's "revolution from above" comes especially from Bernstein (fn. 12); Stephen F. Cohen, *Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution* (New York: Knopf, 1973); and Moshe Lewin, *Russian Peasants and Soviet Power*, trans. Irene Nove (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1968).

[18] An insightful discussion of the different phases of nationalist mobilization in Russia and China appears in William G. Rosenberg and Marilyn Young, *Transforming Russia and China: Revolutionary Struggle in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982).

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Union met the military challenges of World War II much more effectively than tsarist Russia had met the exigencies of World War I.[19] The Soviet people and armed forces fought back with considerable efficiency and amazing zeal in the face of terrible casualties. For the first time since 1917, Soviet rulers were able to use Russian nationalism to bolster their leadership. Stalin did not hesitate to revive many symbols of Russian national identity from prerevolutionary times, and he also restored prerogatives of rank and expertise in the military.[20] It is therefore not surprising that, when World War II ended in victory for the U.S.S.R. and the Allies, the Soviet rulers' domestic legitimacy—as well as the country's global great-power status—had been enhanced significantly.

Social Revolutions in Dependent Countries: Geopolitical Contexts and the Possibilities for Militarization

In the classic social revolutions of France, Russia, and China, long-established monarchical states were transformed into mass-mobilizing national regimes; most other social revolutions in the modern era, however, have occurred in smaller, dependent countries.[21] In some, such as Vietnam and the Portuguese colonies of Africa, which had been colonized by foreign imperial powers, social-revolutionary transformations were part of the process of national liberation from colonialism. In others, such as Cuba, Mexico, Iran, and Nicaragua, neopatrimonial dictatorships were caught in webs of great-power rivalries within the capitalist world economy and the global geopolitical system. Social revolutions in these countries have forged stronger states that are markedly more nationalist and mass-incorporating than the previous regimes and other countries in their respective regions. Still, the new regimes have remained minor powers on the world scene.

With the exception of the Iranian Revolution of 1977-1979, which was primarily carried out through urban demonstrations and strikes, all third-world social revolutions have depended on at least a modicum of peasant support for their success. In most instances, both peasants and city dwellers were mobilized for guerrilla warfare by nationalist revolutionary elites; only in the Mexican and Bolivian revolutions were peasant

[19] Adelman (fn. 7), chaps. 4-7.

[20] Alf Edeen, "The Civil Service: Its Composition and Status," in Cyril E. Black, ed., *The Transformation of Russian Society* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), 274-91; see esp. 286-87.

[21] For useful overviews, see Eric R. Wolf, *Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century* (New York: Harper & Row, 1969), chaps. 1, 4-6; John Dunn, *Modern Revolutions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), chaps. 2, 4-8.

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communities able to rebel on their own as did the French and Russian peasant communities.[22] Most third-world social revolutions have been played out as military struggles among leaderships contending to create or redefine the missions of national states. And these revolutions have happened in settings so penetrated by foreign influences—economic, military, and cultural—that social-revolutionary transformations have been as much about the definition of autonomous identities on the international scene as they have been about the forging of new political ties between indigenous revolutionaries and their mass constituents.

Consequently, the various international contexts in which third-world revolutions have occurred become crucial in conditioning the new regimes that have emerged from them. One basic aspect of the international situation is the relationship between a country undergoing revolution and the great powers, whatever they may be in a given phase of world history. Military, economic, and cultural aspects of such relations all need to be considered in our analysis. The regional context of each revolution also matters: What have been the possibilities for military conflicts with immediate neighbors? Have revolutionized third-world nations faced invasions by third-world neighbors, or have they been able to invade their neighbors without automatically involving great powers in the conflict? As I will illustrate in the remainder of this section, attention to international contexts can help us to explain at least as much about the structures and orientations of social-revolutionary new regimes in the third world as analyses of their class basis or propositions about the inherent logic of modernization and the violence and disruptiveness of various revolutions.

Social Revolutions in the Shadow of a Great Power

A great power can use actual or threatenend military intervention to prevent revolutionary transformations near its borders, as the Soviet Union has done in postwar Eastern Europe and as the United States used to do in Central America. Short of that, major political transformations of any kind that proceed in a great power's sphere of military dominance are invariably profoundly influenced by possibilities for rebellion or accommodation. Throughout the 20th century, social revolutions in Central and Latin America, if they happened at all, have been affected by the actions and inactions of the United States as the hegemonic power in the hemisphere. These revolutions have also been affected by the global

[22] Alternative modes of peasant involvement in social revolutions are analyzed in Theda Skocpol, "What Makes Peasants Revolutionary?" *Comparative Politics* 14 (April 1982), 351-75.

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power balances of their day. The cases of Mexico, Cuba, Bolivia, and the still-unfolding revolution in Nicaragua suggest a number of ways in which the great powers have influenced the shape of the new regimes that emerged from social-revolutionary interregnums.

In one sense, the most "benign" example of U.S. influence is demonstrated in relation to Mexico: the social revolution there was originally allowed to proceed, and was eventually consolidated into a regime that is a unique hybrid between a Western-style electoral democracy and a single-party authoritarian regime.[23] Still, we should note that unlike most other social-revolutionary regimes in the modern world, that of Mexico has never been able to engage in mass mobilization for international warfare. Nationalist self-assertion has been restricted to state-led economic development, particularly in periods such as the 1930s and 1940s, when the United States was distracted by larger domestic or world crises. Popular political participation has been managed by a corporatist, patronage-oriented party-state that preserves order in economically inefficient ways.

Originally, the anti-imperialist thrust of the Mexican Revolution was directed primarily against the European powers that were heavily involved in the economic and military affairs of the prerevolutionary regime of Porfirio Díaz; yet relations with the United States increasingly figured in successive phases of the revolution.[24] The Mexican Revolution could not have broken out at all in 1910-1911 had not the northern forces opposed to Porfirio Díaz been able to move back and forth across the U.S. border, counting on tacit American support in an era when the European great powers were the prime targets of Mexican nationalists. In addition, if the United States had been able and willing to launch sustained anti-revolutionary interventions, the Revolution could not have continued after the defeats of Francisco Madero and General Victoriano Huerta made it potentially socially radical. Some scattered U.S. interventions were launched, but they were so minor that their only consequence was to provoke Mexican resentment. World War I and the presidency of Woodrow Wilson brought these American counterrevolutionary efforts to an end and gave the Mexicans space to begin the process of consolidat-

[23] Huntington (fn. 2), 315-24, discusses the postrevolutionary Mexican regime. See also Nora Hamilton, *The Limits of State Autonomy: Post-Revolutionary Mexico* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), and Roger D. Hansen, *The Politics of Mexican Development* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971).

[24] On the Mexican Revolution and its relations with foreign states, see Wolf (fn. 21), chap. 1; Dunn (fn. 21), chap. 2; Friedrich Katz, *The Secret War in Mexico: Europe, the United States, and the Mexican Revolution* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981); Walter Goldfrank, "World System, State Structure, and the Onset of the Mexican Revolution," *Politics and Society* 5 (No. 4, 1975), 417-39; and John Womack, Jr., *Zapata and the Mexican Revolution* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969).

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ing a new regime under populist and nationalist auspices. During the 1930s and World War II, U.S. abstention from unusual levels of meddling in Mexican affairs was again important in allowing Lazaro Cárdenas to complete construction of a populist, single-party "democracy" with sufficient nationalist clout to expropriate U.S. oil companies.[25]

Due to the basic geopolitical context, there was never any question of a new regime devoted to mass mobilization for military purposes at any point during the Mexican Revolution. Full-scale war with the United States would obviously have been fatal to any revolutionary leadership, and attempts to export revolution to the south would probably have provoked the ire of the northern colossus. Given some breathing space by the United States, Mexican revolutionary nationalists chose instead to ritualize mass mobilization into the subordinate incorporation of peasant communes and workers' unions into the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party. They produced what is perhaps the most nonmartial nationalist regime ever to emerge from a social-revolutionary transformation in the modern world. They also produced a patronage-oriented party-state that has become steadily more economically inefficient over the years, requiring a constant flow of graft to buy off elite factions and to co-opt popular leaders.[26]

The other major social revolution right on America's doorstep, the Cuban Revolution of 1959, culminated in a new regime remarkably adept at mobilizing human resources for military adventures across the globe. The failure of the United States to prevent or overthrow Fidel Castro's triumph over the Batista dictatorship helped to account for this outcome. But the global superpower rivalry of the United States and the Soviet Union was also a crucial ingredient, for Soviet willingness to protect and bankroll the new regime gave Cuban "anti-imperialists" a leverage against the United States that would have been unimaginable to the earlier Mexican revolutionaries.

Once established in power, Castro could assert Cuban national autonomy against the overwhelming U.S. economic and cultural presence. Having done so, he could then protect his rule from U.S.-sponsored overthrow only by allying himself domestically with the Cuban Communist Party and internationally with the Soviet Union. Subsequently, Cuba has become economically and militarily so dependent on Moscow that it finds itself serving Soviet interests throughout the third world.[27] Cubans are

[25] Hamilton (fn. 23), chaps. 4-7.

[26] Hansen (fn. 23); Susan Eckstein, *The Poverty of Revolution: The State and the Urban Poor in Mexico* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977).

[27] Kosmos Tsokhas, "The Political Economy of Cuban Dependence on the Soviet Union," *Theory and Society* 9 (March 1980), 319-62.

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trained and mobilized for foreign service both as military advisors and as educated civilian technicians, which is a way in which Castro can partially repay the Soviets. In addition, it is an opportunity for a small, dependent revolutionary nation to create enhanced mobility for trained citizens.[28] It also allows Cuba to exert considerable military and ideological influence on the world scene—an amazing feat for such a tiny country located only ninety miles from a hostile superpower.

The weakest and poorest southern neighbors of the United States to experience social revolutions have been Bolivia in 1952-1964 and Nicaragua since 1979. These two cases demonstrate opposite effects of U.S. determination to counter radical change in contexts where the Soviet Union could not or would not do as much as it did for Castro's Cuba.

In Bolivia, spontaneous popular revolts by peasant communities and tin miners initially expropriated major owners, both domestic and foreign, and threatened to create a nationalist new regime that was not under the influence of the United States.[29] After international tin prices collapsed, however, the new Bolivian authorities accepted international aid, including help from the United States, to rebuild a professional military apparatus. In due course, the refurbished military took over, establishing Bolivian governments which, while not attempting to reverse the peasant land expropriations of 1952, have followed both domestic-economic and foreign policies that are amenable to American interests. In essence, the United States used a combination of benign neglect and cleverly targeted foreign aid to deradicalize the Bolivian Revolution. A number of circumstances facilitated American containment policies. Bolivian revolutionaries in 1952 had no foreign wars to fight, and popular radicalism (led by Trotskyist cadres) remained focused on internal class struggles. What is more, Bolivian revolutionaries were not reacting to—or capitalizing upon—a bitter prior history of direct Yankee military interventions, which was the case in Cuba and Nicaragua.

In Nicaragua as in Cuba, U.S. authorities initially acquiesced in the overthrow of a corrupt and domestically weakened patrimonial dictator even though he had originally been installed under U.S. sponsorship. Then, again as in Cuba, a dialectic got underway between a revolutionary radicalization couched in anti-American rhetoric and increasing efforts

[28] Susan Eckstein, "Structural and Ideological Bases of Cuba's Overseas Programs," *Politics and Society* 11 (No. 1, 1982), 95-121.

[29] My account of the Bolivian case draws upon Huntington (fn. 2), 325-34; Robert J. Alexander, *The Bolivian National Revolution* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1958); Bert Useem, "The Bolivian Revolution and Workers' Control," *Politics and Society* 9 (No. 4, 1980), 447-69; and Jonathan Kelley and Lawrence Klein, *Revolution and the Rebirth of Inequality* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1981).

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by U.S. authorities to roll back or overthrow the revolution.[30] American counterrevolutionary efforts became more determined and sustained after Ronald Reagan was elected President in 1980. At first, they seemed to make some headway when economic shortages and domestic unrest in the face of an unpopular military draft tended to undercut the Sandinistas' legitimacy as leaders of a popular guerrilla movement against the Somoza regime. Because of domestic political constraints, however, the United States has been unable to invade Sandinista Nicaragua, having to rely instead on economic pressures and the financing of Nicaraguan counterrevolutionary fighters; but the latter have proved to be neither militarily efficient nor politically adept.

Predictably—in the light of the history of foreign efforts to subvert emerging revolutionary regimes in such ways—these U.S. measures have simply provided the Sandinistas with excuses for economic shortages. More importantly, the U.S. efforts have nourished sustained but not overwhelming counterrevolutionary military threats, which have actually helped the Sandinistas to consolidate a mass-mobilizing authoritarian regime through nationalist appeals and an unprecedented military buildup. In short, U.S. policies since 1980, declaredly aimed at "democratizing" Nicaragua, have had the opposite effect; they have undermined elements of pluralism in a postrevolutionary regime and enhanced the nationalist credentials of the more authoritarian Nicaraguan Leninists. Still, as of this writing in 1987, it remains possible that shifts in American policy may stop this process of militarization short of full-scale war in Central America.

Militarized Third-World Revolutions under Communism and Islam

Far removed from the areas of the New World that are close to the United States, the Vietnamese and Iranian revolutions are two instances in which great-power rivalries, along with geographical distance, have made it possible for revolutionary regimes to take a stand against "American imperialism" without being overthrown by U.S. military intervention. What is more, Vietnam and Iran in the mid-20th century, like France in the late 18th, are examples of the awesome power of social-revolutionary regimes to wage humanly costly wars and to transform regional political patterns and international balances of power. Both revo-

[30] My account of Nicaragua draws upon Walter LaFeber, *Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1983); Shirley Christian, *Nicaragua: Revolution in the Family* (New York: Vintage Books, 1986); and Lawrence Shaefer, "Nicaraguan-United States Bilateral Relations: The Problems within Revolution and Reconstruction" (Senior honors thesis, University of Chicago, 1984).

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lutions demonstrate this, even though one is a "communist" revolution and the other "Islamic" and thus militantly anticommunist.

Analysts of agrarian class struggles have stressed that the Vietnamese Revolution was grounded in peasant support in both the northern and southern parts of the country.[31] But attempts to explain the overall logic of this revolution in terms of the social conditions of either the northern or the southern peasantry have inevitably missed the other main ingredient in the revolution's success. From the French colonial period on, educated Vietnamese found the Communist Party of Vietnam and the various movements associated with it to be the most effective and persistent instruments of resistance to foreign domination—first by the French colonialists, then by the Japanese occupiers during World War II, then by the returning French, and finally by the United States. The Vietnamese communists were their country's most uncompromising nationalists; they were willing, when conditions required or allowed, to wage guerrilla warfare through peasant mobilization.[32] By contrast, foreign occupiers and their Vietnamese collaborators worked from the cities outward, especially in the south, which had been the center of French colonial control.

Geopolitically, the Vietnamese communists benefited from the distance the French and American forces had to traverse to confront them, from the availability of sanctuaries in Laos and Cambodia, and (after the partial victory in the north) from their ability to receive supplies through China from both China and the Soviet Union. Had the United States been able or willing to use nuclear weapons in the Southeast Asian theatre, or had the Soviet Union and China not temporarily cooperated to help the Vietnamese, it seems doubtful that the Vietnamese Revolution could have reunified the country, notwithstanding the extraordinary willingness of northern and many southern Vietnamese to die fighting the U.S. forces.

Since the defeat of the United States in southern Vietnam, the Hanoi regime has faced difficult economic conditions; it seems to tackle such problems with much less efficiency and zeal than it tackled the anti-imperialist wars from the 1940s to the 1970s. As the unquestionably dominant military power in its region, the Vietnamese state has invaded and occupied Cambodia and engaged in occasional battles with a now-hostile China. Vietnam continues to rely on Soviet help to counterbalance U.S.

[31] See, for instance, Wolf (fn. 21), chap. 4. For a discussion of alternative perspectives on the Vietnamese peasantry, see Skocpol (fn. 22).

[32] Dunn (fn. 21), chap. 5; Huynh Kim Khanh, *Vietnamese Communism, 1925-1945* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1982); John T. McAlister, Jr., *Vietnam: The Origins of Revolution* (New York: Knopf, 1969).

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hostility and the armed power of China. But, what is perhaps more important now that Vietnam is indeed "the Prussia of Southeast Asia," the Vietnamese communists still find it possible to legitimate their leadership through never-ending mobilization of their people for national military efforts. The Chinese threat, Cambodian resistance, and American opposition to the normalization of Vietnam's gains have provided just the kind of internationally threatening context that the Vietnamese communists, after so many years of warfare, find most congenial to their domestic political style.

The militant Shi'a clerics of Iran, who seem to be so different from the Vietnamese communists, are another mass-mobilizing and state-building revolutionary elite that has been helped immensely by a facilitating geopolitical context and protracted international warfare.[33] The Iranian Revolution is still in progress, and it is therefore too early to characterize its outcome in any definitive way. Nevertheless, the process of this remarkable upheaval has already dramatized the appropriateness of viewing contemporary social revolutions as promoting ideologically reconstructed national identities involving the sudden incorporation of formerly excluded popular groups into state-directed projects. Moreover, this revolution shows that mass mobilization for war, aggressive as well as defensive, is an especially congenial state-directed project for revolutionary leaders.

From both Marxian and modernization perspectives, the Iranian Revolution, especially the consolidation of state power by the Ayatollah Khomeini and the Islamic Republican Party since the overthrow of the Shah in 1979, has been a puzzle. Marxist analysts have been reluctant to call this a "social revolution" because class conflicts and transformations of economic property rights have not defined the main terms of struggle or the patterns of sociopolitical change. Modernization theorists, meanwhile, have been surprised at the capacity of the untrained and traditionist Islamic clerics to consolidate their rule; these theorists expected that, after a brief "terror," such noncommunist and ideologically fanatical leaders would give way to technically trained bureaucrats if not to liberal-democratic politicians.

In fact, from 1979 through 1982, the Islamic Republican Party in Iran systematically reconstructed state organizations to embody direct controls by Shi'a clerics. Step by step, all other leading political forces—liberal

[33] The following discussion draws on Theda Skocpol, "Rentier State and Shi'a Islam in the Iranian Revolution," *Theory and Society* 11 (No. 3, 1982), 265-84. It also relies heavily on R. K. Ramazani, *Revolutionary Iran: Challenge and Response in the Middle East* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), and Shaul Bakhash, *The Reign of the Ayatollahs: Iran and the Islamic Revolution* (New York: Basic Books), 1984.

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Westernizers, the Mujhahedeen, the Tudeh Party, and technocrats and professional military officers loyal to Abolhassan Bani-Sadr—were eliminated from what had once been the all-encompassing revolutionary alliance. The party did this by deploying and combining the classic ingredients for successful revolutionary state building.

For one thing, the Islamic Republican clerics shared a commitment to a political ideology that gave them unlimited warrant to rule exclusively in the name of all the Shi'a believers. Khomeini had developed a militant-traditionalist reading of Shi'a beliefs, calling on the clerics themselves to govern in place of secular Iranian rulers corrupted by Western cultural imperialism. The Islamic Republican Constitution for Iran officially enshrined such clerical supervision over all affairs of state; concrete political organizations, including the Islamic Republican Party that dominated the Majlis (parliament), also embodied this orientation.

Moreover, the Islamic Republican clerics and their devout nonclerical associates did not hesitate to organize, mobilize, and manipulate mass popular support, including the unemployed as well as workers and lower-middle-class people in Teheran and other cities. Islamic judges supervised neighborhood surveillance bodies; Islamic militants organized revolutionary guards for police and military duties; and consumer rations and welfare benefits for the needy were dispensed through neighborhood mosques. Iranians never before involved in national political life became directly energized through such organization; those with doubts were subjected to peer controls as well as to elite supervision. With these means of mass-based power at their disposal, the Islamic Republican Party had little trouble eliminating liberal and leftist competitors from public political life.

Right after the Shah's overthrow, ideologically committed Islamic cadres, backed by mass organizations, reconstructed major public institutions in Iranian national life. Not only special committees of revolutionary justice, but also traditionally educated clerical judges took over the criminal and civil legal system, reorienting it to procedural and substantive norms in line with their understanding of the Koran. The next targets were Western-oriented cultural institutions, particularly schools and universities. These were first closed and then purged, turned into bastions of Islamic education and revolutionary propaganda. Civil state bureaucracies were similarly purged and transformed; and so, in due course, were the remnants of the Shah's military forces, particularly the army.

The kinds of transformations I have just summarized took place not automatically but through hard-fought political, bureaucratic, and street

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struggles that pitted other elites—alternative would-be consolidators of the Iranian Revolution—against the militant clerics and their supporters. As these struggles within Iran unfolded, the emerging clerical authoritarianism repeatedly benefited from international conditions and happenings that allowed them to deploy their ideological and organizational resources to maximum advantage.

Overall, the version of the Iranian Revolution that the clerics sought to institutionalize has been virulently anti-Western, and defined especially in opposition to "U.S. imperialism." Opposition to Soviet imperialism has also been a consistent theme. Fortunately for the clerics, the fiscal basis of the Iranian state after as well as before the revolution lies in the export of oil, for which an international market has continued to exist.[34] A geopolitical given is coterminous with this economic given: neither the Soviet Union nor the United States has been in a position to intervene militarily against the Iranian Revolution, in part because Iran lies between their two spheres of direct control. It is also fortunate for Iran's radical clerics that the United States has acted in ways that were symbolically provocative while not being materially or militarily powerful enough to control events in Iran. The admission of the deposed Shah to the United States, the subsequent seizure of the American embassy by pro-Khomeini youths, and the ensuing unsuccessful efforts of the U.S. authorities to free the American hostages, all created an excellent political matrix within Iran for the clerics to discredit as pro-American a whole series of their secular competitors for state power.

Then, in the autumn of 1980, the secularist-Islamic regime of Saddam Hussein in neighboring Iraq attacked revolutionary Iran; since the Iraqis perceived Khomeini's regime as weak and internally disorganized, they expected it to fall. What happened with the Jacobins in 18th-century revolutionary France then repeated itself in revolutionary Iran. At first, the foreign invaders made headway, for the remnants of the Shah's military, particularly the army, were indeed disorganized at the command level. But revolutionary Islamic guards poured out to the fronts, and the Iraqi offensives began to come up against fanatically dogged resistance. Islamic fundamentalists and Iranian secular nationalists pulled together, however grudgingly, to resist the common enemy.

Domestic Iranian power struggles have not stopped during the war with Iraq. During the final months of his attempt to survive within the Khomeini regime, President Bani-Sadr tried to use the newly essential

[34] Ramazani (fn. 33), chaps. 13-14; Shaul Bakhash, *The Politics of Oil and Revolution in Iran* (Washington, DC: Staff Paper, The Brookings Institution, 1982); and "Oil Revenue Lifts Iranian Economy," *The New York Times*, Friday, July 9, 1982, pp. D1, D4.

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regular army to build up secular-technocratic leverage against clerical rule. But he and his followers, along with many army officers, were defeated and removed. Thereafter, during 1981 and into 1982, despite setbacks in the war due to the initial lack of coordination between revolutionary guards and regular army forces, a new Islamic military loyal to the clerical regime was gradually synthesized for Iran.[35] It was able to combine regular strategic planning for battles with the use of such unconventional tactics as human waves of martyrs willing to clear Iraqi mine fields with their bodies. By early 1982, the Iranians had succeeded in driving the Iraqis out of their country; the latter have been on the defensive ever since, as the consolidated clerical regime in Iran has doggedly pursued the war in the name of its transnationalist ideological vision.

In the end, the Iranian Revolution will probably settle down into some sort of Islamic-nationalist authoritarianism that coexists, however uneasily, with its neighbors. The Iranian armies are unlikely to overrun the Middle East the way the French revolutionary armies temporarily overran much of continental Europe. Iran is still a third-world nation; on the global scene, it faces superpowers who can inhibit its wildest aspirations. Nevertheless, Iran's military accomplishments have already disproved the expectation of modernization theorists that a regime run by anti-Western Shi'a clerics would not be viable in the contemporary world. By consolidating and reconstructing state power through ideologically coordinated mass mobilization, and by directing popular zeal against a faraway superpower and channeling it into a war against a less populous neighboring state, the Islamic Republicans of Iran have proven once again that social revolutions are less about class struggles or "modernization" than about state building and the forging of newly assertive national identities in a modern world that remains culturally pluralistic even as it inexorably becomes economically more interdependent.

Conclusion

If, as Franz Borkenau argued, students of revolutions must attend to "changes in the state order," much remains to be understood about the kinds of political transformation that revolutions have accomplished and the activities to which their enhanced state capacities have been directed with varying degrees of success. In this essay, which is suggestive rather than conclusive, I have speculated that many social-revolutionary regimes have excelled at channeling enhanced popular participation into pro-

[35] Ramazani (fn. 33), chap. 5; William F. Hickman, *Ravaged and Reborn: The Iranian Army, 1982* (Washington, DC: Staff Paper, The Brookings Institution, 1982).

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tracted international warfare. Because of the ways revolutionary leaders mobilize popular support in the course of struggles for state power, the emerging regimes can tackle mobilization for war better than any other task, including the promotion of national economic development. The full realization of this revolutionary potential for building strong states depends on threatening but not overwhelming geopolitical circumstances.

The full exploration of these notions will require more precise theorizing and more systematic comparative research, going well beyond the historical illustrations offered here. Yet further investigations of war-making as a proclivity of social-revolutionary regimes could hardly be more timely. The image of teen-age Iranians blowing themselves up on Iraqi land mines as a way to heaven should remind us that the passions of 16th- to 18th-century Europe have yet to play themselves out fully in the third world of the 20th century. These passions will not often embody themselves in social-revolutionary transformations, but when they do—and when geopolitical circumstances unleash international conflicts and do not proscribe the outbreak of war—we can expect aspirations for equality and dignity, both within nations and on the international stage, to flow again and again into military mass mobilization. Arguably, this is the mission that revolutionized regimes perform best. In the face of serious (but not overwhelming) foreign threats, they excel at motivating the formerly excluded to die for the glory of their national states.

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SCIENCE AND SOVIETOLOGY: Bridging the Methods Gap in Soviet Foreign Policy Studies

By JACK SNYDER*

EVERYONE is in favor of greater scholarly rigor, but people define rigor in seemingly antithetical ways. Two methodological cultures, positivism and holism, coexist uneasily in the social sciences. For "logical positivists," rigor means deducing an "if, then" hypothesis from a general theory, and testing whether the predicted relationship holds true over a set of cases in which the influence of extraneous factors is held constant. Holism is more eclectic in its methods; for most holists, rigor means reconstructing the meaning of an action in the subject's own terms, and interpreting it in light of a richly detailed cultural, social, and historical context. Thus, positivists usually seek objective causes; holists typically explain behavior through the prism of the actor's subjective understanding. Positivists trace patterns across many cases, setting context aside by holding it constant; holists trace patterns within cases, exploring connections between context and action.[1]

Underlying these different approaches to scholarly method are different assumptions about the nature of reality. Holists see a world of great complexity and interrelatedness. In any situation, many independent elements interact in complex ways to shape the ideas and actions of actors. Artificial attempts to focus on some small number of factors and relationships, which could be compared across cases, only hinder understanding.

* The present article is based on a report prepared for the Subcommittee on Soviet Foreign Policy of the Joint Committee on Soviet Studies of the Social Science Research Council and the American Council of Learned Societies; the views expressed do not necessarily reflect the views of the subcommittee or its members. Douglas Blum, Richard Herrmann, Theodore Hopf, Robert Jervis, Friedrich Kratochwil, Robert Legvold, Cynthia Roberts, and Marshall Shulman have offered helpful suggestions and criticisms.

[1] These are ideal types. Real scholars often use both approaches in varying combinations or proportions. For example, some positivist scholars, like Kenneth Waltz, look at whole systems or, like Robert Jervis, try to explain the subjective understandings of actors. Despite these qualifications, I would contend that the above distinctions capture the most important lines of epistemological cleavage. The term "holism" is unsatisfactory, but alternatives like "traditionalism" or "non-positivism" are even more problematic. For further discussion, see Paul Diesing, *Patterns of Discovery in the Social Sciences* (New York: Aldine, 1971), and Donald Polkinghorne, *Methodology for the Human Sciences* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1983).

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Emphasis is placed on the unique aspects of each situation, not on superficial or partial similarities across situations. Consequently, theories designed to illuminate more than one case must be rich, open-ended checklists, not deductive, narrow-beam searchlights. Some holists even take the position that objective reality is so complex, diverse, and unknowable that only subjective (or "intersubjective") dialogues about reality can be profitably studied.

Positivists, on the other hand, believe that the analytical convenience of simplification is legitimate because it can be shown empirically that some factors are more important than others. Complex interactions between some important variables may occur, but everything is not inextricably related to everything else. Even "unique" situations are not considered to be *sui generis*, but rare types whose differences from other cases can be described in general terms. Moreover, when positivists look at whole systems, they assume that relationships among the parts can be explained in terms of some relatively simple and regular structural effects.

The relationship between positivism and holism is especially important for Soviet foreign policy studies. In that field, as in area studies more generally, a scholar's regionalist culture pulls him toward holism, while his disciplinary culture of political science pulls him toward positivism. In this conflict of cultural and institutional cross-pressures, it is important to find some firm intellectual ground on which methodological choices can be based.

The distance between positivism and holism is not as great as it appears. Each captures a valuable truth, and the two work best in conjunction. Positivism—and in particular its driving engine, deductive theory—poses questions in a way that clarifies arguments, facilitates testing, and directs research to ripe, important questions. Holism, on the other hand, reminds us that in the Soviet field causal generalizations that hold true 60 percent of the time are not the ultimate goal of research. Rather, such generalizations must contribute to understanding in full contextual detail the one particular case that we care most about—the present. Moreover, reconstructing the Soviets' thinking may sometimes be easier than understanding the underlying causes of their behavior, and just as valuable in guiding policy choices.

The benefits of positivism and holism can often be captured simultaneously by recasting holist interpretations in deductive, causal terms. A holist's "context" can in most cases be translated into the positivist's "causal variables." Even when holist explanations deal with ends and means rather than with causes, they can often be sharpened by expressing them in deductive terms.

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Most Sovietologists are already using a method that combines the reconstruction of Soviet thinking with a complex causal explanation of behavior. In executing this method, however, positivist rules for stating and testing causal arguments are often ignored. As a result, debates go in circles and irrelevant evidence piles up. The most urgent need in the field of Soviet foreign policy today is to reformulate research questions in terms of deductive arguments, but without sacrificing the sound holist traditions of the discipline.

In an earlier article on a similar theme, I laid out the logic of positivist testing procedures, paying only brief attention to the central role of deductive theory in the positivist approach; I was similarly brief on the compatibility of positivism and holism.[2] The present essay will focus on these more basic questions as they relate to Soviet foreign policy studies. Its sections will focus on (1) what positivism is, and the role of deductive theory in it; (2) what holism is, and its relation to positivism; (3) the shortcomings of holism; (4) the use of deductive theory to repair holism's shortcomings and, more generally, to set a research agenda for the field; (5) the shortcomings of positivism; and (6) the use of hybrid methods to repair the shortcomings of positivism. Illustrations will show the value of deductive theory in addressing some of the major questions of the field, including Soviet views on the political implications of military imbalances and the domestic sources of Soviet expansionism. These and other illustrations will be drawn from some of the best secondary works in the field.

I. Positivism

Explanation and testing in the positivist framework can be summarized in terms of five elements, the most central one being deductive theory.[3]

A. Causal Generalization

Positivists state their hypotheses in the form of "if, then" generalizations. They seek to explain individual events by identifying "if, then" generalizations, or covering laws, that match the patterns of those events. For example, a hypothesis in the literature of international politics posits that, if offense becomes easier, then international conflict will increase.[4] Thus, one explanation for the origins of the cold war could be that the

[2] Jack Snyder, "Richness, Rigor, and Relevance in the Study of Soviet Foreign Policy," *International Security* 9 (Winter 1984-85), 89-108.

[3] For elaboration and qualifications, see Snyder (fn. 2) and Diesing (fn. 1).

[4] Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," *World Politics* 30 (January 1978), 167-214.

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fluid political situation in Europe after Germany's defeat made offensive tactics advantageous, both for opportunistic and security purposes. The converse suggests that if offense becomes more difficult, then conflict will diminish. Thus, one explanation for the rise of detente in Europe is that the Berlin crisis of 1958-1961 showed it was easier to defend the status quo than to change it.

B. Operational Definitions of Variables

The terms of the hypothesis, including causes and consequences, must be clearly defined to minimize disagreements about the classification of particular cases. For example, definitions of offensive advantage and defensive advantage must be clear enough so that a researcher can decide into which category his case falls.[5]

C. Covariation

Testing must show that offensive advantage correlates with increased conflict, and that defensive advantage correlates with decreased conflict.

D. Controlled Comparison

Testing focuses on cases in which competing hypotheses make opposite predictions. For example, it might be argued that international conflict is caused not by offensive advantage but by domestic political pathologies that promote expansionism. If so, offensive advantage might be spuriously related to increased conflict, because domestically motivated expansionists work to create offensive capabilities. In order to disentangle the effects of the two putative causes, the researcher looks for cases where there is an offensive advantage but no domestic motivation to expand, and for causes where there is a defensive advantage but high domestic motivation to expand.[6]

E. Deductive Theory

Just as "if, then" generalizations at a low level of abstraction act as covering laws that explain individual events, so too generalizations at higher levels of abstraction explain the covering laws. For example, the hypothesis that offensive advantage causes conflict even among status quo powers is just one application of the more general Prisoners' Dilemma theorem in game theory.[7] According to a strictly mathematical proof, rational

[5] Jack S. Levy, "The Offensive/Defensive Balance of Military Technology: A Theoretical and Historical Analysis," *International Studies Quarterly* 28 (Summer 1984), 219-38.

[6] Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), chap. 6, illustrates how to detect spurious causal inferences.

[7] Jervis (fn. 4).

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players in a single-play Prisoners' Dilemma, by the logic of their situation, are constrained to compete even though they end up worse off than if they had cooperated. Offensive advantage increases the incentive for competitive play by magnifying the gains that arise from exploiting one-sided cooperation in a single play of the game, and by magnifying the losses that arise from being exploited. If international politics is like a Prisoners' Dilemma, and if offensive advantage makes it resemble a single-play contest, then, by logical deduction, offensive advantage should promote conflict.

Deductive theory is the predictive engine that drives the positivist method as a whole. It generates "if, then" hypotheses, which in turn generate testable predictions in specific cases. As a result, the implications of arguments are made clearer when they are expressed as theoretical deductions, and tests for them are easier to think up.

II. Holism

In a study of Soviet views on the role of military power in international politics, Robert Legvold has reiterated the main tenets of the holistic position: understanding behavior in terms of the actor's own frame of reference, and explaining it by placing it in a rich context. Thus, "the student of politics who looks only at patterns of behavior but leaves out the meanings that actors give to their own and to each other's conduct turns into a specialist of shadows."[8] Analyzing another culture's approach to strategic thought in terms of one's own theories (in this case, Thomas Schelling's ideas about the "diplomacy of violence") introduces an ethnocentric bias that hinders understanding. Moreover, "Soviet thoughts about semiabstractions, like the functioning of force in contemporary international politics, are but a fragment of the larger issue." They must be understood in the larger context of Soviet goals and fears, the broader Soviet worldview, and the international environment in which the Soviets calculate. Understanding also requires distinguishing among different contexts in which the question arises: using force, deterring the use of force, indirectly influencing diplomatic trends, and so forth.[9] Empathy and context-dependent nuances of meaning are the watchwords of this approach.

[8] Robert Legvold, "Military Power in International Politics: Soviet Doctrine on Its Centrality and Instrumentality," in Uwe Nerlich, ed., *Soviet Power and Western Negotiating Strategies* (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1983), 124, quoting Stanley Hoffmann, "Perception, Reality, and the Franco-American Conflict," *Journal of International Affairs* 21 (No. 1, 1967), 57.

[9] Legvold (fn. 8), 125, 123, and passim. I will return to Legvold's study in order to suggest how it might be recast in positivist terms.

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Though the general epistemological stance of holism is quite clearly articulated, its methodological prescriptions rarely are. In part, this reflects a conscious choice to avoid imposing *a priori* concepts and approaches, and a preference to be guided *ad hoc* by the data of the particular case. Still, Sovietologists, like anthropologists setting out to do fieldwork, like to bring along a checklist of questions to think about. These initial concepts or theories are usually designed to be flexible and nondeductive so that they adjust to fit the case rather than force it into a Procrustean bed.[10]

In the Soviet field, the clearest exposition of this method is the framework that Marshall Shulman used in his study of Stalin's foreign policy and his attempt to think through contemporary Soviet arms-control policy while he served in the Carter administration.[11] The method is roughly as follows: prepare a chart arraying the major domestic and international developments impinging on Soviet calculations; track these developments over the period to be studied, along with the development of Soviet statements and actions; and reconstruct a plausible line of Soviet reasoning that could have led to those actions, using a background knowledge of Soviet history and politics for guidance. The objective international setting and the peculiarly Soviet way of looking at it are both included.

In this style of analysis, positivist and holist elements are mixed. At one level, situational constraints and deep structural effects of history and the social system are treated like *causes*, in a basically positivist fashion. Thus, the Soviets behave a certain way "because of" the effects of these variables. However, these causal inputs are integrated through an analysis of the Soviets' *reasons* for pursuing certain ends with certain means, in a holist fashion. Thus, the Soviets' subjective perspective leads them to behave in a particular way "in order to" achieve certain goals.

There is nothing in this method that bars the development of a general thesis from which testable hypotheses can be derived. When this occurs, it comes close to replicating the positivist method. In *Stalin's Foreign Policy Reappraised*, for example, Shulman adopted what amounts to a rational-choice theory of Soviet international behavior, arguing for "the largely rational responsiveness of Soviet policy to changes in the world environment, and particularly to changes in power relationships." According to this case study, the Soviet leadership by 1949 began to recognize the counterproductive effects of its confrontational policies, decided that adverse trends in both the socialist and capitalist camp dictated the

[10] Diesing (fn. 1.)

[11] Marshall Shulman, *Stalin's Foreign Policy Reappraised* (New York: Atheneum, 1969); Strobe Talbott, *Endgame* (New York: Harper Colophon, 1980), 80.

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need for a breathing spell, and consequently moved toward a policy of peaceful coexistence in order to demobilize the opposing bloc.[12]

From this rational-choice theory, Shulman deduced testable "if, then" hypotheses—some explicit and some implicit. One is that the Soviets are less confrontational when the balance of power is against them in the short run and favors them in the long run. Another is that the Soviets are more confrontational in situations of offensive advantage (e.g., when the status quo is fluid) than in situations of defensive advantage (e.g., when militancy is seen to unify opponents, when peace propaganda sells better than revolutionary appeals).[13]

Because of the emphasis on the interaction of multiple factors in chronological context, however, effects of the individual variables, such as the balance of power, are not fully tested as separate hypotheses.[14] From a positivist standpoint, this leads to some puzzles in the course of the narrative. Weakness and fear sometimes appear as motives for restraint; at other times they serve as rationalizations for militancy—as in Zhdanov's response to the Marshall Plan and in Molotov's reasons for retaining the confrontational line even after the Berlin crisis.[15] Likewise, the strength of socialism sometimes appears as an argument for militancy, sometimes as an argument for the feasibility of peaceful coexistence.[16] These apparent anomalies do not stand out in the chronological narrative because they are plausibly integrated into reconstructions of how a whole range of incentives came together to shape Soviet thinking.

This might lead a positivist to question whether the balance of power really was the key factor in Soviet policy—or indeed, whether it had any systematic effect at all. Perhaps the relative advantages of offense and defense determined Soviet policy, and not the current or prospective balance of power. Or perhaps the effect of these two factors varies, depending on the aggressiveness of the opponent. To test this, the positivist might want to set up a chart with eight boxes, think through the logic of all the permutations, and look for cases to test each one.

To the holist, such testing might seem beside the point, since the main thing is to demonstrate the validity of the general thesis about the rational responsiveness of Soviet policy, not to produce law-like statements about the effects of separate variables. Once he knows that the Soviets are ra-

[12] Shulman (fn. 11), 3, 50, 259, and passim.

[13] *Ibid.*, 8, 14, 123, and passim.

[14] *Ibid.*, 8, comes close to doing this, citing a few instances of Soviet attempts to buy time during periods of weakness.

[15] On Zhdanov and Molotov, see *ibid.*, 14-15, 117-18. Suslov's militancy, however, is linked to the argument that the correlation of forces was turning in favor of socialism; see *ibid.*, 119.

[16] See especially the discussion of Malenkov, *ibid.*, 111-17.

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tionally responsive to their environment, he can interpret their moves in specific contexts *ad hoc*. In this view, to be valid, laws would have to be so complex, qualified, and cumbersome that they would offer no advantage over *ad hoc* reconstruction.

To the positivist, the basis for the larger generalization is shaky without the separate testing of the effects of individual variables. Unless a close connection between specific incentives and specific policies is shown, there is a possibility that Soviet policy is not based on rational calculations, but on a rote response to the failure of the previous policy. It makes a great deal of difference whether the Soviets are rationally reacting to specific geopolitical incentives or whether they are cybernetically alternating between stereotyped policies of militancy and lulling.[17] Indeed, Shulman identifies two patterns of Soviet learning: a cyclical alternation between confrontational "left" and nonconfrontational "right" tactics, which seems to be cybernetic, and a secular shift to the right which may be a rational response to a secular decline in revolutionary opportunities.[18] It might also be caused, however, by factors such as the evolution of the Soviet political system. A recasting of these questions in terms of explicitly competing theories and deducing testable "if, then" hypotheses from them could open up a fresh line of research, building on Shulman's ideas and leading to practical conclusions about how the Soviets learn in response to U.S. behavior.

In short, some forms of holism are not far from positivism in their implicit use of deductive theory and "if, then" hypotheses. In such cases, it may be quite easy to recast the holist argument in terms of explicit, deductive theory. Holism may be farther from positivism, however, in its reluctance to test the effects of individual variables in controlled contexts. Problems arise when the deductive links in a theory are left implicit and when multiple causes are examined all at once.

III. Some Shortcomings of Holism

The lax attitude of holism toward deductive logic leads to two errors. The first is that its predictions tend to be logically underdetermined. Causal assertions are made without showing why the same stimulus could not just as easily have led to the opposite consequences. The second error is that holistic explanations after the fact tend to be logically overdetermined. Several independent factors are indiscriminately listed as the

[17] On cybernetic decision making and how it differs from analytic rationality, see John Steinbruner, *The Cybernetic Theory of Decision* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974).
[18] Shulman (fn. 11), 3-9, 263-71.

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joint causes of an action, even though any one of them might have been sufficient to cause it. This shortcoming is serious in cases where different causes might have different policy implications for the West. Closer attention to the deductive logic of arguments can help to avoid these problems.

A. Predictive Underdetermination

Harry Gelman's argument about the role of Soviet leadership politics in promoting an opportunistic, expansionist approach to detente illustrates the problem of logical underdetermination.[19] Gelman's book is a good example of eclectic holism, integrating causal explanations with the reconstruction of Soviet ends/means calculations. Despite some logical loose strands, it offers the best available account of the domestic politics of foreign policy in the Brezhnev period; if reinterpreted in the light of rational-choice theories of logrolling, it constitutes a significant theoretical advance as well.

Gelman offers three kinds of causal factors to account for the Soviet Union's tendency toward opportunistic expansion and for variations in its intensity. The first—not an argument that is distinctive to Gelman—focuses on the balance of costs, risks, and opportunities present in the international environment. The second is an endemic "attacking compulsion" rooted in the deep structure of the Leninist political culture and operational code. Gelman does not advance direct evidence for this proposition aside from its general plausibility in light of the obvious facts of Soviet expansionism. As such, it functions as a kind of residual, explaining what cannot be explained in any other way.

The third line of explanation rests on consensus building and leadership politics. Though the narrative sounds persuasive, Gelman never makes clear why consensus building produces an expansionist result rather than the opposite. His historical reconstruction holds that,

> since Brezhnev was confronted simultaneously with temptation (Podgornyy's assumption of a vulnerable political stance [in favor of restraint on defense spending]), positive incentives (the political rewards waiting in the form of support from the military and Suslov), and competition (the extreme rhetoric Shelepin offered the military and the ideologues), his reaction was a foregone conclusion.[20]

[19] Gelman, *The Brezhnev Politburo and the Decline of Detente* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984). On the problem of *a priori* underdetermination and *a posteriori* overdetermination, see James Kurth, "United States Foreign Policy and Latin American Military Rule," in Phillippe Schmitter, ed., *Military Rule in Latin America* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1973), 244-322.

[20] *Ibid.*, 83.

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But why was it a foregone conclusion? Couldn't this whole formulation be turned on its head: temptation in the form of the vulnerability of Shelepin and the military, due to their reckless rhetoric and opposition to obviously beneficial arms restraint; positive incentives in the form of Podgornyy's support; competition in the form of Kosygin's budgetary alliance with Podgornyy—leading to international retrenchment? It didn't work out this way, but why?

The simplest explanation would be that elite groups and institutions with an interest in expansion (Gelman cites the military and the Central Committee's International Department) became disproportionately powerful in the Brezhnev years. That, however, begs the questions of where their power came from, and why it increased in this period. Moreover, Gelman's own account emphasizes that the rising power of these groups was as much a result or a concomitant of the expansionist consensus as a cause of it. The basic levers of power, Gelman argues, remained in the hands of the Politburo, above the level of institutional interests.[21]

Another explanation (which Gelman does not explicitly advance) would argue, along with George Breslauer, that the process of logrolling and consensus building in itself tends to produce "taut," overcommitted policies.[22] Gelman's evidence, reinterpreted in light of this theory, suggests that Brezhnev succeeded politically because he devised a policy of expansionist detente that promised to reconcile an arms build-up for the military, expansion into the third world for the ideologues, and increased technology transfer to co-opt Kosygin's domestic economic issue. For this line of argument, it need not be true that expansionist interests were more powerful than anti-expansionist interests. Rather, in a system where each interest gets what it wants most, expansion will result as long as *any* veto groups have an interest in it. That is a straightforward deduction from rational-choice theories of logrolling.[23]

Lacking this theoretical element, however, Gelman is unable to explain the expansionist character of the coalition in terms of domestic political dynamics alone. Consequently, he resorts to the notion of an "attacking compulsion": for reasons rooted in the deep cognitive structures of Leninists, it is political death to be considered, as Podgornyy was, "unacceptably 'soft.' "[24] If that is true, an entirely different research design is indicated. Domestic politics, the area in which Gelman carried out most

[21] *Ibid.*, 46, 52-58.

[22] George Breslauer, *Khrushchev and Brezhnev as Leaders* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1982), conclusion, esp. 280, 284-90.

[23] William H. Riker and Steven J. Brams, "The Paradox of Vote Trading," *American Political Science Review* 67 (December 1973), 1235-47.

[24] Gelman (fn. 19), 73; also 79, 90, 114.

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of his original research, "becomes all product and is not at all productive."[25] If the "attacking compulsion" is really the key to the explanation, then it would have been better to look for propositions and tests focusing on the origin, structure, and evolution of belief systems. Alternatively, Gelman could have stayed with the domestic focus while recasting and sharpening his hypothesis with the help of rational-choice logrolling theory.

B. Explanatory Overdetermination

As if to compensate for arguments that are loose enough to predict any outcome and its opposite, holists tend toward explanatory overkill, piling up any number of logically unrelated or logically contradictory reasons for an occurrence. It is true that a variety of unrelated factors may sometimes come together to produce an outcome or a decision, but psychologists tell us that decisions are often taken on the basis of one salient consideration, and that multiple rationales are invented later.[26] When each of several candidate explanations implies a different policy prescription, it is especially important to distinguish which of them are really operating and which are spurious.

An example is provided by explanations that consider aggressiveness in Soviet foreign policy to be rooted in the totalitarian origins of the political system. This argument is often invoked without supplying any logical connection at all, relying on the analogy to Nazi Germany for persuasiveness. At other times, a whole list of reasons is supplied: (1) totalitarians take their ideology seriously; (2) their political style requires either total control or total conflict; (3) they manufacture foreign threats and successes abroad to shore up their tenuous legitimacy; and, more subtly, (4) real pressures of international competition force the leader of a backward state to use domestic repression and militant appeals to mobilize his inefficient society.[27]

Each of these explanations is logically distinct. There is no reason to believe that if one of them is true, the rest are true also. Moreover, each of them seems to imply a different strategy for the opponent: (1) firm deterrence while waiting for the totalitarians' ideology to atrophy; (2) sub-

[25] Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979), 50, used this phrase to characterize earlier systems theories.

[26] Jervis (fn. 6), 128-42.

[27] The last hypothesis, omitted in most accounts of the links between totalitarianism and foreign policy, is based on Alexander Gerschenkron, *Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 1962). For other arguments, see Carl Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956), and Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Ideology and Power in Soviet Politics* (New York: Praeger, 1962).

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version to change their political system; (3) symbolic international agreements to replace symbolic conflict as the basis for their domestic legitimacy; and (4) an easing of external pressure to reduce the need for internal repression. Since some of these policies are opposites, lumping these explanations together indiscriminately, in typical holist fashion, would destroy their practical value. Logically independent explanations need to be disentangled and tested separately, in positivist fashion.

In short, holist studies of Soviet foreign policy often include causal arguments as part of their interpretation. Typically, these arguments suffer from the errors of predictive underdetermination and explanatory overdetermination. Such problems can be corrected by recasting the arguments in terms of deductive theory and by adopting positivist testing procedures. In the examples cited above, this could be accomplished through relatively small adjustments to the original holist argument. The intervention of deductive theory can also transform a holist debate in a more fundamental way, refocusing its arguments and establishing an entirely new research agenda.

IV. Transforming a Research Agenda by Means of Deductive Theory

Deductive theory can do much more than just clean up the loose ends of holist arguments. At its best, it can reformulate the questions asked in academic and policy debates, clarify the branchpoints where contending arguments diverge, and reorient research toward more decisive tests. Beyond this, a deductive theory can turn diverse, narrowly focused studies into contributions toward a unified research program. Historians of science have found that the take-off point for most disciplines comes when work is focused on a stable core of explanatory goals that are expressed as a set of deductively interrelated puzzles.[28] One of the main barriers to progress in the field of Soviet foreign policy is the absence of this kind of research program that would provide direction to its work.

In recent years, the discipline of international politics has been making considerable progress toward defining a coherent, productive, yet flexible and relatively pluralistic research program. Though this field is hardly a perfect model for emulation, it is normal in science for the more applied fields to borrow ideas and approaches from the more basic, more theoretical field that is most closely related to it. Thus, it is natural for Soviet

[28] See Stephen Toulmin, *Human Understanding* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972).

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foreign policy studies to look to the discipline of international politics for guidance in setting an agenda for research.

One of the core aspirations of the field of international politics is to explain outcomes on the two game-theory dimensions of cooperation/conflict and win/lose—especially counterintuitive outcomes produced by the perverse effects of international anarchy. From this core explanatory goal and rational-choice base, puzzle-solving activity radiates outward in a variety of directions toward systems theory, deterrence theory, bargaining theory, regime theory, theories about the effects of anarchical competition on domestic structure, and theories about adjustments needed in rational-choice models to take into account systematic psychological biases.[29] This is a rich and diverse agenda, which unites the security and political economy subfields and even accommodates nonpositivist offshoots.[30] Despite this diversity, the research program hangs together because of its core puzzles and common intellectual style, much of which can be traced back to Thomas Schelling.

If this research agenda is applied to the Soviet field, it offers some advantages and some potential disadvantages. To demonstrate the advantages, an extended example will show how Schelling's theoretical insights can be used to restructure the Garthoff-Pipes debate on Soviet attitudes regarding nuclear deterrence by clarifying the opposing arguments, proposing new empirical tests, and pointing toward a broad agenda for further research. In a subsequent section, I will discuss the potential disadvantages of importing a deductive research program of this kind into the Soviet field: its ethnocentrism, its monolithic character, and the questionable applicability of the special skills of Sovietologists to the research program it proposes.

The disagreement between Raymond Garthoff and Richard Pipes over Soviet attitudes on the nature of nuclear deterrence has been one of the most lively and consequential debates in research on Soviet military strategy.[31] In essence, Garthoff contends that the Soviets accept the inexorability of a deterrent relationship based on mutual assured destruction, though they retain the vestiges of a war-fighting doctrine and force posture in case deterrence fails. Pipes avers that the Soviets seek a war-

[29] A recent example of work done in this tradition is the special issue of *World Politics* 38 (October 1985), also published as *Cooperation under Anarchy*, Kenneth A. Oye, ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985).

[30] See, for example, Friedrich Kratochwil and John Ruggie, "International Organization: A State of the Art on an Art of the State," *International Organization* 40 (Fall 1986).

[31] "A Garthoff-Pipes Debate on Soviet Strategic Doctrine," *Strategic Review* 10 (Fall 1982), 36-63.

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winning capability, though they are resigned temporarily to its infeasibility. When the debate is formulated in this way, it is unclear what evidence might constitute a test of the two views. Garthoff could explain the war-fighting capability of the SS-18 as a hedge against the failure of deterrence, while Pipes could explain the ABM Treaty as a temporary expedient. War-fighting statements in the military press could be explained as reflecting only the military-technical level of doctrine, while politicians' renunciation of nuclear first-use and the possibility of victory in nuclear war could be explained as eyewash for the West.

As a result of this impasse, empirical research has moved on to narrower, more concrete questions such as Soviet force posture and doctrine for a major conventional war in Europe. The Garthoff-Pipes debate is hard to escape, however, because the question of what deters nuclear escalation is central to interpreting Soviet conventional strategy. Do the Soviets believe that mutual vulnerability will deter both sides from nuclear use regardless of the nuclear balance, or do they believe that superiority in nuclear war-fighting capability is needed to prevent NATO from escalating? The answer to this question has profound implications for the choice of forces to deter a Soviet conventional offensive, the strength of Soviet inclinations to preempt, and the interpretation of Soviet diplomatic and arms-control motivations.

Because the Garthoff-Pipes debate, in one guise or another, cannot be avoided, perhaps it can be reformulated in ways that make it more amenable to testing. To produce findings that cannot be easily explained away, the testing strategy should focus on evidence that is unambiguously at the political level of doctrine, and on behavior that is too important to be used for the purposes of disinformation. Only Soviet crisis diplomacy and coercive bargaining meet these criteria. But exactly what predictions should follow from the views of Garthoff and Pipes in such circumstances? Here is where Schelling's help is essential in clarifying arguments and deducing empirical hypotheses.

Schelling and other game theorists have argued that, under conditions of mutual assured destruction, the outcome of coercive diplomacy depends not on who is stronger (since the ability to punish is absolute), but on who is more willing to run risks and who bears the onus of the last clear chance to avoid disastrous escalation.[32] From this logic of the game of Chicken, Robert Jervis has deduced the corollary that, in most situations, nuclear weapons give a double advantage to the defender of the sta-

[32] Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), chaps. 2 and 3; Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (London: Oxford University Press, 1960), chap. 2.

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tus quo.[33] First, defenders will be more willing to run risks, since people usually value what they have more than what they covet. Second, the onus of the last clear chance to avoid the risk of uncontrolled escalation normally weighs more heavily on the side trying to change the status quo. That is why Schelling found deterrence to be easier than compellence. He added, however, that this is less true when there is uncertainty about who has the last clear chance, or when clever tactics can shift it to the opponent.

These deductions help to clarify the Garthoff-Pipes dispute and to devise tests that would determine which side is right. If the view that the Soviets accept the implications of the mutual deterrent relationship means anything, it should mean that Soviet coercive bargaining behavior fits Schelling's pattern. That is, the Soviets are predicted to stand firm when the balance of motivation favors them (in particular when defending the status quo), and to be extremely cautious in trying to change the status quo by force. Nonetheless, we would expect them to try to manipulate the last clear chance and to take advantage of ambiguities in the status quo in order to make limited gains. Assuming that both sides have at least minimum assured destruction capabilities, the balance of nuclear capabilities should *not* correlate strongly with Soviet behavior. Moreover, the more strongly the Soviets share Schelling's view that the function of conventional combat is to generate the risk of escalation,[34] the less strongly Soviet behavior will be shaped by the local balance of conventional forces.

Pipes should make the opposite predictions. He believes that Soviet strategic calculation "always involves matters of relative not absolute advantage."[35] Even if both players are Chicken, to use Schelling's categories, relative war-fighting disparities make some players more Chicken than others. Following this logic, Soviet coercive diplomacy should not be decisively driven by the balance of motivations in a particular case, nor should it distinguish strongly between defending the status quo and changing it, or between deterrence and compellence. Rather, the Soviets are predicted to stand firm when they enjoy dominance in nuclear war-fighting capabilities and/or a local conventional preponderance, and to give in when their war-fighting capabilities are weaker than those of their opponents. Rather than manipulating the last clear chance, the Soviets' coercive bargaining tactics are predicted to focus on demonstrating their ability to deploy or alert a superior war-fighting force.

[33] Jervis, "Why Nuclear Superiority Doesn't Matter," *Political Science Quarterly* 94 (Winter 1979-80), 617-33.

[34] Schelling (fn. 32, 1966), 106.

[35] *Strategic Review* (fn. 31), 57.

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With these deductions in hand, tests bearing on the Garthoff-Pipes debate are easy to devise and to carry out. In fact, an existing analysis of Soviet naval diplomacy by James McConnell comes close to being a test of Schelling's theory, and thus of the Garthoff-Pipes debate, though he did not conceive of it as such.[36] McConnell's tests illustrate many of the procedures used in positivist comparative methods, but they also reveal some of positivism's pitfalls.

A. Covariation

McConnell tests for covariation between the defense of the status quo and the achievement of one's aims in coercive diplomacy. He finds that the two correlate in the vast majority of his cases; but this result is marred by his *ad hoc* approach to determining what the status quo is and who is defending it. In a few cases, the judgment of who was the defender in a showdown seems to be influenced by who was the winner.[37]

B. Alternative Explanations

McConnell also tests for covariation between the military balance and success in coercive diplomacy—a relationship that Pipes would predict to be a strong one. McConnell does not explicitly discuss the nuclear balance; if he had, he would have found no correlation over the 1967-1976 period that he examined.[38] Instead, he focuses on the local naval balance, finding little correlation between it and the outcome. In most cases of naval confrontation on the high seas, the superpowers simply matched each other's deployment, each carrier task force calling forth a comparable anti-carrier force.[39] Regardless of the ships available for further reinforcement, deployment races to achieve local superiority failed to occur, implying that the superpowers viewed the purpose of the forces not as warfighting, but as a token of commitment and risk-taking.

C. Crucial Cases

McConnell looks for crucial cases that stack up all other alleged explanations against the status quo explanation. Enclaves within the oppo-

[36] James M. McConnell, "The 'Rules of the Game': A Theory on the Practice of Superpower Naval Diplomacy," in Bradford Dismukes and James McConnell, eds., *Soviet Naval Diplomacy* (New York: Pergamon, 1979).

[37] For example, the argument (*ibid.*, 265-66) that the United States was the defender in the mining of Haiphong Harbor, though not unreasonable, makes use of *ad hoc* criteria that place more weight on American statements linking the action to the defense of South Vietnam than on the *prima facie* offensive character of U.S. behavior.

[38] See also Barry Blechman and Stephen Kaplan, *Force without War* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1978), 127-29.

[39] For this point, and qualifications to it, see McConnell (fn. 36), 244.

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nent's sphere of interest, such as Berlin and Cuba, are cases of this type, in which the balance of local capability and the balance of strategic interests (apart from the reputational interest in defending the status quo) work against the survival of such enclaves.[40] The fact that they do survive against challenges means that McConnell and Schelling pass a hard test.

D. Process Tracing

Schelling's predictions concern not only outcomes, but also tactics and process; so these too can be the basis for corroborative tests. Schelling expects that players will try to manipulate the status quo and the "last clear chance" to their advantage. McConnell offers some illustrations of the Soviets' use of such tactics. For example, during the Angolan civil war, there was no stable status quo, so outsiders were relatively free to jockey for advantage. In doing so, the Soviets counted on using the freedom of the seas (a kind of normative status quo or, for Schelling, an escalation threshold) to protect the movement of Cuban troops through seas dominated by the U.S. Navy.[41]

E. Deviant Cases

McConnell seeks out deviant cases in order to refine his hypothesis. The Middle East wars, for example, show that the bargaining advantage of the defender extends only to the protection of a client's core areas and not to peripheral aspects of the status quo, such as desert frontiers.[42] This raises the question of how to distinguish progressive refinements of a theory from *ad hoc* rationalizations to excuse its degeneration. The general rule is that refinements are progressive if they help explain many cases rather than just one, and if they suggest ways to apply the theory to new questions.

To sum up, the Schelling/McConnell example shows that recasting holist debates in positivist terms can help to clarify arguments and make them more amenable to testing. It also sets in motion a self-sustaining program of research, involving the analysis of deviant cases, the refinement of the original hypothesis, and the tracing of the implications of the theory into new areas. In this case, for example, an important extension of the theory might examine what happens under conditions in which conflict is predicted to be greatest—in cases where the status quo is am-

[40] *Ibid.*, 247-48.
[41] *Ibid.*, 265.
[42] McConnell's own conclusions from these cases are somewhat more complex. See *ibid.*, 246, 267-76.

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biguous or where both sides believe they are defending it.[43] Research might address the causes and consequences of such situations, how the Soviets behave in them, and what tactics have proved safe and effective in confronting such dilemmas.

This theory-driven research program can also suggest questions for holist scholars engaged in the detailed reconstruction of Soviet perceptions and calculations in individual cases. Direct evidence of Soviet thinking could be important for corroborating or refuting McConnell's interpretation of his cases, for example. Schelling himself uses a number of Khrushchev quotations to illustrate his tactical theories. In one partially apocryphal example, Khrushchev is said to have remarked that Berlin was not worth a war, but his Western interlocutor reminded him that this shared risk was a two-edged sword. Khrushchev, as if coached by Schelling, replied that "you are the ones that have to cross a frontier"—thereby showing that he did think in terms of the manipulation of shared risk as well as the manipulation of the status quo as a means to pass the onus of the last clear chance to the opponent.[44] Sovietological scholarship producing this kind of evidence would nicely complement multi-case analyses of overt behavior by specialists in international relations.

More generally, the game-theoretic perspective opens up a variety of questions for the area-studies scholar. Though simplified versions of game theory assume a generic rational player, the character and tactical style of the player can be treated as a variable in the theory. In Chicken games, for example, Schelling argued for surrendering the initiative by means of irrevocable preemptive defection, but Nathan Leites's Bolshevik chooses to probe cautiously and to retain the last clear chance to avoid disaster.[45] The work of Sovietologists on such questions is likely to be bet-

[43] Richard K. Betts, "Elusive Equivalence: The Political and Military Meaning of the Nuclear Balance," in Samuel P. Huntington, *The Strategic Imperative* (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1982), 108, draws attention to this question. See also Richard Betts, *Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1987), which carries out detailed, sophisticated tests similar to those described above.

[44] Schelling (fn. 32, 1966), 46-47. This vignette seems to be a conflation of several Khrushchev remarks. For an example of the invocation of uncontrollable risk, see Robert Slusser, *The Berlin Crisis of 1961* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), 98-99; for asymmetry in motivation, Hannes Adomeit, *Soviet Risk-Taking and Crisis Behavior* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1982), 207, and Jack Schick, *The Berlin Crisis, 1958-1962* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971), 178; for the onus of the last clear chance, Strobe Talbott, ed., *Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament* (New York: Bantam, 1974), 575. For more examples and for some qualifications to this view, see Hope Harrison, "Was Khrushchev a Student of Thomas Schelling?: Khrushchev's Coercive Diplomacy in the 1958-1961 Berlin Crisis," unpub. (Harriman Institute, Columbia University, 1987).

[45] Nathan Leites, *A Study of Bolshevism* (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1953); Alexander George, "The 'Operational Code': A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-Making," in Erik Hoffmann and Frederic Fleron, eds., *The Conduct of Soviet Foreign Policy*, 2d ed. (New York: Aldine, 1980), 191-212.

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ter focused and more useful if they use game theory to shape the questions they ask.

In short, deductive theory can undoubtedly be used to reformulate holist debates and direct the work of holist scholars. Certain obvious benefits would result, but at what cost? Because of some of the shortcomings and limitations of positivism, caution must be exercised against completely subsuming holist research under a monistic program of positivist research.

V. Shortcomings and Limitations of Positivism

Three objections may be raised to the use of positivist international relations theory to reformulate the research agenda of the field of Soviet foreign policy: the question of ethnocentrism, inherent problems of implementing the positivist method in the social sphere, and the danger of adopting any single approach.

A. Ethnocentrism

In order to minimize the danger of ethnocentrism, holists suggest analyzing the Soviets' behavior in terms of the Soviets' own categories and concepts. Certainly one way of testing an interpretation of Soviet behavior is to find out whether the Soviets share it. That has its limits, however. Robert Legvold, in his study of Soviet attitudes toward military power, starts with the Soviet literature, but then adds distinctions and concepts that are entirely his own. The question, then, is not whether Western ideas are admissible, but when and with what safeguards they are introduced.

In view of these criteria, does the imposition of Schelling's categories on Soviet behavior constitute unchecked, unvarnished ethnocentrism? Schelling's ideas, like those of Clausewitz, were produced by particular historical experiences in a particular social setting. Both transcend that setting, however, by virtue of their high degree of abstraction, their deductive clarity, and their susceptibility to empirical refutation. Using Western concepts like "escalation dominance" in an *ad hoc* manner to describe Soviet thinking is surely ethnocentrism, but using Schelling's theory self-consciously as a guide for careful testing is not. How could a science make any headway if it were forbidden to use ideas that it had thought up itself?

B. Inherent Flaws in Positivist Testing Procedures

A more fundamental objection is that positivism, at least in the social sciences, is unable to fulfill its promise to carry out conclusive tests.

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McConnell's tests, for example, are not fully satisfying because he does not offer a reliable definition of the status quo, such that any two researchers would always agree on who was defending it and who was challenging it in a given case. As a consequence, deciding whether a case supports or contradicts his hypothesis involves a partly subjective, *ad hoc* judgment.

Though it is possible that more precise measures could have reduced arbitrariness, nonpositivist philosophers of science contend that the underlying problem is inherent: in their view, the variables in social theories do not closely correspond to hard observables in nature. The variables exist only as conventions, either as a linguistic custom of the people under study or as a category imposed by the scientist. Several consequences thus undermine the positivist method. First, most of the phenomena that social scientists find interesting will be difficult to measure. Second, measurements must either be subjective or rely on highly artificial protocols that measure a variable only indirectly. Third, the scientist is allowed a degree of arbitrariness in deciding whether cases fit his theory and, if they do not, whether the theory or the measurement procedures are at fault. Under these conditions, "objectivity" can at best mean agreement among subjective observers, each of whom brings biases and preconceptions to the task of observation.[46]

William Zimmerman and Robert Axelrod's quantitative study of the lessons that Soviet commentators drew from the Vietnam War illustrates some of these difficulties.[47] In testing the hypothesis that different Soviet press organs serve as forums for the articulation of "left" and "right" opinions in foreign policy debates, these authors first classify press statements on the lessons of Vietnam as either left or right, using well-articulated criteria and requiring agreement among multiple coders. They then show that press organs vary on the left/right spectrum, with differences across various newspapers and journals that were, for the most part, just barely significant by conventional statistical standards. Despite the extreme care taken in measuring left and right lessons, residual ambiguities in the research design make it difficult to judge whether the results support or contradict the hypothesis.

One view might be that these results impressively confirm the existence of pluralistic press debates, on the grounds that the findings would have been even stronger if sharper concepts and better measures had been used. Because the operational definitions of left and right failed to capture

[46] Polkinghorne (fn. 1), 107 and passim.

[47] William Zimmerman and Robert Axelrod, "The 'Lessons' of Vietnam and Soviet Foreign Policy," *World Politics* 34 (October 1981), 1-24.

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logically coherent and mutually exclusive belief systems, correlations were watered down by extraneous, random data. On some of the dimensions measured, the left/right dichotomy is clear: for example, the sharp contrast between the left assertion that "the aggressive essence of imperialism is unchanged" with the right view that "realistically thinking circles of the capitalist states have become increasingly conscious of the necessity for peaceful coexistence." But the connection between this and dichotomies that are less stark seems problematic. Compare, for example, the allegedly left statement that "the patriots of South Vietnam will surmount all the obstacles in the path to the complete triumph of their just cause" with the allegedly right statement that "there is no force that could turn back developments in South Vietnam."[48] In short, debate on the general left/right dimension surfaces in the data even though some murky conceptual distinctions and operational measures tend to blur it.

In an opposite view, the findings tend to refute the hypothesis, since the small variations across different press organs could easily have been caused by differences in propaganda strategy or institutional function. For example, Zimmerman and Axelrod note,

> We treated as leftist those statements that emphasized the role of military aid to Vietnam and the significance of military and political doctrine in the North Vietnamese victory; as rightist those statements that stressed economic and material support.[49]

By this coding rule, a military newspaper could be expected to wind up on "the left" simply by devoting disproportionate space to issues within its own functional purview or by targeting "lessons" considered appropriate for its distinctive readership.

In short, all the inherent difficulties of positivism seem to show up in this example. In order to test a hypothesis whose variables do not closely correspond to hard facts in nature, cases must be classified either by partially subjective judgments or by indirect, artificial measures. When subjectivity is permitted, researchers tend to see what they want to see; when indirect measures are concocted, there is a tendency to get weak correlations. And when that happens, it is unclear whether the fault lies with the measures or with the theory.

Defenders of positivism, however, could argue that the solution lies in tightening up the sources of ambiguity: control for alternative explanations, develop logically tighter ideal types for the left and right syndromes, and throw out ambiguous dimensions that water down the findings. Only then—if the hypothesis continued to produce weak

[48] *Ibid.*, 10-11. [49] *Ibid.*, 8.

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correlations across a shrinking range of successful applications—would we know that the research program based on that theory was degenerating. Although an evaluation of the results of any particular test may involve subjective judgments, objective criteria can be applied to appraising the long-run outcome of a whole research program.[50]

Though positivism can answer its critics in principle, in practice there are limitations to what can be expected from the use of positivist methods in the social sciences. Positivism is like democracy—the worst system except for all the rest. Because of its limitations, however, it makes sense to use other methods to cross-check its findings and to provide alternative guides when it falters.

C. The Danger of Monolithic Dogmatism

Academic strategy, like military strategy, must avoid the equal dangers of dogmatic attachment to a single doctrine and of aimless activity in the absence of any doctrine at all. Though the game-theoretic, rational-choice traditions of the field of international politics are flexible enough to encompass a variety of opinions and approaches, the exclusive adoption of any theoretical stance will tend to focus attention on some new ideas and blinker it toward others. For this reason, it is healthy for some proportion of the research to be conducted outside the dominant paradigm. In the Soviet field, research driven by international relations theory should be supplemented by research on ideas that emerge more directly from the data. Even in the latter case, however, positivism can play a role in increasing the payoff from the work.

VI. Hybrid Methods

Some holist arguments are causal, staying close to the Soviets' categories and tending toward complex, case-specific explanations. Other holist arguments are reconstructions of Soviet ends/means calculations, interpreting Soviet behavior in terms of what it was trying to achieve. In arguments of both types, positivist methods and deductive thinking can be usefully applied without undercutting the distinctive character of the holistic approach.

A. Recasting Causal Arguments

In the study cited earlier, Robert Legvold argues that the Soviets evaluate the utility of military power according to different criteria in differ-

[50] Polkinghorne (fn. 1), 117-18; Imre Lakatos, "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes," in Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave, *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge: Proceedings of the International Colloquium in the Philosophy of Science, London, 1965*, Vol. IV (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970).

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ent contexts. He quotes Vasilii Kulish as saying that the effectiveness of military power is "determined not only by the forces themselves," but "depends upon the specific international-political situation." Kulish then goes on to muse about the "complicated interlacing" of national interests, political constraints on the use of force, the strength of the national liberation movement, and so forth.[51] In testing whether the Soviets actually behave in accordance with these notions, however, the "complicated interlacing" of putative causes can only be the final step in a systematic process. The first step is to make a list of "contexts" or characteristics of "international-political situations." Such a list might include Legvold's own distinction among peace, crisis, and war situations, as well as items from Kulish's list. These are the independent variables. The next step is to offer a hypothesis about how the Soviets view the utility of military superiority in each of these contexts. For example, one hypothesis might be that superiority is useful in preventing NATO escalation in the context of an ongoing war, but that it has no value for supporting progressive change in peacetime. What counts in that context is whether strong national liberation movements can achieve gains on their own initiative—which strategic parity will suffice to defend. Subsequent steps would carry out the usual kinds of positivist testing across a varied range of behavioral and verbal evidence. Only at the final stage could there be complicated interlacing of the hypotheses—for example, by specifying which conditions were necessary or sufficient conditions for certain outcomes, how the interaction of two variables might change their effects, and so forth.

If a large number of variables must be considered simultaneously, this procedure will become too cumbersome. In that event, it may be necessary to step back and look for a few "taproot" causes, like bipolarity or nuclear weapons technology, which exert their effects simultaneously and systematically on a lot of seemingly independent variables.

B. Deductive Reconstruction of Soviet Ends/Means Calculations

Michael MccGwire's analysis of Soviet military policy in terms of a changing set of military objectives shows how a Sovietologist can use deductive logic and positivist testing procedures to reconstruct Soviet aims and strategies.[52] MccGwire argues that around December 1966, a decision was taken to change the objective of Soviet military strategy in a world war from "do not lose the war" to "avoid the nuclear devastation of Russia,"—a shift that reflected the new belief that a war might be kept lim-

[51] Legvold (fn. 8), 131.

[52] Michael MccGwire, *Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign Policy* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1987).

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ited. He proceeds to deduce a set of specific missions, doctrines, force structures, and organizational structures that would logically follow from those general objectives.

At this point, MccGwire is ready to carry out a number of tests based on the predictions that flow from his deductive model and his tentative identification of a decision period in late 1966. In the jargon of social science, he is carrying out cross-sectional and lagged time-series tests of covariation. The cross-sectional tests involve checking whether his predictions are borne out—not only, say, in the area of doctrinal writings, but also in the areas of force posture and arms control. The time-series test is a before-and-after check to show that the hypothesized changes in higher-level objectives correspond to observed changes in doctrine and force posture, with adjustment for necessary lead times. In carrying out these before-and-after tests, MccGwire tries to hold constant as many perturbing factors as he can. Therefore, in reading the Soviet press to establish the date of the decision to pursue a conventional option in Europe, he compares relevant passages in back-to-back editions of the same authoritative book, one signed to press just before the presumed decision, the other after.

In short, MccGwire's theory is holistic in the sense that it explains various parts of Soviet policy in terms of their relation to a larger whole that gives them meaning. It is also holistic in paying more attention to reconstructing Soviet perspectives and calculations than to discovering their underlying causes. Nonetheless, he constructs and tests his deductive argument according to standard positivist procedures.

Conclusion

Both positivism and holism can make valuable contributions to the study of Soviet foreign policy. Positivist theories, borrowed in part from the field of international politics, can provide sharp, testable arguments and a fertile research agenda. Holism can provide the means to harness positivist generalizations in a detailed understanding of particular cases, including the present.

Far from being incompatible, holism and positivism can often work synergistically. Holists, while taking up questions appropriate to their particular skills, can use positivist theories to shape their research agenda. Even when they pursue research questions suggested mainly by their own data, holists can use deductive logic and positivist methods to help structure their work.

Despite this complementarity, some irreducible disagreements be-

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tween the practitioners of holist and positivist methods are likely to persist. Differing attitudes about such issues as simplification, generalization, and empathy are rooted in different views of the nature of reality and of the purposes that knowledge is meant to serve. However, because the implicit stance of most Sovietologists lies not at the extremes of this dichotomy but in the middle, the complementary use of both approaches will be compatible with these scholars' assumptions about the natural order of social life.

In the past, the positivist side of Soviet foreign policy studies has remained underdeveloped. In the present, therefore, the most pressing task is to use the opportunity presented by recent developments in international-relations theory to correct that weakness, and to do this in a way that leaves the old virtues of the field's nonpositivist traditions intact. Together, these complementary research strategies can sharpen old debates, spark new ones, and generally put scholarly discourse in the Soviet field on a livelier, sounder footing.

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LEFT-LIBERTARIAN PARTIES: Explaining Innovation in Competitive Party Systems

By HERBERT P. KITSCHELT*

IN contemporary democracies, political stability and change are intimately linked to developments in the party systems. For at least two generations prior to the 1970s, most democratic party systems were structured along stable patterns of societal cleavages such as class, religion, ethnicity, and center/periphery relations.[1] Since the 1960s, however, electoral dealignment and realignment have undermined this continuity.[2] It is particularly significant that political parties, mostly of recent origin, have developed programs and attracted electoral constituencies that cut across the established cleavage structures.

Probably the most significant cohort of new political parties in advanced democracies are "left-libertarian" parties. These parties appeared first in Scandinavia, France, and the Netherlands under "New Left" labels and competed with the established communist and social democratic parties. More recently, in Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, and West Germany, new "ecology" or "green" parties have attracted considerable electoral support. By now, New Left and ecology parties have converging

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[1] For European party systems, this argument was made by Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments: An Introduction," in Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, eds., *Party Systems and Voter Alignments* (New York: Free Press, 1967). Lipset and Rokkan are concerned with the societal nature of cleavages that are represented on the level of party competition, not with the relative strength of particular parties. Critics and supporters of their argument are mistaken when they test the persistence of cleavages by the electoral stability of individual parties. See Richard Rose and Derek Urwin, "Persistence and Change in Western Party Systems Since 1945," *Political Studies* 18 (No. 3, 1970), 287-319; Maria Maguire, "Is There Still Persistence? Electoral Change in Western Europe, 1948-1979," in Hans Daalder and Peter Mair, eds., *Western European Party Systems: Continuity and Change* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage 1983); and Michal Shamir, "Are Western Party Systems 'Frozen'? A Comparative Dynamic Analysis," *Comparative Political Studies* 12 (No. 1, 1984), 35-79.

[2] As a survey on contemporary debates about the dealignment and realignment of party systems, see Russell J. Dalton, Scott C. Flanagan, and Paul Allen Beck, eds., *Electoral Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985).

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programmatic outlooks and electoral constituencies. All left-libertarian parties are critical of the logic of societal development and the institutions that underlie the postwar compromise between capital and labor in industrial societies. They oppose the priority that economic growth has on the political agenda, the patterns of policy making that restrict democratic participation to elite bargaining among centralized interest groups and party leaders, and the bureaucratic welfare state. Their political alternatives conform neither to traditional conservative nor to socialist programs, but link libertarian commitments to individual autonomy and popular participation, with a leftist concern for equality.

This essay will explore why left-libertarian parties have been able to attract significant groups of new voters in some Western democracies. In particular, it will examine whether the rise of left-libertarian parties is traceable to structural and institutional conditions in advanced democracies or to transitory grievances and deprivations in societies and party systems that are essentially stable. Conditions that explain the rise of political parties may not necessarily explain their persistence. Nevertheless, if structural factors are responsible for the emergence of left-libertarian parties, these parties are likely to signal lasting changes in the cleavage structure of party systems. If, on the other hand, conjunctural factors—such as short-term economic fluctuations and single issues—explain the rise of left-libertarian parties, the new parties may well be passing fads or "flash parties."

Research on the supporters, organization, and strategy of left-libertarian parties should demonstrate which explanation is correct. The parties become a more interesting object of study if they are indeed grounded in the structural and institutional developments of modern democracies. In that case, their bases of support and patterns of mobilization may have lasting consequences for political participation and public policy making. A comparative study of eighteen democracies, some of which have sizable left-libertarian parties, will demonstrate that these new parties mark the rise of a new political cleavage and represent a significant challenge to the dominant forms of interest intermediation between state and civil society in a distinctive subset of advanced democracies.

I. Theoretical Models of Political Mobilization and the Restructuring of Party Systems

The mobilization of new political demands, whether by social movements, interest groups, or political parties, has been explained by means

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of three different theoretical models: breakdown, structural change, and resource mobilization.[3] Advocates of the breakdown model see political mobilization as a response to societal strains and relative deprivation. Crises occur when societies generate popular loyalty based on institutionalized norms and values, but fail to attain their own standards of institutional stability and legitimation. For instance, modern welfare states promise economic security and opportunity for upward mobility through enhanced education and training. In the view of many of their citizens, however—particularly the younger generation—the economic crises of the 1970s and 1980s have shattered these hopes. The experience of a widening gap between expected and realized benefits triggers collective protest when the existing social order is held to be responsible for this discrepancy.

Proponents of structural change models argue that societies are well able to meet the demands and aspirations on which their legitimacy is based. But, because the societies are involved in continuous change and transformation, this very "success" may generate new preferences which cannot be satisfied by the existing institutions and thus become new sources of dissatisfaction. Societal transformation provokes collective mobilization around new issues and new lines of conflict. Breakdown models bear a close affinity to Marxist and functionalist theories, which predict collective mobilization when capitalist societies experience economic crisis; structural change models are closer to Weber's and Schumpeter's view that capitalism and liberal representative democracy will be victims of their own success.

Adherents of resource mobilization theories maintain that neither crises nor structural change by themselves explain the organization of new collective political demands. Grievances and institutional change are endemic in most societies, but they rarely translate into collective political action. Instead, the actors' skills and resources and the broader institutional opportunity structures determine when individuals are able to engage in collective mobilization. In particular, the choice of a specific ve-

[3] Among a growing body of literature on social movements and political protest, see Gary T. Marx and James L. Wood, "Strands of Theory and Research in Collective Behavior," *Annual Review of Sociology* 1 (1975), 363-428; John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, "Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory," *American Journal of Sociology* 82 (No. 6, 1977), 1212-41; Charles Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1978); Craig J. Jenkins, "Sociopolitical Movements," in Samuel I. Long, ed., *Handbook of Political Behavior* Vol. IV (New York: Plenum Press, 1981); Alain Touraine, *The Voice and the Eye* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982); Claus Offe, "New Social Movements: Challenging the Boundaries of Institutional Politics," *Social Research* 52 (No. 4, 1985), 817-68. A fourth theoretical model stands in the Weberian sociological tradition and emphasizes the change of world views and definitions of collective identities. I incorporate this perspective in a broadly interpreted structural theory of movements and party formation.

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hicle of mobilization, such as a political party, can be explained only in terms of actors' resources and opportunities.

I will argue that a combination of structural change and resource mobilization theories explains the emergence of left-libertarian parties better than breakdown theories do. Theories of structural change highlight the necessary background conditions for the rise of left-libertarian parties; but the sufficient conditions are provided only by favorable political opportunity structures. Breakdown theories as such do not help us to identify necessary or sufficient conditions of party formation. The competing explanations will be tested in a macrocomparison of eighteen advanced democracies.

II. The Cases

Common ideological and programmatic convictions, similar compositions of electoral constituencies, and a minimum level of voter support determine which parties qualify as significant left-libertarian parties. The formal party labels (left-socialist, ecological, or libertarian), the age, and the political origin of left-libertarian parties are not relevant for these criteria. With respect to political ideology, left-libertarian parties grow out of the sentiment that the realms of instrumental action in modern society—the market place and bureaucratic organization—dominate too much of social life and have displaced relations of solidarity (in the private sphere of interpersonal communication) and participatory political deliberation (in the public sphere of collective decision making). Left-libertarians mistrust markets because the latter orient human preferences toward the pursuit of material commodities, devalue social community, and endanger the supply and protection of many nonmarketable collective goods—not the least of which is an intact environment. Simultaneously, left-libertarians oppose the centralized bureaucratic welfare state and the hegemony of professional expertise in public policy and society. In their view, the formal rationalities of markets and bureaucracies expropriate the citizens' capacity to determine their own lives and must be checked by institutions that impose substantive standards of rationality on their boundless expansive dynamic.

Consistent with the socialist legacy, left-libertarians are "left"; they oppose the market place and insist on solidarity and equality. They are also "libertarian" in that they reject centralized bureaucracies and call for individual autonomy, participation, and the self-governance of decentralized communities.

Left-libertarian parties not only have common programmatic orienta-

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tions, but also similar socioeconomic profiles of electoral support. There is no systematic study of left-libertarian electorates that covers all countries with significant parties, but existing surveys show that all of these parties overproportionally draw voters from the ranks of the younger, well-educated middle class; they are employed in human services (teaching, health care, social work), have left-of-center political convictions, subscribe to "postmaterialist" values, and sympathize with environmental, feminist, and peace movements.[4]

Left-libertarian parties can obviously make a difference in advanced industrial democracies only if they receive a minimum level of electoral support. Why do some countries have electorally significant left-libertarian parties, but others not? It is difficult to choose a single and universally applicable measure of electoral support as the criterion for distinguishing "significant" from "insignificant" left-libertarian parties. Since these parties vary in age, one cannot average their electoral performance over a long period of time, and since the competition between party blocs in a number of European countries is very close and often determined by marginal changes in electoral support, the criterion of significance should not be too stringent. In some instances, a share of 2 or 3 percent of the vote may place a left-libertarian party in a position to affect the formation of governmental majorities.

I have classified left-libertarian parties as significant if they have received about 4 percent or more of the vote in a national parliamentary or presidential election at least once in the 1980s. Alliances among left-libertarian parties are permitted to count toward the 4-percent threshold. The dependent variable is thus a dummy with two values indicating whether a country has (= 1) or does not have (= 0) significant left-libertarian parties.

Table 1 shows that parties in eight West European democracies easily meet this criterion. Luxemburg and Iceland are too small to be included in the present comparative analysis. In three of the six remaining cases,

[4] Electoral analysis of Scandinavian New Left parties are provided in John Logue, *Socialism and Abundance* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982), chaps. 6 and 8; Alastair H. Thomas, "Social Democracy in Scandinavia: Can Dominance Be Regained?" in William E. Paterson and Alastair H. Thomas, eds., *The Future of Social Democracy* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986). For France, see Daniel Boy, "Le vote ecologiste en 1978" [The ecological vote in 1978], *Revue française de science politique* 31 (No. 2, 1981), 394-416. For West Germany, compare Hans Joachim Veen, "Wer wählt grün? Zum Profil der Neuen Linken in der Wohlstandsgesellschaft" [Who votes Green? On the profile of the New Left in the affluent society], *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* 34 (September 1984), 3-17; and Wilhelm P. Bürklin, "The Greens: Ecology and the New Left," in H. G. Wallach and George K. Romoser, eds., *West German Politics in the Mid-Eighties: Crisis and Continuity* (New York: Praeger 1985). For other countries, see Ferdinand Müller-Rommel, "The Greens in Western Europe: Similar but Different," *International Political Science Review* 6 (No. 4, 1985), 483-99.

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(Denmark, the Netherlands, and Norway), the left-libertarian parties may be classified as New Left or left-socialist. They originated in the late 1950s and 1960s and languished in the 1970s, but in recent years they have developed a profile of voter support and a programmatic outlook that qualifies them as left-libertarians. The three other unambiguous cases are the Austrian, Belgian, and West German ecology parties. They are less than ten years old and started from environmentalist visions that always involved a genuinely left-libertarian commitment.

Three additional countries have borderline left-libertarian parties. In Switzerland, the New Left and ecology parties coexist side by side and cooperate with each other. In Sweden, two established parties—the Center Party and the Communist Party—have moved toward the left-libertarian agenda and preempted the successful formation of either New Left or ecology parties. Since they have not entirely renounced their traditional clienteles and ideological affinities, they must be treated as borderline cases. Norway and the Netherlands also have centrist or liberal parties that have moved toward the left-libertarian agenda. They are not included in my list because their outlook is more ambiguous than that of those that are included.[5]

In France, which is the most difficult case to classify, left-socialist parties played some role in the 1960s and 1970s, but have now virtually disappeared from the political scene. France was actually the first country in which the ecologists enjoyed some modest success in local and regional elections in the 1970s, but their performance at the national level has been inconsistent and disappointing. Although the ecology candidate received almost 4 percent of the vote in the first round of the 1981 presidential election, the ecologists have fared badly in all elections to the French national assembly.

A total of nine countries may be considered either clear or borderline cases with significant left-libertarian parties. My classification does not predetermine the findings of the comparative analysis, however; it is itself subject to test. If some of the borderline cases do not conform to a pattern of determination that explains the rise of left-libertarian parties in most other cases, we will have to reclassify the countries. France is most likely not a case of true, significant left-libertarian parties. In the empirical analysis, I will therefore count France alternatively as a case with a significant

[5] The Norwegian party, unlike its Swedish counterpart, barely cleared the 3% threshold in the 1980s, and finally lost its parliamentary representation in 1985. See John Modeley, "Norway's 1985 Election: A Pro-Welfare Backlash," *West European Politics* 9 (No. 2, 1986), 289-92. For an analysis of the Swedish and Norwegian centrist libertarian parties, see Neil Elder and Rolf Gooderham, "The Centre Parties of Norway and Sweden," *Government and Opposition* 13 (No. 2, 1978), 218-35.

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TABLE 1
LEFT-LIBERTARIAN PARTIES IN WESTERN DEMOCRACIES:
BEST PERFORMANCE 1980-1986

I. COUNTRIES WITH SIGNIFICANT LEFT-LIBERTARIAN PARTIES

A. "Clear" Cases			
Austria (A)	The Greens	4.6%	(national elections 1986)
Belgium (B)	AGALEV/ECOLO	6.2%	(national elections 1985)
Denmark (DK)	Socialist People's Party	11.5%	(national elections 1984)
	Left Socialist Party	2.7%	(national elections 1984)
Netherlands (NL)	PPR/PSP/CPN (Green Progressive Accord)	5.7%	(national elections 1982)
Norway (N)	Socialist People's Party	5.4%	(national elections 1985)
West Germany (FRG)	The Greens	5.6%	(national elections 1983)
Iceland	Women's Party	5.0%	(national elections 1983)
Luxemburg	The Green Alternative	5.2%	(national elections 1984)
B. "Borderline" Cases			
France (F)	Ecologists	3.9%	(presidential elections 1981)
	Les Verts	1.2%	(parliamentary elections 1986)
Sweden (S)	Left Communist Party	5.4%	(national elections 1985)
	Center Party	12.4%	(national elections 1985)
Switzerland (CH)	Greens	2.9%	(national elections 1983)
	Progressive Organizations	2.7%	(national elections 1983)

II. Countries without Significant Left-Libertarian Parties

A. Marginal Parties Exist

Canada (CND)	Green Party of Canada		(no contest in national elections)
New Zealand (NZ)	Values Party	0.2%	(national elections 1984)
United Kingdom (UK)	Ecology/Green Party	1.1%	(in districts contested in the 1983 national elections)

B. Proto-Parties or Loose Electoral Coalitions Exist

Finland (FI)	Greens	1.4%	(national elections 1983)
Ireland (IRE)	Comhaontas Glas/Greens		(no contest in national elections)
Italy (I)	Radical Party	2.2%	(national elections 1983)
	Various local Green lists		(no contest in national elections)
Japan (J)	Green Party		(declared only)
Spain	Green Party		(declared only, no independent participation in national elections)
United States (US)	Citizens' Party	0.1%	(presidential elections 1984)
	New World Alliance		(no contest in national elections)

C. No Parties Declared

Australia (AUS)
Greece
Portugal

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left-libertarian party (France = 1) and without it (France = 0). If France is a true case of left-libertarian party formation, variables that predict the presence of these parties in the other countries should do the same for France. If, however, the addition of the French case to the countries with left-libertarian parties weakens the correlation between various independent variables and left-libertarian party formation, France should be excluded from this group.

In twelve other Western democracies, significant left-libertarian parties do not exist. Many of them have very small ecology or left-socialist splinter parties (which are not necessarily listed in the table); but these parties are electorally insignificant by my criteria. Closest to the threshold of political significance are Italy, where the Radical Party managed to surpass 3 percent in one national election during the 1970s, and Finland, where a small ecology party is actually represented in the national parliament. Whether I have classified these two cases correctly can be validated by checking if the absence of left-libertarian parties is explained by the same factors in these cases as in the other countries without such parties.

Nine of the twelve countries without significant left-libertarian parties are included in the comparative analysis. Greece, Portugal, and Spain were dropped because their transition to democracy is too recent. An initial exploration, moreover, showed that they have none of the attributes that facilitate the rise of left-libertarian parties in other countries. Adding these countries would thus confirm my analysis.

The development of left-libertarian parties cannot be reviewed individually and by country in this paper.[6] In general, New Left parties are the oldest subgroup; they have attracted electoral support in Scandinavia, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. The newer left-libertarian parties appeared in the late 1970s; they are the ecology or "green" parties of Austria, Belgium, France, Switzerland, and West Germany. Despite their names, these parties are not narrow environmentalist pressure groups, but address the entire range of left-libertarian demands. In addition to

[6] Case materials for a comparative study of left-libertarian parties in general, and ecology parties in particular, can be found in Jürgen Baumgarten, ed., *Linkssozialisten in Europa: Alternative zu Sozialdemokratie und kommunistischen Parteien* [Left socialists in Europe: Alternatives to social democracy and communist parties] (Hamburg: Junius, 1982); Frank De-Roose, "De Groene Golf: Over de nationale diversiteit van een international fenomeen" [The Green wave: On the national diversity of an international phenomenon], *De Groene Schriften* 7, pp. 33-61; Patrick Florizoone, *De Groenen: Idee, bewegingen en partijen* [The Greens: Ideas, movements, and parties] (Deurne: Kluver, 1985); Ferdinand Müller-Rommel, " 'Parteien neuen Typs' in Westeuropa: Eine vergleichende Analyse" ['Parties of a new type' in Western Europe: A comparative analysis], *Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen* 13 (No. 3, 1982), 369-90, and "New Social Movements and Smaller Parties: A Comparative Perspective," *West European Politics* 8 (No. 1, 1985), 41-54; Wolfgang Rüdig, "The Greens in Europe. Ecological Parties and the European Elections of 1984," *Parliamentary Affairs* 38 (No. 1, 1985), 56-72.

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these two main subgroups, there are a few center-left parties with a left-libertarian agenda in Sweden, Norway, and the Netherlands.

III. Methodology of Comparison

The small number of cases, the definition of the dependent variable as a dummy, and the collinearity among the independent variables preempt a sophisticated multivariate statistical analysis and causal modeling of the paths that lead to left-libertarian parties. In view of these limitations, I will use some less powerful quantitative and semi-quantitative measures and techniques to draw inferences about the association of variables. The analysis is theory-driven and its conclusions go beyond what the statistical analysis alone would warrant.

My main analytic technique is the cross-tabulation of dichotomized independent and dependent variables. I dichotomize ordinal- or interval-scaled variables around the median. Because the eighteen countries in my comparison are evenly distributed over each of the two values that independent and dependent variables can assume, we can calculate by how much the actual distribution of countries over the cells of the resulting two-by-two tables diverges from random probability. If a hypothesis predicts that all cases may be found in two of the four cells, while random probability would lead us to expect 50 percent of the cases in these cells, the difference between the actual number of cases and the 50-percent mark indicates the explanatory power of that hypothesis. For each table, a "coefficient of reproducibility" calculates the percentage of cases that are correctly classified according to the hypothesis being tested.

In addition, if independent variables are metric or interval-scaled, we can compare whether countries with left-libertarian parties have different mean values on these variables from countries where these parties are absent. In such cases, I have used regression analysis. Because the dependent variable is a dummy, I have used a loglinear regression model (LOGIT) to test the statistical significance of the association between independent variables and left-libertarian parties. In addition, I provide Pearson linear correlation coefficients to measure the strength of the association between the variables.

All empirical indicators are at the macro level. They presuppose microfoundations that cannot be explicitly tested in this paper. There are no sufficient comparative data to determine how and why individual supporters of left-libertarian parties differ from the overall electorates in the eighteen democracies.

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IV. Structural Change and Left-Libertarian Parties

Most contemporary theories of structural change adopt the Schumpeterian perspective that the success of capitalist institutions and values will ultimately bring about the demise of capitalism's organizational and moral foundations.[7] These theories identify the spread of markets and bureaucracies as the source of new dissatisfaction. They interpret the programmatic concerns of left-libertarian parties as a protest against the emerging bureaucratic and meritocratic postindustrial society.

According to these theories, modern welfare capitalism was made possible by an unprecedented period of economic growth, affluence, and institutional stability. The new social movements and left-libertarian parties are mobilizing against certain consequences of this process and articulating new preferences for social change. They respond to tendencies in postindustrial societies that (1) produce unacceptable risks to human life and the environment, (2) restrain the autonomy of the individual citizen, and (3) undercut a democratic governance of social change. Although these societies promote sophisticated education, they simultaneously frustrate demands for more political participation and centralize control in hierarchies of experts and bureaucracies. They foster individualism and mobility, but deny a more autonomous definition of individual lifestyles and collective identities at the local level. Theories of postindustrial society suggest that the growing tension between citizens' demands for autonomy and participation on the one hand, and the increasingly comprehensive and complex hierarchies of social control on the other, is what leads to the formation of left-libertarian parties.

A simple way to explore the link between societal transformation and left-libertarian parties is to compare the per capita incomes of the Western democracies. The more affluent countries should create stronger preferences and individual capacities to pursue left and libertarian goals. At the same time, these countries tend to regulate social life more tightly through market exchange relations and organizational hierarchies. Table 2 shows that levels of economic affluence correctly predict the presence or absence of left-libertarian parties in sixteen out of eighteen cases. The average income in countries with relevant left-libertarian parties is noticeably higher than in those without, and the coefficient of reproducibility is much higher than chance. The LOGIT analysis shows that the association

[7] Macrostructural theories are especially influenced by the work of Jürgen Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1975), and Habermas, *Communication and the Evolution of Society* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1979); Alain Touraine, *The Self-Production of Society* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977); and Claus Offe, *Contradictions of the Welfare State* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1984).

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TABLE 2
LEFT-LIBERTARIAN PARTIES AND PER CAPITA INCOME
(1980)

	Income Greater than $11,000 per Capita		*Income Smaller than $11,000 per Capita*	
Significant Left-Libertarian Parties Exist (Average = $13,001)	B	(11,816)	A	(10,251)
	DK	(12,952)		
	F	(12,136)		
	FRG	(13,305)		
	N	(14,019)		
	NL	(11,851)		
	S	(14,761)		
	CH	(15,922)		
No Significant Left-Libertarian Parties Exist (Average = $8,972)	US	(11,364)	AUS	(10,129)
			FI	(10,440)
			I	(6,906)
			IRE	(5,193)
			J	(8,873)
			NZ	(7,441)
			UK	(9,335)
			CND	(10,582)

Source: OECD, *Historical Statistics 1960–1980* (Paris: OECD, 1982).

STATISTICAL INTERPRETATION

	France with Left-Libertarian Party (France = 1)	*France without Left-Libertarian Party (France = 0)*
*Coefficient of Reproducibility (CR)**	.89	.83
r	.75	.71
Significance Level (LOGIT *Regression)*	.055	.04

* $CR = 1 - \frac{N \text{ of mistakes}}{N \text{ of cases}}$

of income and party formation is close to the commonly accepted level of statistical significance, and the correlation coefficient is quite strong. Nevertheless, the link is not perfect: Austria and the United States are anomalies not explained by the theory. France strengthens the correlation if it is counted as a case with left-libertarian parties.

Within West Germany, the relationship between affluence and left-

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libertarian party strength holds true at an even more disaggregate level. If we regress the electoral support for the West German Greens in state and national elections from 1981 to 1985 on the per capita income of the West German states, there is a strong and significant correlation between income levels and electoral support.[8] Figure 1 illustrates this link. Other variables, such as the industrial structure or the competitive position of different parties in each state, may explain the remaining variance. We will return to these variables in the cross-national analysis.

Postindustrial societies are said to be characterized by a high percentage of the economically active population working in the service sector and by increasing levels of education in the population. But in the eighteen democracies in the sample, no association between the sectoral structure of the economy and left-libertarian parties can be found (see Table 3). Similarly, the relative size of the student population in advanced education shows no link to party formation.[9] These negative findings suggest that sociological theories of postindustrialism offer only limited explanations at best for the rise of new parties.

This conclusion is reinforced when we analyze the link of postmaterialist values in affluent democracies to the formation of left-libertarian parties. Surveys show that most left-libertarian voters do prefer postmaterialist values. But the reverse does not hold true: not all postmaterialists support left-libertarian parties. Although we do not have data on the entire set of eighteen democracies to substantiate this assertion, data exist on six European countries with and without left-libertarian parties. In the countries with left-libertarian parties (West Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, and France as a borderline case), the percentage of citizens with postmaterialist values is not unambiguously greater than in the countries that do not have such parties (Britain and Italy).[10]

[8] Autocorrelation between the values of Green electoral support within each German state may make the correlation look stronger than it is. But in view of the small number of cases and the limited purpose of this analysis, I have settled for a simple bivariate analysis.

[9] The number of college students per 100,000 inhabitants is taken as a measure of educational advancement. Data are provided by UNESCO, *Statistical Digest 1984* (Paris: UNESCO, 1984).

[10] Data on the distribution of materialists and postmaterialists in these countries are provided by Paul R. Abrahamson and Ronald Inglehart, "Generational Replacement and Value Change in Six West European Societies," paper prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC, August 30-September 2, 1984. If we average the postmaterialism scores for 1976-1980 in Belgium, the Netherlands, and West Germany, they are only slightly higher than the average in France, Britain, or Italy. West Germany's score is smaller than that of France or Britain. Belgium, which was more postmaterialist in 1976-1980, is much less postmaterialist than are all other countries in the 1980s. Finally, the postmaterialism measure is heavily influenced by the actual inflation rates of a country. If this variable was held constant, the association between national postmaterialism scores and left-libertarian parties would probably disappear entirely.

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FIGURE 1
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PER CAPITA INCOME
IN THE WEST GERMAN STATES (1980)
AND THE GREEN VOTE IN STATE AND NATIONAL ELECTIONS (1981–1985)



Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, *Statistisches Jahrbuch der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1984).

Key: S-H = Schleswig-Holstein; SAAR = Saarland; NS = Niedersachsen (Lower Saxony); R-P = Rheinland-Pfalz (Rhineland-Palatinate) [same result in two elections]; BAY = Bayern (Bavaria); NR-W = Nordrhein-Westfalen (Northrhine-Westfalia); B-W = Baden-Württemberg; HES = Hessen (Hesse); WB = West Berlin; BRE = Bremen; HAM = Hamburg.

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TABLE 3
LEFT-LIBERTARIAN PARTIES AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SERVICE SECTOR
(Percentage of the employed labor force)

	Percentage Greater than 57.5%		*Percentage Lower than 57.5%*	
Significant Left-Libertarian Parties Exist (Average = 57.9%)	B	(62.3%)	A	(51.5%)
	DK	(63.3%)	CH	(52.3%)
	NL	(62.1%)	F	(55.3%)
	N	(61.8%)	FRG	(49.2%)
	S	(62.2%)		
No Significant Left-Libertarian Parties Exist (Average = 57.1%)	AUS	(62.4%)	FI	(54.0%)
	CND	(66.0%)	I	(48.0%)
	UK	(59.2%)	IRE	(48.4%)
	US	(65.9%)	J	(54.2%)
			NZ	(55.2%)

Source: OECD, *Historical Statistics, 1960–80* (Paris: OECD, 1982), Table 2.11, p. 35.

STATISTICAL INTERPRETATION

	France = 1	*France = 0*
CR	.56	.61
r	.06	.1
p (LOGIT)	.79 (n.s.)	.67 (n.s.)

Inglehart and Dalton argue that value change does not instantly translate into electoral realignments.[11] Still, this does not explain why the apparent "lags" between value change and party realignments differ from country to country. Theories of postmaterialism either do not use reliable and valid measures of value change or they underrate the importance of changing cognitive capabilities and of institutional opportunities and constraints as determinants of collective political action.

Thus, theories of postindustrialist society and value change at best account for changing individual orientations, preferences, and capabilities to engage in collective protest. But they do not sufficiently predict the conditions and opportunities under which these values and preferences lead to the formation of left-libertarian parties.

[11] See Ronald Inglehart, "The Changing Structure of Political Cleavages in Western Societies," in Dalton et al. (fn. 2), 62, and Russell J. Dalton, "Environmentalism and Value Change in Western Democracies," paper prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC, August 30-September 2, 1984.

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V. Political Opportunities for and Constraints on the Development of Left-Libertarian Parties

Although socioeconomic theories of party formation remain unsatisfactory, we can explore the significance of political institutions and power relations in the development of left-libertarian parties. The socioeconomic transformation of modern democracy explains *why* there is pressure to represent left-libertarian interests in the political arena, but political institutions and power relations explain *whether* these pressures are represented by specific political parties, *when* these parties appear, and *what* label they adopt.

The formation of political parties can be examined from the perspective of rational actors who have postindustrial political demands and are searching for the most effective strategies to place them on the political agenda. Forming new parties in order to press for new political demands requires more effort than using existing political channels, such as established parties and interest groups. Rational actors will attempt to build new vehicles of interest representation only if traditional organizations fail to respond to postindustrial demands. Moreover, these actors must be able to take advantage of opportunities and acquire resources to build a new party. Thus, new political parties will form only when the *unresponsiveness* of existing political institutions coincides with favorable *political opportunities* to displace existing parties.

Four conditions shape the opportunities and constraints of left-libertarian party formation. Comprehensive welfare states increase the financial resources and the motivational dispositions of important groups to shift their political attention from economic to postindustrial policy issues. In advanced welfare states, strong labor corporatism and the participation of left parties in government constrain the pursuit of postindustrial demands through established political channels, and thus render the development of new political vehicles for these demands more probable. The likelihood of the formation of left-libertarian parties increases further when highly visible conflicts about postindustrial policy issues (such as nuclear power) mobilize social movements and polarize society.

The welfare state protects the material well-being of many citizens from the effects of the business cycle and capitalist labor markets on their behavior and aspirations. Social insurance systems, public employment, educational institutions, and retraining programs provide a "safety net" and a subjective sense of security that is essential to the reorientation of people's political agenda. Such arrangements encourage them to discount the negative impact of low economic growth on their individual lives and increase their willingness to support policies that restrain private business

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and the bureaucratic management of economic growth. This type of logic presumes a certain myopia among the actors because, after all, the welfare state itself is dependent on economic performance. Nevertheless, actual perceptions of opportunities and constraints may be reconstructed by such policies.

Welfare states encourage left-libertarian mobilization in another sense. They organize many social services (education, social welfare, health, etc.) in bureaucratic institutions. Nonmarket services in general, and the bureaucratic provision of social services in particular, may thus give rise to intense consumer dissatisfaction, which in turn fuels left-libertarian demands for a decentralized, consumer-controlled reorganization of public services.[12]

If this reasoning is valid, comprehensive welfare states should be most likely to generate left-libertarian parties. Table 4 shows that the existence of left-libertarian parties is strongly linked to public social expenditure as a percentage of gross domestic product. The coefficient of reproducibility as well as the correlation coefficient indicate a firm association between these variables. The mean social expenditures are much higher in countries with relevant left-libertarian parties, and the LOGIT analysis demonstrates that this association is statistically significant. The welfare state explains the "anomalies" we find when examining the association between left-libertarian parties and economic development. Austria and the United States are now classified correctly. France, again, contributes more to the association if it is classified as a country with left-libertarian parties. The association between the welfare state and left-libertarian parties, however, yields some new anomalies: Ireland and Switzerland. Plausible *ad hoc* arguments explain at least the Swiss case.[13]

The strength of welfare states is the result of economic development and peculiar political forces and institutions.[14] The most comprehensive welfare states are associated with strong, centralized labor unions and the frequent participation of social democratic and socialist parties in government. But while the welfare state creates *opportunities* for the mobiliza-

[12] See Albert O. Hirschman, *Shifting Involvements* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), 39-41.

[13] The figures understate the exceptional social and economic security Swiss citizens enjoy due to Switzerland's unique position in the world economy. See Manfred Schmidt, *Der schweizerische Weg zur Vollbeschäftigung* [The Swiss path to full employment] (Frankfurt/Main: Campus Verlag, 1985).

[14] See Peter Flora and Arnold J. Heidenheimer, eds., *The Development of Welfare States in Western Europe and North America* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1981), and Francis G. Castles, *The Impact of Parties* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1982). Compare, as a recent analytic survey of studies on the determinants of the welfare state, Hannu Uusitalo, "Comparative Research on the Determinants of the Welfare State: The State of the Art," *European Journal of Political Research* 12 (No. 4, 1984), 403-24.

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TABLE 4
LEFT-LIBERTARIAN PARTIES AND SOCIAL SECURITY EXPENDITURE
(1979–1980) (Percentage of GNP)

	Expenditure Greater than 19%		*Expenditure Smaller than 19%*	
Significant Left-Libertarian Parties Exist (Average = 23.6%)	A	(21.4%)	CH	(12.8%)
	B	(24.5%)		
	DK	(26.2%)		
	F	(25.5%)		
	FRG	(23.0%)		
	N	(19.8%)		
	NL	(27.6%)		
	S	(31.2%)		
No Significant Left-Libertarian Parties Exist (Average = 14.9%)	IRE	(20.6%)	AUS	(11.6%)
			CND	(14.8%)
			FI	(18.0%)
			I	(16.3%)
			J	(9.8%)
			NZ	(14.1%)
			UK	(16.9%)
			US	(12.2%)

(Overall Average = 19.2%)

Source: International Labor Office, *The Cost of Social Security. Eleventh International Inquiry 1978–80* (Geneva: ILO, 1985).

STATISTICAL INTERPRETATION

	France = 1	*France = 0*
CR	.89	.83
r	.72	.61
p (LOGIT)	.02	.03

tion of left-libertarian demands, labor-interest organizations and government participation by the socialists provide *constraints* that prevent these demands from being articulated through established political channels. Labor corporatism and left party governments increase the *rigidity* and *unresponsiveness* of political systems to left-libertarian policy demands, and thereby speed the formation of new parties.

In capitalist democracies, labor can gain power only if it is well organized. It must represent a large share of a country's wage earners and it

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must centralize organizational decision making. This form of mobilization increases labor's capacity to engage in elite bargaining with business and political parties.[15] Each participant has the resources to do damage to the others, but it also has capacities to enter into and enforce compromises.

Corporatist interest intermediation constrains left-libertarian demands in at least two ways. Because of the very centralist, formal organization of the participants in corporatist policy-making arenas, it is comparatively more difficult for new, less well-organized interests to be heard in the political system. In particular, existing political parties will discount new demands if no organization is behind them. Moreover, business and labor have a common interest as economic producers in preserving the logic of industrial growth and bureaucratic regulation—precisely the institutions that left-libertarian forces attack. When producer interests dominate the political agenda, left-libertarians can hope to disrupt this policy-making system only by establishing new vehicles of interest representation.

Since business interests and conservative parties as a rule are inimical to most left-libertarian demands for more egalitarian, participatory, and ecological economic or political institutions, the inclusion of labor in corporatist interest intermediation is vital to understanding why corporatism enhances pressures to create left-libertarian parties. Unions, labor parties, and left-libertarians have a common mistrust of the market and prefer greater equality and political redistribution. As labor organizations are drawn into corporatist interest intermediation, they sacrifice their anticapitalist spirit in favor of tangible short-term benefits for their constituencies (e.g., in the areas of social policy and employment). They move away from potential alliances with left-libertarian forces and lose their capacity to include left-libertarian demands in their own political platforms.

Only in a few of the noncorporatist countries have labor unions shown sympathy toward left-libertarian positions, such as opposition to nuclear power. Most notably, the French and Japanese socialist unions voiced concern about nuclear power in the 1970s. Some dissent from nuclear policies also developed in the British Trade Union Congress and in some U.S. unions. In corporatist systems, on the other hand, unions have always supported national nuclear policies, even if some union activists or

[15] In the burgeoning literature on labor corporatism, see in particular Philippe C. Schmitter and Gerhard Lehmbruch, eds., *Trends Toward Corporatist Intermediation* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1979); Gerhard Lehmbruch and Philippe C. Schmitter, eds., *Patterns of Corporatist Policy-Making* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1982); and Suzanne Berger, ed., *Organizing Interests in Western Europe* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

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suborganizations opposed this position. For this reason, the formation of left-libertarian parties should increase parallel to the firmness of labor-corporatist arrangements.

I use Schmitter's combined index of organizational centralization and associational monopoly of unions to measure labor corporatism.[16] Table 5 shows a very high association between labor corporatism and the development of left-libertarian parties. Three anomalies remain: Finland, France, and Switzerland. In the Swiss case, Schmitter's index may not appropriately tap the corporatist patterns of interest intermediation that are common in that country.

TABLE 5
LEFT-LIBERTARIAN PARTIES AND LABOR CORPORATISM*
(Combined rank order of organizational centralization and associational monopoly of unions, 1965–1980)

	High Labor Corporatism	*Low Labor Corporatism*
Significant Left-Libertarian Parties Exist	A NL B S DK FRG N	F CH
No Significant Left-Libertarian Parties Exist	FI	AUS J CND UK IRE US I

* No Data on New Zealand

Sources: The measure was developed by Schmitter (fn. 16), 294. Japan and Australia were added to Schmitter's sample as cases of low labor corporatism, based on data reported in David Cameron, "Social Democracy, Corporatism, Labour Quiescence, and the Representation of Economic Interest in Advanced Capitalist Society," in John H. Goldthorpe, ed., *Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism* (London: Oxford University Press, 1984), 143-78, at 165.

CR = .82 (France = 1)
CR = .88 (France = 0)

In view of the difficulty of quantifying corporatism, I have chosen the level of strike activity in the countries as an indirect measure of economic interest intermediation. Because it facilitates compromise between capital and labor, labor corporatism is inversely related to strike activity. Table 6 shows that the association between strike activity and left-libertarian

[16] Philippe C. Schmitter, "Interest Intermediation and Regime Governability in Contemporary Western Europe and North America," in Berger (fn. 15), 287-330.

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TABLE 6
LEFT-LIBERTARIAN PARTIES AND STRIKE ACTIVITY*
(Working days lost per 1000 employees in the labor force, 1965–1981)

	Loss Less than 260 Days per Year	*Loss More than 260 Days per Year*
Significant Left-Libertarian Parties Exist (Average = 85.1%)	A (10) B (156) CH (1) DK (148) FRG (28) N (28) NL (22) S (95)	F (278)
No Significant Left-Libertarian Parties Exist (Average = 458.3%)	J (71)	AUS (427) CND (707) FI (358) I (840) IRE (484) UK (375) US (411)

* No Data on New Zealand

Source: International Labor Office, *Yearbook of Labor Statistics* (Geneva: ILO, 1983), quoted in Cameron (see sources, Table 5).

STATISTICAL INTERPRETATION

	France = 1	*France = 0*
CR	.88	.94
r	−.77	−.78
p (LOGIT)	.02	.05

parties is strongly negative. The coefficient of reproducibility is high; only France—if counted as a country with a significant left-libertarian party—and Japan remain as anomalies. The mean strike activity among countries with left-libertarian parties is much lower than in the other eight countries, and the LOGIT analysis confirms that the bivariate association is significant. Because France has an intermediate level of strike activity, its classification does not affect the level and significance of the associations much.

Labor corporatism is linked to two other variables that I have not ex-

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plicitly modeled in the present analysis. Countries with labor corporatism tend to be small and to develop political cultures based on bargaining, compromise, and the depoliticization of conflict. Some authors have related this "northern European polity model" to the low level of autonomy that small countries enjoy in the world economy. If they want to respond flexibly to external challenges, they cannot afford high levels of domestic conflict.[17] The price of domestic consensus, however, is centralized elite bargaining and the absence of popular participation in policy making. Left-libertarians evidently support a view of politics that is diametrically opposed to these patterns. They are a force that is bound to challenge and disrupt consensualist policy making.

In examining the role that political parties play in the emergence of left-libertarian competitors, we must pursue the same logic as we did with respect to labor corporatism: independent left-libertarian parties are more likely to develop when the traditional left is unavailable as a vehicle of protest against the dominant model of societal development. Whether this is actually the case depends on national structures of party competition.

The initial premise is that voters with left-libertarian sympathies are most likely to support traditional left parties in situations where they can choose *only* between socialist/social democratic and conservative parties.[18] Even if there is a left-libertarian alternative, voters will still tend to support the traditional left when the socialist and conservative parties are of roughly equal electoral strength because they fear that defection from the socialists will indirectly help the conservatives. For this reason, established left parties have often advertised themselves to left-libertarian constituencies as the "lesser evil." Moreover, as long as the traditional left is in the opposition, it can invoke both pro-labor and left-libertarian programs to gloss over the tensions that an alliance between these two forces would create.

Three different competitive configurations in party systems favor the development of left-libertarian parties. First, when the traditional left governs hegemonically, a conservative government is not a real threat;

[17] See Peter Katzenstein, "The Small European States in the International Economy: Economic Dependence and Corporatist Politics," in John Gerard Ruggie, ed., *The Antinomies of Interdependence* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983); Katzenstein, *Small States in World Markets* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984); Michael Wallerstein, "The Microfoundations of Corporatism: Formal Theory and Comparative Analysis," paper prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC, August 30-September 2, 1984.

[18] In two instances, left-libertarian centrist parties in Sweden (the Center Party) and in the Netherlands (Democrats '66) actually supported conservative governments. In both instances, the voters disapproved of these alliances and the parties lost votes in subsequent elections.

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left-libertarians may therefore be tempted to abandon socialist parties. Second, the longer socialist parties participate in government, the more likely left-libertarians will be to defect from them. The performance record of socialist governments antagonizes left-libertarians and dampens hopes that the traditional left can incorporate new demands into its policies while simultaneously catering to its traditional working class constituency. Finally, where traditional left parties are weak and permanently confined to the opposition, voters have nothing to lose by supporting a new left-libertarian party.[19] From these hypotheses, one would expect a curvilinear association between socialist participation in government and relevant left-libertarian parties, with high probabilities both when socialist participation in government is high and when it is negligible.

The level of electoral support for traditional left parties is not a good empirical predictor of left-libertarian parties because it does not fully reflect the competitive position and influence of the left on the formation of governments and public policy making; socialist participation in government matters more. As Table 7 shows, government participation by the left between 1970 and 1980 is positively associated with the formation of significant left-libertarian parties.[20] This interpretation is also supported by the LOGIT analysis of the bivariate association and the correlation coefficient. However, the relationship between socialist participation in government and the appearance of left-libertarian parties is linear, not curvilinear. With the exception of France, countries with weak socialist parties have not produced left-libertarian parties. Even France may be a misleading case because left-libertarian electoral support dwindled with the rise of the socialist-communist alliance in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Statistically, the association between left-libertarian parties and socialist participation in government strengthens when France is dropped from the sample of countries with left-libertarian parties.

The structure of party systems, especially the internal cohesiveness of right and left party blocs and their ability to control the state executive,

[19] The argument that weak opposition parties spawn new opposition parties was developed by Maurice Pinard, *The Rise of a Third Party: A Study in Crisis Politics*, enlarged ed. (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1975).

[20] Some may argue that the period from 1970 to 1980 misspecifies the left government variable for those countries in which left-libertarian parties were formed much earlier than the late 1970s—i.e., the Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands. The use of earlier time periods for these countries, however, would not substantially alter the result. What is more important is that only in the later 1970s, after a period of organizational and/or electoral crisis, did the Scandinavian and Dutch New Left parties begin to adopt the entire left-libertarian agenda, including ecological demands, and to abandon traditional notions of socialism. The electoral constituency of Scandinavian New Left parties underwent a dramatic change during this period. Compare Logue (fn. 4).

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TABLE 7
LEFT-LIBERTARIAN PARTIES AND MAJOR SOCIALIST/COMMUNIST PARTY PARTICIPATION IN GOVERNMENT
(Months in government, 1970–1980)

	Participation More than 61 Months	*Participation Less than 61 Months*
Significant Left-Libertarian Parties Exist (Average = 89.1%)	A (132) B (90) CH (132) FRG (132) DK (97) N (85) S (82)	F (0) NL (52)
No Significant Left-Libertarian Parties Exist (Average = 32.9%)	FI (112) UK (62)	AUS (35) CND (0) I (0) IRE (51) J (0) NZ (36) US (0)

Source: *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, 1970–1980.

STATISTICAL INTERPRETATION

	France = 1	*France = 0*
CR	.78	.83
r	.59	.74
p (LOGIT)	.03	.03

explains the timing and the label of left-libertarian parties. In countries where New Left parties appeared as precursors of contemporary left-libertarian parties, the left was united while the conservative camp was deeply divided among several bourgeois parties. This strengthened the position of the traditional left parties and reduced the risk that New Left parties would involuntarily support conservative governments—a situation favorable to left-libertarian party formation in Denmark, the Netherlands, France, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland. In countries where the right was well-organized and prevented domination by socialists, left-libertarian parties emerged only in the late 1970s after long periods of left participation in government; they now carry the "Green" or "ecology"

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label. This rationale explains the cases of Austria, Belgium, and West Germany.

In the same way, we can interpret the finding that New Left or center-left libertarian parties emerged in party systems characterized by long-term rising electoral volatility, while ecology parties proved successful in systems with declining volatility (Table 8). It is true that the rise of left-libertarian parties itself affects the regression line of party system volatility, but high volatility usually indicates that many parties win and lose voters simultaneously. Such systems offer a good opportunity for the early formation of left-libertarian parties, a situation that prevails in countries with unstable bourgeois party blocs. When volatility declines, bourgeois party blocs are generally stable and make the formation of new left-libertarian parties more difficult.

Only Switzerland has generated both New Left and ecology parties that have sustained electoral significance (in part because they have strongholds in different Swiss cantons). The case of France is an interesting outlier. In the late 1950s and 1960s, the New Left *Parti Socialiste Unifié* flourished in an environment of high electoral volatility, but faltered as the French party system became intensely polarized in the 1970s.[21] Left-libertarian forces tried to make a new start with ecology par-

TABLE 8
ELECTORAL VOLATILITY AND "NEW LEFT" OR "ECOLOGICAL" LEFT-LIBERTARIANS

	Rising Volatility (1948–1977)	*Declining Volatility (1948–1977)*
Countries with "Green" or Ecology Parties	CH	A B F FRG
Countries with Left-Socialist or "New Left" Parties	DK NL N S CH	F

Source: Calculations of the regression slopes for electoral volatility are taken from Mogens Pederson, "Changing Patterns of Electoral Volatility in European Party Systems, 1948–1977: Explorations in Explanation," in Hans Daalder and Peter Mair, eds., *Western European Party Systems* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1984), 29-66.

[21] See Charles Hauss, *The New Left in France: The Unified Socialist Party* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1978), chap. 2.

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ties in the late 1970s and early 1980s, but made little headway in an environment inhospitable to the formation of a left-libertarian party (no labor corporatism, brief left tenure in government).

The trade-off between New Left and ecology parties suggests that the two are political equivalents and members of the same family of parties. Where New Left parties have won significant electoral support, ecology parties have not been successful even when they appealed to voters who were ideologically more moderate. Moreover, in the cases of Norway, Sweden, and the Netherlands, these moderate libertarians are already served by center-left liberal parties that are complementary to the New Left. Conversely, most successful ecology parties have appeared in countries without successful New Left or center left-libertarian parties. While the New Left has embraced the "ecology" agenda, most ecology parties have accepted the libertarian and anticapitalist spirit of the New Left.

To complete this analysis, we must consider a final catalyst that has triggered the rise of contemporary left-libertarian parties and the convergence of ecologism and the New Left: the nuclear power controversy. Antinuclear activists first attempted to work through the established parties, but neither conservative nor socialist parties were willing to represent and support them, particularly in countries with high labor corporatism and left party governments. In these countries, a high level of alienation from the established political institutions encouraged left-libertarians to resort to the mobilization of antinuclear movements in order to advance their agenda. Although the struggle against nuclear power originated in the pragmatic concerns of scientists and citizens for their health and safety, nuclear power rapidly became a symbol for the technocratic domination of society by government agencies, private enterprise, and unions who defend economic growth and bureaucratic welfare states against the left-libertarian challenge.

The strength or weakness of the nuclear controversy is difficult to determine because cross-national data on the mobilization of opponents to nuclear power are confined to inventories of case studies.[22] Ideally, opinion polls, the incidence of mass demonstrations against nuclear facilities, and politically motivated delays in the construction and licensing of nuclear facilities would be valuable measures of the strength of antinuclear movements. In practice, we must rely on informed judgment about the intensity of conflicts in each country (see Table 9).

[22] See Anna Gyorgy, ed., *No Nukes: Everyone's Guide to Nuclear Power* (Boston: Southend Press, 1979), and Lutz Mez, ed., *Der Atomkonflikt: Atomindustrie, Atompolitik und Anti-Atombewegung im internationalen Vergleich* [Nuclear conflict: Nuclear industry, nuclear policy, and the antinuclear movement in international comparison] (Berlin: Olle & Wolter, 1979).

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TABLE 9
LEFT-LIBERTARIAN PARTIES AND THE NUCLEAR POWER CONTROVERSY
(1975–1980)

	Intense Nuclear Controversy	*No Intense Nuclear Controversy*
Significant Left-Libertarian Parties Exist	A DK NL S CH FRG	B F N
No Significant Left-Libertarian Parties Exist	US	AUS CND FI IRE I J NZ UK

CR = .78 (France = 1)
CR = .83 (France = 0)

Among the countries without relevant left-libertarian parties, only the United States sustained a fairly intense nuclear power controversy throughout the early 1970s, even though Britain, Canada, Finland, Italy, and Japan also developed extensive nuclear power programs. From about 1975 on, most countries with left-libertarian parties have experienced intense nuclear power controversies. Belgium, Norway, and France are exceptions. Belgium was already far advanced with its nuclear power program before antinuclear protests reached their peak in the mid-1970s. Norway did not have any nuclear plants and only briefly pondered construction of such facilities. France is difficult to classify: an initially intense antinuclear mobilization in the mid-1970s triggered the participation of ecologists in local and regional elections. After that, government repression, the oppositional Socialist Party's attempts to co-opt antinuclear activists, and the movement's complete lack of policy impact quelled the mobilization of collective protest.[23] These factors probably

[23] The interaction between state and challenging anti-nuclear movements is analyzed in comparative perspective in Herbert Kitschelt, "Political Opportunity Structures and Political Protest. Anti-Nuclear Movements in Four Democracies," *British Journal of Politial Science* 16 (No. 1, 1986), 57-85.

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also lessened the electoral chances of the French ecologists in the early 1980s.

There is some evidence that the nuclear power controversy was particularly intense in countries in which the social democrats participated in the government. In these cases, the large left parties supported the nuclear programs unambiguously. Since the conservative parties were also committed to nuclear power, no significant political force in the arena of parliamentary politics stood up against nuclear power. In Sweden, this configuration precipitated the move of the moderate-libertarian Center Party to an antinuclear position and pushed the Swedish communists further toward left-libertarian demands. In numerous other countries, it created or reinforced electoral support for new left-libertarian parties.

However, the link between the left's participation in government and the intensity of the nuclear power controversy as a precipitating condition of left-libertarian party formation is far from perfect. The United States is an obvious outlier: the conflict was fairly intense even though many Democrats and even a significant number of northeastern Republicans opposed nuclear power. Belgium and Finland implemented ambitious nuclear power programs during periods of socialist participation in government, but did not witness strong conflicts over nuclear power. To sum up, nuclear power controversies in the 1970s contributed to the emergence or strengthening of left-libertarian parties, but were certainly not the prime determinants of innovation in Western party systems.

VI. Social Structure and Political Opportunities: A Synthesis

After having considered structural, institutional, and precipitating conditions for the emergence of left-libertarian parties, we can combine the five strongest predictors of party formation. Since the relatively high collinearity among the five independent variables rules out a meaningful multivariate analysis of their contribution, a weaker analytical technique is required. The dichotomized values on the five independent variables yield a summary "bet" of how likely left-libertarian party formation is in each of the eighteen countries. Table 10 provides this information. In four countries, all variables correctly predict party formation; in four other countries, four out of five variables make the correct prediction; and in eight cases, the variables predict the absence of left-libertarian parties. Only two ambiguous cases remain: the United States and France.

Individual macrosocietal and political variables reveal serious "anomalies" in a number of countries. The explanatory model of five variables

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TABLE 10
SUMMARY OF VARIABLES THAT INFLUENCE THE PRESENCE OF LEFT-LIBERTARIAN PARTIES IN THE 1980S

	Per Capita GNP		*Social Security Expenditure*		*Strike Activity 1965–1981*		*Left Parties in Government*		*Intensity of Nuclear Controversy*		*Odds for the Emergence of Left-Libertarian Parties*
	High	*Low*	*High*	*Low*	*High*	*Low*	*High*	*Low*	*High*	*Low*	
Denmark	X		X			X	X		X		5 : 0
Netherlands	X		X			X	X		X		5 : 0
Sweden	X		X			X	X		X		5 : 0
West Germany	X		X			X	X		X		5 : 0
Austria		X	X			X	X		X		4 : 1
Belgium	X		X			X	X			X	4 : 1
Norway	X		X			X	X			X	4 : 1
Switzerland	X			X		X	X		X		4 : 1
France	X		X		X			X		X	2 : 3
United States	X			X	X			X	X		2 : 3
Finland		X		X	X		X			X	1 : 4
Ireland		X	X		X			X		X	1 : 4
Japan		X		X		X		X		X	1 : 4
United Kingdom		X		X	X		X			X	1 : 4
Australia		X		X	X			X		X	0 : 5
Canada		X		X	X			X		X	0 : 5
Italy		X		X	X			X		X	0 : 5
New Zealand		X		X	X			X		X	0 : 5

Combined *CR* = .86 (France = 1)
Combined *CR* = .87 (France = 0)

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removes most of these anomalies. A combination of the five variables correctly predicts the presence or absence of significant left-libertarian parties in almost all countries. In the two ambiguous cases, the socioeconomic variables strongly predict the presence of significant left-libertarian parties, but the political variables do not. Because I may have overrated the nuclear controversy in the United States, the U.S. case is quite close to that of countries without left-libertarian parties. France remains the most ambiguous case. Economic affluence and the development of the welfare state favor the emergence of left-libertarian parties, and the nuclear power controversy must be placed somewhere between the "strong" and the "weak" antinuclear movements. Yet in France, as in the United States, the relevant institutional and conjunctural political preconditions of left-libertarian party formation are clearly absent. France has a societal potential to generate left-libertarian parties, but it also has an unfavorable concrete political opportunity structure.

In view of the causal patterns that underlie the formation of left-libertarian parties in each of the eighteen democracies, France should be reclassified as a country *without* significant left-libertarian parties. Conversely, Sweden and Switzerland, which were originally introduced as "borderline" cases along with France, clearly show the same causal pattern encountered in countries with left-libertarian parties; they should be classified accordingly.

Overall, the model's link between macro-societal and political variables makes theoretical sense.[24] Societal changes drive the transformation of citizens' wants, but these lead to the emergence of political parties only if political opportunities and constraints make it rational for actors to step outside the established channels of political communication, and if polarizing conflicts of high symbolic importance create the initial conditions that establish a consensus among actors about the nature and outlook of the new left-libertarian parties.

If we are looking for theoretical parsimony of the explanatory model only, the least ambiguous predictor of left-libertarian parties in the sample of the eighteen democracies is the level of strike activity. (This variable—improperly—predicts only a single case: Japan.) Theoretical parsi-

[24] For the general study of collective social mobilization, an approach that combines social transformation, political opportunity structures, and precipitating conditions was outlined by Neil Smelser, *The Theory of Collective Behavior* (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1963). To explain party formation, Smelser's framework has been elaborated by Pinard (fn. 19); Charles Hauss and David Rayside, "The Development of New Parties," in Louis Maisel and Joseph Cooper, eds., *Political Parties: Development and Decay* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage); and Frank L. Wilson, "Sources of Party Transformation: The Case of France," in Peter Merkl, ed., *Western European Party Systems* (New York: Free Press, 1980).

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mony, however, would be bought at the cost of ignoring the complex web of interacting conditions that cumulatively make the emergence of left-libertarian parties more likely. Strike activity is only one indicator in the syndrome that includes economic development, social policy, corporatism, and left-party governments and is responsible for the rise of left-libertarian parties.

Conversely, one could argue that the analysis of political opportunity structures developed above is too narrow because it focuses almost exclusively on the political organization of class cleavage in advanced capitalist democracies. While a number of variables commonly employed to characterize modern party systems do not shed new light on the rise of left-libertarian parties,[25] there is some evidence that electoral rules influence the number and formation of new parties.[26] Indeed, none of the five countries with plurality voting systems (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States) has a relevant left-libertarian party. On the other hand, countries with qualified proportional electoral rules in which political forces must join alliances to overcome minimum thresholds of parliamentary representation (e.g., 4 or 5 percent of the vote) do in many cases have relevant left-libertarian parties.

All of our cases with plurality voting systems, however, are heavily "overdetermined" by one or several of the structural and institutional variables (affluence, the welfare state, labor corporatism, and left party governments). There is no "hard" test for the significance of electoral laws (e.g., a configuration in which electoral rules are unfavorable to new parties), but most other variables suggest the rise of left-libertarian parties. We find, however, that in countries with majority rule, such as Britain, Canada, New Zealand, and even the United States, third-party challenges around other than left-libertarian issues and cleavages do occur and sometimes gain electoral support far stronger than that received by left-libertarian parties in countries with the most favorable structural conditions. This observation suggests that electoral laws do not have the overriding importance that some studies of party systems attribute to them. Even where a majority voting system prevents a new party from winning any seats, rational voters may support it because they believe the

[25] The fractionalization and the number of cleavages incorporated in party systems, for instance, show little association with the rise of left-libertarian parties. These common measures of party systems apparently do not capture relevant political opportunity structures to explain the new left-libertarian cohort of parties.

[26] Cf. Arend Lijphart, *Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), chap. 9; Robert Harmel and John D. Robertson, "Formation and Success of New Parties: A Cross-National Analysis," *International Political Science Review* 6 (No. 4, 1985), 501-23.

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new party has long-term prospects of displacing one of the established parties or can at least force them to listen to new political demands.

VII. Breakdown Theories and Left-Libertarian Parties

We are now in a position to examine the competing breakdown theories of party formation. According to functionalist breakdown theories, collective mobilization is rooted in conjunctural discrepancies between the prevailing expectations in a society and its capacity to attain them. Collective protest will subside when this gap closes. Marxist breakdown theories are less optimistic about the restoration of an equilibrium between expectations and societal performance. For our purposes, however, functionalist and Marxist breakdown theories have the same empirical content: they predict the formation of left-libertarian parties when relative deprivation is rising. Furthermore, the new parties may be expected to decrease when societies improve their performance and attain the values that legitimize the existing social order.

Breakdown models of party formation build on economic variables; political and cultural conditions also play a role. Boy, Bürklin, and Alber have interpreted the rise of ecology parties as a crisis response of the educated younger generation to the frustrations of tight labor markets and the fierce competition for scarce positions in the political elite.[27] The promise of rapid upward social mobility that accompanied the widening of educational opportunities for the young was broken by the economic crises of the 1970s and 1980s and the demands of labor markets. Breakdown theorists interpret the support of the educated young for ecology parties and their postmaterialist antigrowth program as sour-grapes logic: because society does not provide the *means* for rapid upward mobility, the young army of the overeducated and under employed also rejects the *ends* of social success that are associated with this society: affluence, power, and social status, as well as the system of economic growth and bureaucratic politics that supports these values. The young counterelites thus propose an alternative model of societal organization and use left-libertarian parties to realize it.

[27] See Boy (fn. 4), 414-15; Wilhelm P. Bürklin, "Value Change and Partisan Realignment in West Germany 1970-1983: Recent Findings and some Political Interpretations," paper prepared for delivery at the American Political Science Association Convention, Washington, DC, August 30 to September 2, 1984; Bürklin (fn. 4); Jens Alber, "Modernisierung, neue Spannungslinien und die politischen Chancen der Grünen" [Modernization, new cleavages, and the political chances of the Greens], *Politische Vierteljahresschriften* 26 (No. 3, 1985), 211-26.

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Empirically, economic and political breakdown theorists expect that improving chances of upward mobility—or a resumption of economic growth—and a readjustment of expectations will erode the left-libertarian electorate. Alber, for instance, predicts that the West German Greens will falter when the "intellectual proletariat" disappears with economic recovery and greater realism among young academics.[28]

Some authors link cultural conditions to the economic and political breakdown theories of party formation.[29] Frustrated expectations coincide with the coming-of-age of a third political generation of West Germans that does not share the political commitments of the "founding" generation of the Republic or of its conformist offspring, and that identifies only weakly with the established parties. This generational change feeds into the general disillusionment with the performance of industrial societies and triggers a shift of values toward a romantic anti-industrial "idealism." The Greens represent such a convergence of generational change and political-economic decline.

Other cultural breakdown arguments have gained popularity among American intellectuals who see the Greens and the peace movement as the natural consequence of persisting predemocratic, authoritarian, romantic, and nationalist traditions in German society that reject industrial technology, liberalism, and competitive political systems.[30] Economic crisis and declining U.S. world leadership are seen to have brought this long-standing current to the surface again.

Breakdown theories of left-libertarian party formation must face a number of criticisms. They draw questionable inferences about individual motivations and values from an insufficient basis of empirical evidence. Moreover, they fail to consider the breadth of support for left-lib-

[28] See Alber, *ibid.* To be fair, Bürklin combines breakdown theory and structural change and is more inclined to believe that the West German Greens are here to stay. It is not clear, however, whether breakdown and structural change arguments are compatible with each other in Bürklin's work. See Wilhlem P. Bürklin, "The German Greens: The Post-Industrial Non-Established and the Party System," *International Political Science Review* 6 (No. 4, 1985), 463-81.

[29] See Wilhelm P. Bürklin, *Grüne Politik. Ideologische Zyklen, Wähler und Parteiensystem* [Green politics: Ideological cycles, voters, and party system] (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1984).

[30] This view is popular in liberal and conservative editorial opinion, as well as in the work of some recognized historians. See Gordon Craig, *The Germans* (New York: Meridian, 1982), 210-11, and Walter Laqueur, *Germany Today: A Personal Report* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1985), 162-74. For a critique of the West German peace movement, see especially Russel Berman, "Opposition to Rearmament and West German Culture," *Telos* (No. 56, 1983), 141-47. A more balanced assessment of the peace movement and nationalism in German politics is provided by Andrei S. Markovits, "On Anti-Americanism in West Germany," *New German Critique* (No. 34, 1985), 3-27.

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ertarian parties, and they lack a systematic comparative framework to test their arguments.

Breakdown theories rely on the same demographic data about voters and sympathizers of left-libertarian parties as structural change theories, but they attribute a sour-grapes logic to the young and educated who are still in the early stages of their professional careers or who are still in the educational system. In the absence of empirical evidence, these data warrant other motivational interpretations as well. For instance, young people may reject the present economic and political institutions, and *therefore* choose educational tracks that rarely lead to high-status professional careers, but possibly to personal growth and a convivial lifestyle. The social-structure attributes of left-libertarian voters as such do not reveal which of these competing motivational interpretations is correct. The psychological assumptions of breakdown theories thus rest on shaky empirical ground.

There are empirical data to refute one specific variant of the cultural breakdown theory—the characterization of the West German Greens as successors to earlier predemocratic traditions. According to surveys taken in the 1970s, supporters of left-libertarian social movements strongly approve of democratic institutions and procedures, but criticize the unresponsiveness of the existing political elites to the new issues.[31] Also, Green sympathizers were found to express a radical-democratic and not an antidemocratic or nationalist spirit.[32] The approval of democratic institutions coincides with rejection of the existing political elites.[33] National identification is lower among Green supporters than among any other group in the German population.

Breakdown theorists also encounter problems with the quantitative calibration of their arguments. The individuals to whom breakdown theorists attribute a sour-grapes logic represent only a small segment of left-libertarian sympathizers. Again, data on the most closely researched case, that of the West German Greens, are instructive. In the first half of 1984, surveys found that 13 percent of the unemployed supported the Greens. Among unemployed academics, no less than 41 percent said they would vote for the Greens in a general election.[34] These figures must be put into

[31] See Samuel H. Barnes and Max Kaase, eds., *Political Action: Mass Participation in Five Western Democracies* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1979).

[32] Bürklin (fn. 4), p. 206.

[33] Bürklin (fn. 29), p. 199.

[34] Ursula Feist, Dieter Fröhlich, and Hubert Krieger, "Die politischen Einstellungen von Arbeitslosen" [The political attitudes of the unemployed], *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* 34 (No. 45, 1984), 3-17.

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perspective, however. After a short-time high in 1984, support for the Greens among the unemployed fell back to a level that differs little from support in the overall population. In early 1985, only about 8 percent of 2.5 million unemployed, or 0.2 million voters, supported the Greens.[35] That is less than 10 percent of the 2.1 million Green votes cast in the 1983 federal election. The subgroup of unemployed academics amounts to fewer than 5 percent of the Green voters. Moreover, it is inconsistent with breakdown theories that the Greens enjoy considerable support among educated members of the middle class who are in their thirties, work in occupations with relatively high prestige, and display a fairly high level of economic "saturation."

Like economic and cultural breakdown theories, political breakdown arguments lack empirical support. There is no evidence that signals a relative or an absolute decline in the circulation of the West German political elite during the 1970s and 1980s.[36] To the contrary, elite circulation has probably been higher in recent decades than in the 1950s and 1960s because the generation of political leaders who had remained in power since the immediate post-World War II years finally had to step aside. It may be true that more young university graduates avoid the "sweatshop" of parties, bureaucracies, and corporations to make a professional career, but this trend would say more about changing preferences than about reduced opportunities to rise in the ranks of political and economic elites.

The greatest weakness of all breakdown theories is their lack of comparative analysis and empirical confirmation. If the peculiar predemocratic German political tradition is essential to the rise of the left-libertarian Greens and the peace movement, why is it that countries with more fortunate democratic histories have developed similar movements and parties? And is it true that countries with a poor record of economic performance in the 1970s were more likely to spawn left-libertarian parties than countries with a better record?

If breakdown theories were correct, we could expect left-libertarian parties in countries with above-average rates of inflation and high levels of unemployment. An even better measure of relative deprivation and breakdown is the rate of *change* in economic performance within countries over time. Those countries that have experienced the most precipitous economic decline in the 1970s should also be the ones most likely to

[35] Hubert Krieger, "Arbeitsmarktsituation und politische Stabilität: Reaktionsformen abhängig Beschäftigter auf die Arbeitsmarktentwicklung 1975-1985" [Labor market situation and political stability: Patterns of reaction among employees to labor market developments], *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* 36 (No. 17, 1986), 3-15.

[36] Bürklin (fns. 27 and 29) emphasizes declining elite circulation as a cause of left-libertarian party support.

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develop strong left-libertarian parties. In Table 11, the decline of average economic growth rates and the increase of average unemployment rates from the period 1967-1973 to the period 1974-1980 measures the intensity of relative deprivation within the countries.

Columns 1 and 2 provide the mean values for the four economic "misery indices" in the eighteen democracies with or without significant left-libertarian parties. They do not reveal any positive association between party formation and economic misery. In fact, the coefficients of reproducibility, correlation coefficients, and significance levels of the associations in a LOGIT least squares regression show that, if there are any statistical relationships, they are the reverse of those predicted by breakdown theories: countries with significant left-libertarian parties have lower levels of unemployment and consumer price increases than countries without these parties. A similar, though weaker and statistically insignificant association applies to the two other measures of economic change.

Only one socioeconomic indicator tends to support the breakdown theory. In countries with rapidly growing student populations, the income advantages and the job security of people with a higher education diminish.[37] Due to the deterioration of their market position, young academics in these countries may constitute a large pool of frustrated and politically restless people willing to support new political parties. And that, indeed, is quite strongly associated with the presence of significant left-libertarian parties, as coefficients of reproducibility, LOGIT analysis, and correlation coefficients reveal (see Table 12).

Even this finding must be interpreted cautiously. We must presuppose the validity of the sour-grapes logic in order to count the impact of educational opportunities on left-libertarian parties as support for the breakdown theories. Moreover, only a limited percentage of left-libertarian voters is exposed to the potential frustrations of a contemporary university education. Comparative information is missing, but the point can be illustrated with West German data. Surveys show that postmaterialist value inclinations are a stronger predictor of the Green vote than educational accomplishment.[38] In one representative sample, only 22.4 percent of Green sympathizers in the early 1980s were under thirty years old *and* held a secondary-school diploma that enabled them to attend university.[39]

On the whole, the evidence supporting breakdown theories is thus very limited and not empirically solid. There can be little doubt that

[37] See Arnold J. Heidenheimer, Hugh Heclo, and Carolyn Teich-Adams, *Comparative Public Policy*, 2d ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), 49-51.
[38] Bürklin (fn. 27), Tables 7 and 8.
[39] *Ibid.*

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TABLE 11
INDICATORS OF ECONOMIC MISERY AND LEFT-LIBERTARIAN PARTIES*

	Significant Left-Libertarian Parties Exist	*No Significant Left-Libertarian Parties Exist*	*CR for the Association of Economic Indicators and Parties*	*r*	*p* (LOGIT)
Average level of unemployment (1974–1980)[a]	*3.2%*	*5.0%*	*.22*	*−.43*	*.08*
Average increase of the consumer price index (1973–1980)[b]	*8.0%*	*12.6%*	*.28*	*−.70*	*.05*
Decline in real per capita GDP growth (average 1974–80 vs. 1967–73)[c]	−2.0%	−2.4%	.50	.21	.4
Rise of unemployment as percent of labor force (1974–1980)[d]	1.5%	2.3%	.33	−.25	.3

* France = 0

Sources: [a] OECD, *Historical Statistics, 1960–80* (Paris: OECD, 1982), Table 2-14.
[b] *Ibid.*, Table 2-13.
[c] *Ibid.*, Table 3-2.
[d] *Ibid.*, Table 2-14.

TABLE 12
LEFT-LIBERTARIAN PARTIES AND THE INCREASE IN THE STUDENT POPULATION
(Student increase per 100,000 inhabitants, 1975–1980)

	Increase Greater Than 210 Students		*Increase Smaller Than 210 Students*	
Significant Left-Libertarian Parties Exist (Average 298.1%)	A	(542)	DK	(−105)
	B	(380)	F	(42)
	FRG	(324)		
	N	(277)		
	NL	(440)		
	S	(477)		
	CH	(306)		
No Significant Left-Libertarian Parties Exist (Average 150.6%)	I	(214)	CND	(79)
	AUS	(218)	FI	(108)
			IRE	(179)
			J	(53)
			NZ	(201)
			UK	(172)
			US	(181)

(Overall Average 196.5)

Source: UNESCO, *Statistical Digest 1984* (Paris: UNESCO, 1984)

STATISTICAL INTERPRETATION

	France = 1	*France = 0*
CR	.78	.83
r	.44	.57
p (LOGIT)	.09	.04

macrostructural and resource-mobilization approaches provide much firmer evidence to explain the rise of left-libertarian parties.

CONCLUSION: THE PROSPECTS OF LEFT-LIBERTARIAN PARTIES

Left-libertarian parties are likely to emerge in economically advanced and (usually) small corporatist welfare states. These countries provide a structural and institutional setting that is conducive to a change in popular preference toward left-libertarian politics. Simultaneously, they

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severely restrict the chances that new demands can be articulated through established parties and interest groups. Electoral laws, particularly qualified proportional representation, may affect the chances of left-libertarian party formation; but, by themselves, they appear to be only a secondary factor. Two precipitating conditions increase the chances of left-libertarian party formation. First, extended periods of left party participation in government dispel hopes among left-libertarian voters that their demands are compatible with the traditional left redistributive political agenda. Second, the nuclear power controversies of the 1970s and 1980s aggravate the tensions between the old redistributive and the new libertarian left and accentuate the left-libertarians' disaffection with the traditional parties.

Macrostructural and resource-mobilization approaches thus offer a rather sophisticated interpretation of the phenomenon of the left-libertarian party. They lead us to the conclusion that left-libertarian parties are more than short-term "flash" parties, and result from a complex interaction of institutional and conjunctural factors. They do not represent merely another competitor in electoral politics; rather, they result from and attack a comprehensive network of interest intermediation between state and civil society of which parties are only one element.

Breakdown theories, on the other hand, predict the demise of left-libertarian parties when temporary societal strains disappear. Is it warranted, then, to infer from macrostructural and resource-mobilization theories that left-libertarian parties are about to establish themselves permanently in advanced welfare state democracies? Even if we reject the breakdown argument, the competing economic and political interpretation of the left-libertarian phenomenon adds some caveats about the future of the new party cohort. Explaining the *emergence* of political parties is one thing; explaining their long-term *persistence* is another. Even though left-libertarian issues apparently constitute a new *cleavage dimension* in modern politics, this cleavage will not necessarily spawn permanent independent political parties.

The structural and political changes on which left-libertarian electoral support is based are far from being permanent and irreversible. The welfare state has recently come under attack in Europe; labor corporatism has noticeably declined in the 1980s; and a renewed discipline of the marketplace may challenge the foundations of economic security and affluence on which left-libertarian parties rest. Under such circumstances, the dominant political agenda of Western democracies would most likely shift away from the highly publicized left-libertarian issues so prominent in the 1970s and 1980s—ecology, energy, feminism, and nuclear arma-

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ment—and reestablish an exclusive hegemony of economic-distributive struggles.

In a sense, left-libertarian parties pursue a political agenda that could erode the institutional underpinnings on which they have thrived. They fight against the bureaucratic welfare state, labor corporatism, and the structural rigidities of elite bargaining in "consensual" democracies. Although their vision of social change differs radically from that of conservative free-market ideologies, their attack on the post-World War II political and economic class compromise could unintentionally play into the hands of conservative political forces; if it undermines the organized power of labor, it may recenter the political conflict on distributive issues.

The outlook for left-libertarian parties also depends on the strategic moves of their competitors. Conservative parties would hardly become a threat to the electoral support of left libertarian parties; but in a number of countries, socialist and social democratic parties have been ousted from government office in the 1980s. As opposition parties, they have greater incentives and opportunities to blur the issues that separate their working-class supporters from left-libertarian constituencies and to present themselves as politically more effective representatives of left-libertarian causes than the left-libertarian parties themselves. Because their supporters show little party loyalty, this social democratic strategy may become a serious threat for left-libertarian parties. Most left-libertarians are educated, highly sophisticated individuals who are more likely to vote strategically than on the basis of stable party identifications.

Once back in power, however, left parties that have successfully reintegrated the left-libertarian electorate will inevitably display strains and conflicts among their different electoral constituencies. The West German Social Democrats, for instance, absorbed left-libertarian sentiments in the early 1970s, but paid a high price for this success in terms of internal organizational disruption, factionalism, and endemic conflicts—which eventually contributed to their electoral decline in the 1980s.[40] In this sense, traditional social democratic or socialist parties may only temporarily halt the rise of left-libertarian parties.

Finally, the future of left-libertarian parties does not depend only on conditions and competitors in their environment, but also on their own strategic capabilities. In this respect, left-libertarian parties face a difficult task. On the one hand, they must preserve the fluid, open organizational form and the obstructionist quality of their political strategies that chal-

[40] See Gerard Braunthal, *The West German Social Democrats, 1969-1982: Profile of a Party in Power* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1982).

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lenge the highly institutionalized corporatist welfare state and maintain the loyalty of the left-libertarian core constituencies. On the other hand, left-libertarian parties must become effective political players both in terms of electoral appeal and of impact on public policy. In parliamentary multiparty systems, this usually presupposes a cohesive, disciplined party organization with a consistent, moderate political strategy that appeals to marginal voters. Left-libertarian parties must resolve the conflict between a logic of representing a constituency that is oriented toward the visions of the core party militants and activists in left-libertarian movements and a logic of party competition that upholds standards of electoral success and external strategic effectiveness in the pursuit of policy gains.[41]

[41] For a close analysis of the internal dynamic of left-libertarian parties, see Herbert Kitschelt, "Logics of Party Formation. Structure and Strategy of the Belgian and West German Ecology Parties" (mimeo), Duke University, 1986 (forthcoming, 1988).

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Review Articles

NEOREALISM AND NEOLIBERALISM

By JOSEPH S. NYE, JR.*

Robert O. Keohane, ed., *Neorealism and Its Critics*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1986. 378 pp.
Richard Rosecrance, *The Rise of the Trading State*. New York: Basic Books, 1986. 268 pp.

INTERNATIONAL relations theory is constrained by the fact that history provides a poor substitute for a laboratory. In world politics, a relatively small number of states play major roles, along with many other entities that seek to influence events. Even if one focuses on state behavior, one is confronted by few independent events and by multiple causes of behavior at different levels of analysis. Furthermore, strategic interaction is inherently indeterminate, and states often have incentives to deceive observers. To use an analogy from another social science, multiple causality makes some aspects of international relations more like macroeconomics than like microeconomics, and strategic indeterminacy means that the relevant analogy in microeconomics would be the troubled area of oligopoly theory.

Moreover, most theorists of international relations suffer from being in the middle of events, rather than viewing them from a distance. Thus it is not surprising that international relations theory has always been strongly affected by current political concerns. This is true even for the Realists with their parsimonious efforts to state eternal truths. Thucydides, the founding father of Realism, presented a structural account of the origins of the Peloponnesian War in part because of the lessons he wished to teach his fellow citizens.[1] When Hans J. Morgenthau wrote his postwar classic, *Politics Among Nations*, he was clearly intent on instructing *his* fellow citizens about the importance of avoiding the idealist and iso-

* I am grateful to Robert Beschel, Sean Lynn-Jones, Andrew Moravcsik, and David Welch for comments.

[1] Donald Kagan, *The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1969).

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lationist fantasies of the interwar period. Even the neorealist structural theories of Kenneth Waltz can best be read as exhortations to policymakers and fellow citizens about how they *ought* to respond to the structure of power rather than as accurate accounts of how the two superpowers behave.

The Changing Context of Theory

In the early 1970s, many theorists, reflecting current concerns, overreacted to the traditional theories of Realism. There was widespread repugnance to the Vietnam War, and detente seemed to reduce the importance of the nuclear competition. At the same time, international trade grew more rapidly than world product. Transnational corporations not only developed patterns of international production, but in some instances played dramatic political roles as well. All this occurred against a backdrop of declining U.S. economic predominance—from one-third to less than one-quarter of world product. President Nixon and Secretary of State Kissinger spoke of the development of a five-power world, and futurologists such as Herman Kahn predicted the imminent arrival of a multipolar international system.[2]

On top of all this came the oil crisis of 1973. Some very weak states extracted enormous resources from the strong. Even Hans Morgenthau described what he called an unprecedented divorce of military and economic power based on the control of raw materials.[3] The vulnerability of the Western societies at a period of high commodity prices encouraged many of the less developed countries to believe that a greater transformation of power had occurred than was actually the case. A number of theorists reflected these concerns. Among the modernist writers of the 1970s, a representative view was that

> the forces now ascendant appear to be leaning toward a global society without a dominant structure of cooperation and conflict—a *polyarchy* in which nation-states, subnational groups, and transnational special interests and communities would all be vying for the support and loyalty of individuals, and conflicts would have to be resolved primarily on the basis of ad hoc bargaining in a shifting context of power relationships.[4]

[2] Herman Kahn and B. Bruce-Briggs, *Things to Come* (New York: Macmillan, 1972).

[3] Hans J. Morgenthau, "The New Diplomacy of Movement," *Encounter* 43 (August 1974), 52-57, at 56.

[4] Seyom Brown, *New Forces in World Politics* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1974), 186.

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By the late 1970s the mood began to change both in the United States and in the United Nations. East-West concerns started to supplant North-South issues at the top of foreign policy agendas. The experience of the Carter administration reflects the changes in American opinion: while campaigning in 1976, Jimmy Carter promised to reduce the defense budget, but by 1980 his position was closer to that of his rival, Reagan, than to his own previous position. The election of Ronald Reagan to the American presidency accentuated these trends. American policy focused on East-West confrontation and scaled down North-South issues and the role of multilateral institutions. The defense budget increased in real terms for five straight years, and the United States became more willing to use military force, albeit against extremely weak states such as Grenada and Libya. Arms control was downgraded and the modernization of nuclear forces was seen as restoring an "edge" for additional utility of military force. This shifting agenda of world politics saw a resurgence of Realist analysis, for history seemed to have vindicated the Realist model.

While some analysts in the 1970s tended to overstate the obsolescence of the nation-state, the decline of force, and the irrelevance of security concerns, some in the early 1980s unduly neglected the role of transnational actors and economic interdependence. Contrary to the tone of much political rhetoric and some political analyses, the world of the 1980s is not a return to the world of the 1950s. Just as the decline of American power was exaggerated in the 1970s, so was the restoration of American power in the 1980s. Looking carefully at military and economic indices of power resources, one notes that there has been a far greater change in psychology and mood than in these indicators of power resources. The diffusion of power, as measured by shares in world trade or world product, continues. Economic interdependence, as measured by vulnerability to supply shocks, has eased in a period of slack commodity markets, but this could change if markets tighten again and growth of economic transactions continues. Sensitivity to exchange-rate fluctuations has remained high. The costs of the great powers' use of force seem higher than in the 1950s—measured, for instance, by the ease with which the U.S. overthrew governments in Central America and Iran then as contrasted with the 1980s. Moreover, despite rhetoric, relations between the superpowers do not show a return to the Cold War period. Not only are alliances looser, but transactions are higher, and relations between the superpowers reflect a fair degree of "learning" in the nuclear area.[5]

[5] Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Nuclear Learning and U.S.-Soviet Security Regimes," *International Organization* 41 (Summer 1987), 371-402.

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Realism and Liberalism

In a sense, the contrast between the 1970s and the 1980s is merely the latest instance of a recurring dialectic between the two main strands in what has been called the classical tradition of international relations theory. Realism has been the dominant strand;[6] the second is the Liberal or Grotian tradition that tends to stress the impact of domestic and international society, interdependence, and international institutions. In their simplest forms, Liberal theories have been easily discredited. The proposition that the gains from commercial transactions would overcome the problems inherent in the security dilemma and make war too expensive were belied in 1914. Hopes that a system of international law and organization could provide collective security, which would replace the need for self-help inherent in the security dilemma, were disappointed by 1939. Nonetheless, the sharp disagreement between Realism and Liberal theories is overstated. In fact, the two approaches can be complementary. Sophisticated versions of Liberal theory address the manner in which interactions among states and the development of international norms interact with domestic politics of the states in an international system so as to transform the way in which states define their interests. Transnational and interstate interactions and norms lead to new definitions of interests, as well as to new coalition possibilities for different interests within states.

How states define their interests, and how their interests change, has always been a weak area in Realist theory. One of the most thought-provoking questions in international relations is how states learn. How do national interests become defined, and how do those definitions change? Can cooperation be learned? Realist theories maintain that states learn by responding to structural changes in their environment; to put it in game-theory terms, they adjust their behavior to changes in the payoff matrix. When mutual interests or a long shadow of the future suggest that rewards for cooperation are great, states may adopt new strategies in pursuit of their interests. In that case, Realists admit that cooperation can be learned. Although this is sometimes a satisfactory and parsimonious explanation of changing state behavior, it is often incomplete because it says little about how interests themselves are formulated or redefined. It does not show why the same situation may be perceived in totally different ways by successive governments or different leaders. A Bismarck, a Kaiser, and a Hitler can formulate different answers to similar geopolitical situations. Nor does Realist theory note how groups within societies

[6] K. J. Holsti, *The Dividing Discipline: Hegemony and Diversity in International Theory* (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1985).

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can use partners in transnational coalitions or transnational norms and institutions to advance or retard the learning of new interests by their own governments.

Realist theory is better at explaining interactions than interests. A theory of interests defined solely in terms of power is an impoverished theory of interests. Here Liberalism can help. The more sophisticated variants of Liberal theory provide a useful supplement to Realism by directing attention to the ways in which domestic and international factors interact to change states' definitions of their interests. To say that states act in their self-interest is merely tautological (or "change" is reduced to merely a change in means) unless we have a reasonable account of how such interests are perceived and redefined. Both Realism and Liberalism can contribute to such an account.

The major developments in the Liberal tradition of international relations theory in the post-1945 period occurred in studies of regional integration. These studies did not explicitly refer to classical Liberalism; they were generally called "neofunctionalist." Nevertheless, their focus was clearly on issues emphasized in the Liberal tradition. Karl Deutsch concentrated on the development of pluralistic security communities—groups of states that developed reliable expectations of peaceful relations and thereby overcame the security dilemma that Realists see as characterizing international politics. Ernst Haas focused on the uniting of Europe and the transformation of the Franco-German hostility into a postwar economic and political community. Subsequent scholars extended these perspectives on economic, social, and political interdependence and integration to other regions.[7] What these studies had in common was a focus on the ways in which increased transactions and contacts changed attitudes and transnational coalition opportunities, and the ways in which institutions helped to foster such interaction. In short, they emphasized the political processes of learning and of redefining national interests, as encouraged by institutional frameworks and regimes.

In a sense, the development of regional integration theory outstripped the development of regional communities. Predicted changes materialized more slowly than had been expected, which may account for the declining academic interest in the subject during the 1970s. The transformation of Western Europe into a pluralistic security community is real, however, and many of the insights from integration theory were transferred in the early 1970s to the growing and broader dimensions of inter-

[7] Karl Deutsch et al., *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957); Ernst Haas, *The Uniting of Europe* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1958); Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Peace in Parts* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971).

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national economic interdependence. Studies in transnational relations and interdependence broadened conceptions of how national interests are learned and changed. Some studies explicitly addressed the conditions under which assumptions of Realism were sufficient, or needed to be supplemented by a more complex model of change.[8] Rather than focusing primarily on formal and universalistic organizations such as the United Nations, they devoted much attention to the role of international institutions. The concept of regime was borrowed from international law and broadened to incorporate the whole range of norms, rules, and procedures that constrain states' behavior and around which the actors' expectations converge within a given issue.[9] A rich set of studies applied the concept of regimes to a broad range of behavior in international political economy. But in the climate of the early 1980s, it seemed that the Liberal legacy was relevant only to the peripheral literature on political economy and had little to contribute to the central theory of the field. Kenneth Waltz's *Theory of International Politics*, published in 1979, was a well-timed and elegant restatement of Realism that explicitly cast doubt on the relevance of the writings on interdependence.[10]

The two books reviewed here provide a good opportunity to look at the latest turns in the classic dialectic between Realism and Liberalism. Richard Rosecrance's *The Rise of the Trading State* is clearly in the Liberal tradition. Rosecrance argues that an open trading system offers states ways to transform their positions through economic growth rather than through military conquest. All states can benefit from the enhanced growth. "The basic thrust of trade today is entirely different from what it was in the 1830s, the 1880s, and the 1930s" (p. 227). What is different in the world since 1945 "is that a peaceful trading is enjoying much greater efficacy than ever before. . . ." The main thesis of this book is that a new "trading world of international relations offers the possibility of escaping . . . a vicious cycle and finding new patterns of cooperation among national states" (p. ix).

Robert O. Keohane, in *Neorealism and Its Critics*, features four core chapters of Waltz's influential book and four criticisms of that work. In addition, he includes Waltz's first published reply to his critics. It is rare to have such clear intellectual dialogue in a single volume, and the whole issue is nicely framed by the editor's introductory essay.

[8] Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Power and Interdependence* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977).
[9] Stephen Krasner, ed., *International Regimes* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983).
[10] Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979).

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Neorealist Theory

As Keohane points out, the significance of Waltz's work is not in elaborating a new line of theory, but in the systematization of Realism, which Robert W. Cox (one of the critics) has termed "neorealism." While Hans J. Morgenthau may be the most influential of the postwar Realists, his aspirations to create a science of international politics were marred by inconsistency in his use of the concepts of power and balance. Moreover, by basing international politics on human nature's drive for power, Morgenthau explained too little by explaining too much. Human nature does not adequately account for variation.

Waltz provides a more elegant theoretical basis for Realism. He avoids references to humans pursuing power as an end; pursuit of power as a means is sufficient for his theory. Balance-of-power behavior by states is predicted from the structure of the international system. A system is a set of interacting units having behavioral regularities and identity over time. Its structure defines the ordering of its parts. Structure involves an ordering principle, specification of the functions of different parts, and the distribution of capabilities. In international politics, the ordering principle is anarchy, interpreted as the absence of a higher government above states. The specification of differentiation drops out because states perform similar functions. Thus, the distribution of capabilities (multipolarity, bipolarity) predicts variations in states' balance-of-power behavior. Waltz provides not merely a systemic theory to predict the behavior of the units (states), but a parsimonious *structural* systemic theory.

In a sense, Waltz did for the classical Realists what they never did for themselves. His structural theory provides a simple deductive basis for what was hitherto a heterogeneous set of views about the importance of power politics. In the eyes of the critics, however, Waltz's virtues and faults are two sides of the same coin. Parsimony has been purchased at too high a price. Robert Cox and Richard K. Ashley complain that Waltz's neorealism has sacrificed the interpretive richness of classical Realism as a critical theory in order to transform it into a positivistic problem-solving theory. Although that may be true, neither essay provides a compelling alternative, and Waltz in his reply is quite happy to let their remarks roll off his back.

Keohane and John G. Ruggie launch more telling criticisms. Keohane points out that Waltz's spare structural definition of system ignores international economic processes and institutions that can also have strong effects on states' behavior. Ruggie argues that Waltz has not only ignored changes in the density of interactions in systems, but has been too quick

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in assuming that the differentiation in units can be dropped as a characteristic of the structure of the international system. In the short term, states may be the dominant units and play a similar functional role, but over long periods other units may grow in importance, and roles may alter. Ruggie points to the evolution of the concept of territoriality at the end of the feudal era to illustrate such generative changes, and argues that Waltz's theory is too static to explain such changes.

Waltz replies that "a structural theory of international politics can fix ranges of outcomes and identify general tendencies. . . . We cannot hope to predict specific outcomes" (p. 344). He would not deny the importance of change at the unit level. "Realist theory by itself can handle some, but not all, of the problems that concern us. . . . Yet some successful predictions can be made without paying attention to states" (p. 331). Structural analyses "tell us a small number of big and important things" (p. 329). If we add more variables, theoretical acuity gives way to rich and dense description. Many unit-level factors, such as density of interactions, demographic trends, resource constraints, national ideologies, and political systems, can affect systemic outcomes. Indeed, in the case of nuclear weapons, "a unit-level change has much diminished a structural effect" (p. 327). But it is a mistake to mingle structural and unit levels. Just as "economists get along quite well with separate theories of markets and firms" (p. 340), we shall have to get along with separate theories of international politics and of states.

Waltz has a valid point about the selectivity of theory and the costs of mixing unit and structural characteristics. But his reply to his critics is not entirely satisfactory. First, as Keohane points out in his Introduction, many economists are unhappy about the disjunction between the assumptions of microeconomics and what is known about the behavior of firms. Moreover, oligopoly theory tends to be indeterminate, and efforts to establish a rational-expectations micro-basis for macroeconomics have been problematic. In the words of one economist, the danger for a clinical profession is that "the models become more real than more explicitly descriptive reality."[11]

Second, Waltz accuses Ruggie of reductionism—the explanation of the whole by explaining the behavior of the parts. That is neither good nor bad *per se*. In a parsimonious systemic explanation, the behavior of the parts is handled by assumptions of rationality and the constraining conditions produced by the structure of the system. "Socialization and com-

[11] Francis M. Bator, *The State of Macroeconomics* (Kennedy School Discussion Paper 1520, Cambridge, MA: 1986), 19.

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petition are two aspects of a process by which the variety of behavior and outcomes is reduced." Systems theories explain why different units behave similarly; unit theories explain why different units behave differently despite similar placement in a system. But Waltz's own assignment of characteristics to the systemic and unit levels seems odd. It is easy to understand why characteristics of a particular leader or political culture or domestic regime fit at the unit level. In his words, "a theory about foreign policy is a theory at the national level."[12] But why are demographic trends, transnational flows, and military technology that affect all (or many) states assigned to the unit level? It is particularly odd to see nuclear technology described as a unit characteristic that has had "system-wide" pacific effects (p. 327). Waltz has no way of knowing whether the vaunted stability of the bipolar system is caused by a structural or a unit-level characteristic. Moreover, by assigning everything except the distribution of capabilities to the unit level, that category becomes a dumping ground hindering theory building at anything but the structural level. The result may be theoretical parsimony, but parsimony is not the only way by which one judges good theory. Good theory also requires a good explanatory fit.

A third problem with Waltz's reply to his critics relates to his handling of false predictions. Waltz correctly states that a few false predictions do not falsify a theory. He admits that he will often need to supplement his sparse neorealist theory with foreign policy explanations in order to account for anomalous cases. But sometimes his handling of anomalies runs the risk of being retrogressive in Lakatos's terms—i.e., it explains less and directs researchers away from new information.[13] In response to Keohane's evidence that Canada, a weak state, has often prevailed over the United States, Waltz introduces a power-activation hypothesis: "I suspect that American officials hardly cared about the outcomes or even noticed what they might be" (p. 333). But aside from the danger of tautology, such a reply ignores the evidence that the cases Keohane cites were at the presidential level, and that some, such as oil trade in 1974, were highly visible and politicized.

Some anomalies are forgiven for any theory that has a broad explanatory power and that points to the discovery of new empirical information. But Waltz's theory does not score well on those criteria: it describes a system as stable if it remains anarchic and there is no consequential change

[12] Waltz (fn. 10), 77, 72.

[13] Imre Lakatos, "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes," in Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave, eds., *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970).

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in the number of political units. By this definition, the multipolar system was stable for 300 years until World War II reduced it to the current bipolar system, which has been stable because no third state has been able to develop capabilities comparable to those of the United States and the Soviet Union.[14] But this portrayal of history by the theory leaves an enormous number of important changes unaccounted for, and lends credence to the charge that it is too static. There are so few strands in the web of Waltz's theoretical net that even very big fish slip through it. The change from a flexible alliance system to two rigid alliances before 1914 is not a shift from multipolarity to bipolarity for Waltz. Only the strength of single units counts in measuring bipolarity under his definitions. Thus, his theory tells us little about the onset of World War I. Instead, it disclaims any intent to predict particular wars. Neither is it clear that Waltz's theory tells us about what causes stability in the current world. There has been only one bipolar system as defined in Waltz's theory. Thus he has to test his conclusions about stability against evidence drawn from a sample of *one*. Waltz cannot determine which behavior is caused by structure and which by nuclear weapons (assigned by him to the unit level).

Moreover, Waltz's theory leads him to conclusions that seem to bury rather than uncover new information about the behavior of states. For example, he argues that "in a bipolar world, military interdependence declines even more sharply than economic interdependence. Russia and America depend militarily mainly on themselves."[15] But it is an odd definition of military interdependence that blurs the change from the 1930s to a world in which the U.S. and U.S.S.R. can each destroy the other in thirty minutes. Even if Waltz means his statement to refer only to the formation of alliances, he has a hard time explaining the enormous efforts which both sides devote to their "unnecessary" alliance structures. Waltz may be right that "a five percent growth rate sustained for three years increases the American gross national product by an amount exceeding one-half of West Germany's GNP, and all of Great Britain's," but that alleged evidence for low military interdependence leaves the anomaly of actual U.S. behavior unexplained. In extolling the virtues of economic growth as a path to power, Waltz sounds a bit like Rosecrance; but, unlike the latter, he uses a restricted definition of interdependence to argue that economic interdependence is declining in the modern world.[16] Once

[14] Waltz (fn. 10), 162.

[15] *Ibid.*, 168.

[16] Waltz ignored the criticism of narrow definitions of interdependence in terms of vulnerability alone that was published in *Power and Interdependence* (fn. 8). Had he considered a more complex treatment of interdependence, he might have come to different conclusions about its decline.

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again, Waltz's theoretical lens focuses so tightly on bipolarity that it tends to generate anomalies and to direct attention away from the discovery of new information.

It is not true that Waltz's theory is completely static, for changes in the structure predict changes in unit behavior. But change at the structural level seems to have occurred only once in three hundred years for Waltz. That leaves an awful lot of the stuff of international politics to be explained at the unit level. Waltz would admit as much, but he is then left with a theory that is so spare that nothing seems to move. The charge that Waltz has explained less about more of what concerned traditional Realists seems justified. It is ironic that Robert Gilpin appears in the Keohane volume in a cameo role as the author of a brief reply to Ashley's scattergun criticism of neorealism. Gilpin's own work represents an updating of Thucydides' classical Realist theory of hegemonic transition, which has disappeared in Waltz's nearly static neorealist world. Like Thucydides, Gilpin focuses on the ways in which uneven growth leads to cycles of rising and declining hegemonic states and the onset of great systemic wars.[17] Whatever its own problems, Gilpin's version of Realism is dynamic and focused on explaining the major changes in world politics that slip through the coarse net of Waltz's neorealist theory. Gilpin achieves this, however, by eschewing a purely structural theory and reaching deep into the unit level of analysis.

The Revival of Liberal Theories

Partly in reaction to the inadequacies of neorealism, a number of theorists have begun to resurrect Liberal theory. While admitting the diversity of Liberal theories, they argue that the core of Liberalism is a concern for liberty. That philosophical perspective is often correlated with such features as an interest in limited government, institutional restraints, and open contacts (including trade) across borders.[18] Michael Doyle has pointed out different historical strands of Liberal thought in Schumpeter's economic theories of pacifism, Machiavelli's republican theories of imperialism, and Kant's liberal international confederation based on republican governments and transnational contacts.[19] Robert Keohane has

[17] Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

[18] Stanley Hoffmann, "Liberalism and International Affairs," in *Janus and Minerva* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987). Hoffmann points out a terminological difficulty: many Realists are liberal in their domestic political preferences.

[19] Michael Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," *American Political Science Review* 80 (December 1986), 1151-69.

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identified three major causal strands of classical Liberal theory: (1) commercial Liberalism, which asserts the pacific effects of trade; (2) democratic Liberalism, which asserts the pacific effects of republican government (at the unit level of analysis); and (3) regulatory Liberalism, which asserts the importance of rules and institutions in affecting relations between countries.[20] One might add a fourth: sociological Liberalism, which asserts the transformative effect of transnational contacts and coalitions on national attitudes and definitions of interests. Many of these Liberal causal theories were central to the neofunctionalist theories of regional integration developed in the 1950s and 1960s.

By and large, Rosecrance's *The Rise of the Trading State* fits mainly in the category of commercial Liberalism. His argument rests more upon the beneficial effects of trade than on the other three potential components of a neoliberal theory. Rosecrance's view (p. 218) that "if nuclear war can be ruled out, economic processes will progressively act to reshape the international world" bears a strong family resemblance to Richard Cobden's (1846) belief that "if we can keep the world from actual war, and I trust Trade will do that, a great impulse will from this time be given to social reforms."[21]

Rosecrance does not share all of the illusions of the classical free trade Liberals. He is fully aware that high levels of trade and other transactions did not prevent the outbreak of World War I, and that trade was often associated with conflict in earlier eras. But he argues that the world was different then: "the nineteenth and early twentieth century represent the apex of the military political system" (p. 88). In Rosecrance's view, "it was not until after 1945 that large-scale territorial expansion began to evolve as too costly—too dangerous and too uncertain as a general strategy of national advancement." As that lesson dawned, "one would have reached 'the Japanese period' in world politics . . ." (p. 20).

Even if Rosecrance proves to be correct in his projections, it is unclear to what extent the causation is due to factors stressed by Liberal or by Realist theories. Perhaps what happened after 1945 is that nuclear technology transformed a balance-of-power system into a balance of terror that encourages prudence about any territorial expansion that could raise nuclear risks. In this situation, Japan has found a more successful path to become the second-most-powerful economy in the world than it did in the 1930s. But it has done so while sheltered under the American nuclear

[20] Robert O. Keohane, "Economic Limits of Modern Politics: International Liberalism Reconsidered," unpub., 1986.

[21] Cobden, quoted in Kenneth Waltz, *Man, the State, and War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), 104.

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umbrella and spending only one percent of its GNP on defense. Rosecrance admits that hegemonic stability theory may have some relevance, but he argues that it does not explain "why there has not *already* been a marked decline in international economic cooperation . . . well after the onset of decline in American economic and military power" (p. 57). The answer may lie in the success of economic regimes (which Rosecrance discusses only briefly); or in the exaggeration of the decline of American power; or in Waltz's theory of the stability of bipolarity; or in the paralysis of the territorial conquest system caused by nuclear risk.[22] Causation remains unclear in Rosecrance's account.

Because Rosecrance is cautious, there are really two versions of his argument—a strong form and a weak form. The strong form is close to classic commerical liberalism. "Since 1945, the world has been poised between . . . [a] territorial system . . . composed of states that view power in terms of land mass . . . and [a] trading system . . . based on states which recognize that self-sufficiency is an illusion," Rosecrance writes (p. 16). "A major crossroads is now approaching. . . . In the past the military-political world was efficient. It was cheaper to seize another state's territory by force than to develop the sophisticated economic and trading apparatus needed to derive benefit from commercial exchange with it" (p. 160). "The current equipoise . . . can scarcely be maintained," Rosecrance argues (p. 165). "The worst aspects of the Westphalian system with its emphasis on territoriality, sovereignty, and a spurious independence, are likely to be mitigated in the years ahead" (p. 211). "The increasing deconsolidation of traditional states and the decline of national loyalty as they seek to serve such purposes gradually undermines the military-political system" (p. 214).

But this strong liberal theory is eroded by the more cautious form of the argument. Dualism is proffered as "the minimum possible approach to an international theory" (p. 60).[23] Which strategy will be dominant cannot be predicted at present. One can commend Rosecrance for his cautious judgments when faced with a confusing reality, but such caution

[22] For alternative explanations, see Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), and Bruce Russett, "The Mysterious Case of Vanishing Hegemony: or Is Mark Twain Really Dead?" *International Organization* 39 (Spring 1985), 207-31.

[23] Rosecrance mistakes the argument in *Power and Interdependence* as being similar to his own. Keohane and I did not establish "dualistic categories: power and interdependence . . . power is the preeminent goal of a state-centric universe, but interdependence is a characteristic that only applies when states as entities have lost control" (p. 62). On the contrary, we argued the need to see asymmetrical interdependence as a source of power. Rosecrance seems to confuse the ideal type of complex interdependence developed in chapter 2 of our work with our larger argument about interdependence.

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does not enhance theoretical development. One wishes Rosecrance had gone further in specifying the relationship between the Liberal and Realist components of the dualistic theory he suggests in the weak form of his argument. Perhaps if he had gone beyond commercial liberalism and explored more deeply the effects of transnational contacts on domestic political coalitions, or looked more carefully at the effects of regimes on learning (even in the security area where he discounts regimes), he might have begun to suggest such connections. Since he did not, we are left with a suggestive work, but one that hardly provides the neoliberal theory needed to accompany Waltz's neorealism.

Directions for Future Research

What do these works suggest for future research programs in international relations? Taken on its own terms, Waltz's theory is too static to provide a rich agenda of research questions. But it may be more fruitful when coupled with the rational-actor approach that has received increasing attention in recent years.[24] Neither game theory nor expected utility are really theories of international politics because they need to import theoretical assumptions about context.[25] Here Waltz's structural theory can be helpful, but only if handled with care.

Rational-choice theories can be parsimonious and powerful, but as research strategies, they run risks that are reinforced by the sparse structure of neorealism. How preferences are formulated and how learning occurs may be more important than the actual choice, yet both rational choice and neorealism are weak in this dimension and tend to turn attention in other directions. Moreover, while there is no *a priori* reason why game theory cannot be applied to transnational actors as well as to unitary state actors, such analyses are rare. The benefit of marrying rational choice with neorealist approaches is a double parsimony. The danger is that each already has a negative heuristic that directs attention away from preference formation and transnational interactions. Theorists who would make the marriage must be alert to such costs and open to the insights to be gained from other variants of Realist as well as Liberal theory.

Rosecrance's work suggests a number of interesting avenues for those who wish to develop neoliberal theory. Many of the questions he raises in

[24] See Bruno Bueno de Mesquita, *The War Trap* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), and the special issue of *World Politics* 38 (October 1985), *Cooperation under Anarchy*, Kenneth A. Oye, ed. (also published under that title by Princeton University Press, 1986).

[25] Note the assertion by Duncan Snidal, "The Game *Theory* of International Politics," *ibid.*, 25-57.

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the area of commercial Liberalism suggest both historical and contemporary research about the interconnection between power and nonpower incentives with which states are confronted. But the indeterminacy of his work also suggests the limits of commercial liberalism alone. Much more attention needs to be paid to the effects of norms and institutions, both in the economic and in the security area. More can be done with the ways in which transnational contacts and coalitions affect attitudes, learning, and formulation of preferences. A careful rereading of neofunctionalist integration theory can suggest numerous hypotheses. Finally, neoliberal theory should not neglect the unit level of analysis. Michael Doyle's work on the possible causal relationship between democratic governments and foreign policy choices is highly suggestive.[26]

Above all, it is important to pay more attention to the ways in which Liberalism and Realism relate to each other. One way is to be less restrictive in the basic assumption of anarchy. Alker attacks the metaphor of "anarchy" and argues for Hedley Bull's concept of an "anarchic society," which admits the absence of any formal government above states, but does not define anarchy as the absence of communication, cooperation, and governance.[27] In *Power and Interdependence*, Robert Keohane and I suggested that systemic theory could be enriched without (or before) retreating to the particularisms of the unit level of analysis by adding the concept of systemic process.

Systems have two dimensions: structure and process. We used the term "structure" in the neorealist sense to refer principally to the distribution of capabilities among units. "Process" refers to the ways in which the units relate to each other. In the metaphor of a poker game, the structure refers to the players' cards and chips, while the process refers both to the formal rules and the informal customs or conventions that affect interactions among the players. Variations in the ability of the players to calculate odds, infer the strength of opponents' hands, or bluff are at the unit, or actor, level.[28]

Factors such as the intensity of international interdependence and the degree of institutionalization of international rules do not vary from one state to another on the basis of their internal characteristics. Therefore, they should not be termed unit-level factors according to Waltz's own def-

[26] Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs," *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 12 (Summer 1983), 205-35.

[27] Hayward R. Alker, Jr. "The Presumption of Anarchy in World Politics," unpub., 1986. See also Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society* (London: Macmillan, 1977).

[28] See Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Power and Interdependence Revisited," *International Organization* 41 (Autumn 1987), 725-53, for a fuller discussion of the concepts that are introduced here.

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inition. Making the unit level a grab bag for all unexplained variance is an impediment to the development of theory. Not only does it complicate the task of analysis by confusing unit-level factors referring to domestic political and economic arrangements with factors at the level of the international system; it also leads neorealist analysts to forgo the opportunity to theorize at a systemic level about nonstructural determinants of state behavior.

At the systemic level, in addition to the distribution of power, states experience constraints and opportunities because of changes in levels of world economic activity, technological innovation, shifts in patterns of transnational interactions, and alterations in international norms and institutions. These systemic processes affecting state choices can be categorized as non-power incentives and the ability to communicate and cooperate. Nonstructural incentives alter calculations of national interest without necessarily affecting the distribution of power among actors. For instance, the destructiveness of nuclear weaponry, which Waltz assigned to the unit level, is better portrayed as a feature of systemic process that produces incentives not to engage in warfare regardless of whether the structure is bipolar or multipolar. Similarly, reduced costs of communications and transportation may increase the benefits of transnational business and encourage state policies of greater economic openness, without any changes in the structure of power.

The ability to communicate and cooperate can provide opportunities for the redefinition of interests and for the pursuit of strategies that would not be feasible in a world where the only information available to states was about other states' preferences and the power resources at their disposal. Just as allowing players in Prisoners' Dilemma games to communicate with one another alters the nature of the game, so a systemic process that increases the capability of states to communicate and to reach mutually beneficial agreements can add to the repertoire of state strategies and thus alter political outcomes.

These two aspects of systemic process—non-power incentives and variations in the capacity to communicate and cooperate—have traditionally been emphasized by Liberal theory. Liberal theorists often stress the ways in which trade and economic incentives may alter states' behavior. Similarly, Liberal theorists often stress the effects of increased transnational (and transgovernmental) contacts on attitudes and abilities to communicate. Institutions and norms have always played a role in Liberal theory.

This is not to say that Liberal theory has addressed all processes at the systemic level. For example, most Realists have been concerned about

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technological changes even when they do not alter the distribution of power. And there is much in Liberal theory about the effect of domestic politics that does not belong at the systemic level. However, the addition of the process level to the concept of structure in defining international systems provides an opportunity to develop a "neoliberal" systemic theory that moves toward a synthesis rather than a radical disjunction between Realism and Liberalism. Neorealism would be most appropriate at the structural level of systemic theory; neoliberalism would more often be fruitful at the process level.

The time has come to transcend the classical dialectic between Realist and Liberal theories of international politics. Each has something to contribute to a research program that increases our understanding of international behavior. Perhaps work in the 1990s will be able to synthesize rather than repeat the dialectic of the 1970s and the 1980s.

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STATE, SOCIAL ELITES, AND GOVERNMENT CAPACITY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

By DONALD K. CRONE

Harold Crouch, *Domestic Political Structures and Regional Economic Co-operation*. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1984, 101 pp.

Richard Higgot and Richard Robison, eds., *Southeast Asia: Essays in the Political Economy of Structural Change*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985, 340 pp.

David Jenkins, *Suharto and His Generals: Indonesian Military Politics 1975-1983*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1984, 280 pp.

R. J. May and Francisco Nemenzo, eds., *The Philippines After Marcos*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985, 239 pp.

Ross Prizzia, *Thailand in Transition: The Role of Oppositional Forces*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1985, 122 pp.

Robert Scalapino, Seizaburo Sato, and Jusuf Wanandi, eds., *Asian Political Institutionalization*. Berkeley, CA: Institute of East Asian Studies, 1986, 312 pp.

DUE largely to their rapid economic growth and general appearance of political stability, the major industrializing countries of Southeast Asia have emerged as important models of development during the past decade. Explanations of this phenomenon have generally stressed cultural and policy factors—particularly strong, positive attitudes toward authority and relatively liberal, market-oriented economic policies.[1] Some recent studies of East Asian states, however, have concluded that the role of relatively strong and interventionist governments has been underestimated as a cause of their similar development experiences.[2] A

[1] See, for example, Bela Belassa, *The Newly Industrializing Countries of the World Economy* (New York: Pergamon, 1981); Roy Hofheinz, Jr., and Kent Calder, *The Eastasia Edge* (New York: Basic Books, 1982); Ross Garnaut, ed., *ASEAN in a Changing Pacific and World Economy* (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1980); Mancur Olson, *The Rise and Decline of Nations* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), chap. 6. For a partial exception, see John Wong, *ASEAN Economies in Perspective* (Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1979).

[2] Examples are Colin Bradford, Jr., "East Asian 'Models': Myths and Lessons," in John P. Lewis and Valeriana Kallab, eds., *Development Strategies Reconsidered* (Washington: Overseas Development Council, 1986), 115-28; Alice Amsden, "The State and Taiwan's Economic Development," in Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds., *Bringing the State Back In* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Bruce Cummings, "The Origins and Development of the Northeast Asian Political Economy," *International Organization* 38 (Spring 1984), 2-40; Stephan Haggard, "The Newly Industrializing Countries in the International System," *World Politics* 38 (January 1986), 343-70. More generally, see the anal-

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fuller understanding of development in the Southeast Asian region may therefore also require the inclusion of the role of the state, used here in the sense of the apparatus of political power.[3]

The burgeoning literature concerned with such issues as the development and form of state structures, their capacity and autonomy in particular contexts, and the interaction of the state with social organizations makes an argument for the unique role of the state.[4] In the areas of economic management and political stability, the literature accords the state a significant range of potential capacities.[5] Although the influence of the state is not exclusive in these areas, its role cannot be ignored.

A number of recent contributions to the literature focus on evaluating the capacity and performance of Southeast Asian states, and on the forms of their interaction with domestic groups. The volume edited by Scalapino, Sato, and Wanandi examines the degree to which legalized, predictable political foundations—foundations that would allow peaceful transfers of power and effective development of policies—have emerged

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ysis of the World Bank, *World Development Report, 1983* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), Part II.

[3] For discussions of the different usages of the term "state" and the recent focus of this literature, see Roger Benjamin and Raymond Duvall, "The Capitalist State in Context," in Roger Benjamin and Stephen Elkin, eds., *The Democratic State* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1985); Theda Skocpol, "Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research," in Evans et al. (fn. 2), 3-43.

[4] Among the many studies in this area, see the following major works and the literature cited therein: Gianfranco Poggi, *The Development of the Modern State* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1978); Charles Tilly, ed., *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975); Evans et al. (fn. 2); Eric Nordlinger, *On the Autonomy of the Democratic State* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981); Alfred Stepan, *The State and Society: Peru in Comparative Perspective* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978); Martin Carnoy, *The State and Political Theory* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984); Ralph Miliband, *The State in Capitalist Society* (New York: Basic Books, 1969).

[5] In economic management, these capacities include the process of capital formation and accumulation; business entrepreneurship; the setting of domestic prices; the control of labor; the distribution of welfare; the brokering of foreign financial flows; the regulation of foreign capital; and the structuring of patterns of trade and investment partners. See Rueschemeyer and Evans, "The State and Economic Transformation," in Evans et al. (fn. 2); Haggard (fn. 2); Dennis Encarnation and Louis Wells, Jr., "Sovereignty en garde: Negotiating with Foreign Investors," *International Organization* 39 (Winter 1985), 47-77; James Caparoso, "The State's Role in Third World Economic Growth," *Annals of the American Academy of Political Science* 459 (January 1982); Peter Katzenstein, ed., *Between Power and Plenty: The Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978). In managing social conflict, the state's roles include fostering particular ideological and institutional bases of nationalism; shaping patterns of ethnic identity, communal conflict, and political mobilization; and building central political structures. See Paul Brass, ed., *Ethnic Groups and the State* (London: Croom Helm, 1985); David Laitin, "Hegemony and Religious Conflict," in Evans et al. (fn. 2); Michael Hector and Margaret Levi, "The Comparative Analysis of Ethnoregional Movements," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 2 (July 1979), 260-74; Crawford Young, "The Temple of Ethnicity," *World Politics* 35 (July 1983), 652-62; Anthony Smith, *The Ethnic Revival* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Joseph Rothschild, *Ethnopolitics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981); Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (London: Verso, 1983).

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across the region.[6] Harold Crouch analyzes the potential capacity of the ASEAN governments to implement regional policies by focusing on the degree to which the governments are insulated from pressures "from below" (mass-based) and "from above" (elite-based); he relates higher capacity to greater insulation. The essays in the volume edited by Higgott and Robison, focusing on the consequences of the "new international division of labor" in the region, argue that strong, bureaucratic, authoritarian governments have been the instruments used by governing elites in their drive for economic development (p. 20).[7] Each of these works takes the state in Southeast Asia seriously, but little consensus has emerged so far on the role that state intervention has played in the development of the region. It is difficult, for example, to reconcile Higgott and Robison's view of powerful, centralized regimes (p. 3) with Crouch's depiction of the capability of these states as generally limited by domestic pressures (passim) and Scalapino's pessimism concerning effective political institutionalization (p. 16). Part of this divergence is, of course, due to different approaches, but some is also an indication that state-focused work is only starting to infuse Southeast Asia research.

How have Southeast Asian states shaped their countries' economic management and political stability? More importantly, how do we explain different capacities for constructive intervention? Building on the base of state research, I suggest that the capacities of states vary with the structure of political support and the means of political control available to a state's elites. Narrow, authoritarian regimes tend to be coercive and controlled by powerful interests, which detracts from their states' capacities to promote economic and political goals. Moderately broad-based regimes, by contrast, provide a greater degree of flexibility and political capacity with which state elites can manage economic and political challenges. The argument relies on a structural analysis of the state's relations with social groups, and not primarily on the formal open or closed nature of regimes over time. This approach accounts for significant variations in the Southeast Asian states' capacity to foster growth and stability.

State Autonomy and Capacity

The statist literature characterizes states as partially independent actors, engaged in a struggle for power with various social forces.[8] In dif-

[6] The volume covers Asia generally; only the Southeast Asia portion is considered here.

[7] Compare Herbert Feith, "Repressive-Developmentalist Regimes in Asia," *Alternatives* 7 (Spring 1982), 491-506.

[8] For a discussion of the characteristics of the statist literature, see Stephen Krasner, "Approaches to the State," *Comparative Politics* 16 (January 1984), 223-46.

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ferent periods, states have varying degrees of autonomy relative to these social forces.[9] This balance of state versus social power assumes a crudely dialectical form over time, with past encounters setting the context for present struggles; it is not necessarily, however, a smooth and evolutionary process, as crises may sometimes result in dramatic shifts.[10]

The history of social conflict is one determinant of state autonomy.[11] The issue of "relative autonomy" of the state can be discussed with reference to the role of both elite and non-elite social groups. Powerful socioeconomic groups generally monopolize regular, continuous access to the state and shape the general outlines of public policy without necessarily occupying state offices themselves.[12] For clarity of discussion, I will use the terms "dominant groups" or "socioeconomic elites" to refer to these powerful social and economic actors. These are distinguishable from "state" elites, who do occupy office. State elites may simply follow the preferences of dominant groups, but they may also act independently—by collaborating with some segments of the socioeconomic elite against other segments, by exercising the state's coercive power, or by otherwise manipulating social pressures.[13] The social base of elites is also important for understanding state autonomy. Powerful social elites may derive their strength from large social groups (unions, parties) that are relatively deeply rooted in society, or they may have a shallow and limited mass base (technocrats, financiers). In the former case, the state interacts with a wide social base, while in the latter it may be quite independent of society at large. Two forms of state autonomy thus derive from the pattern of social relations—one providing varying degrees of independence from

[9] See Peter Evans, "Transnational Linkages and the Role of the State," in Evans et al. (fn. 2), and Evans, *Dependent Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979); Fernando Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, *Dependency and Development in Latin America* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979); Bill Warren, *Imperialism* (London: New Left Books, 1980); Carnoy (fn. 4), chap. 7; Nordlinger (fn. 4); Stephen Krasner, *Defending the National Interest* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978).

[10] Frederic Deyo, in "Social Bases of Development Strategy," paper presented at the conference on The Contemporary State in Southeast Asia (Ann Arbor, MI, April 1986), views crisis as a key to a state's "strategic capacity."

[11] Skocpol in Evans et al. (fn. 2), 14-19.

[12] Nicos Poulantzas, in *State, Power, Socialism* (London: New Left Books, 1980), 127, refers to a "power bloc."

[13] Marx recognized the potential for independent state action that extends beyond the limits generally posited as the "executive committee of the bourgeoisie," especially where the process of class development was historically incomplete and the social base therefore more diverse. See "The German Ideology," in Robert C. Tucker, ed., *The Marx-Engels Reader*, 2d ed. (New York: Norton, 1978), 187. Rueschemeyer and Evans (fn. 5), 63, discuss class alliances with the state. Nordlinger (fn. 4), chaps. 3, 4, 5, examines a wide array of conditions under which democratic states attain a degree of autonomy from societal actors, and the variety of tactics used. Krasner (fn. 9), posits conditions for "insulation" of democratic states from social pressures. David Collier, ed., *The New Authoritarianism in Latin America* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), covers aspects of coercion.

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the social elite, and another providing varying degrees of independence from the wider social base.[14]

The statist literature is ambiguous on the issue of the relationship between a state's autonomy and its capacity. Sometimes it equates capacity with autonomy; sometimes it examines them separately; and sometimes it focuses on administrative ability and resource extraction.[15] Crouch's approach, for example, equates autonomy (insulation from elites or from the masses) directly with capacity. Autonomy, however, though necessary to capacity, is not sufficient to ensure that once goals are selected, they are accomplished. The neocolonialism and "soft state" arguments affirm this.[16] State capacity is a pressing issue, one that also informs the general concern of Scalapino et al. for effective policy development through institutionalization. Donald Emmerson (pp. 138-56) defines it as adaptability in problem solving. That is a useful definition of state capacity, but it does little to explain its origin or relate it to autonomy.

If the flexibility of state elites in formulating and implementing policy determines capacity, some degree of insulation from particularistic demands and some degree of social cooperation are required. If they are lacking, political resources are wasted on designing ineffective policies that, regardless of their technical merits, will meet with resistance when they are enforced. A state's capacity is influenced by the degree of the state's autonomy—a consequence of social control techniques and the structure of elite support.

The development of state capacity is influenced by the manner in which power is aggregated and exercised.[17] State elites pursue goals through a combination of techniques, drawing on ideological, legal, and material resources.[18] These social control techniques can be divided analytically into those that are essentially collaborative and those that are essentially coercive in form.[19] Both coercive and collaborative techniques may get some things done,[20] but coercion induces little cooperation. Al-

[14] Nordlinger (fn. 4), discusses different "types" of state autonomy, but these are all the same form, gained under different assumptions about the congruence of state and social preferences.

[15] Skocpol (fn. 3), 16.

[16] Gunnar Myrdal, *Asian Drama* (New York: Pantheon, 1968).

[17] W. Howard Wriggins, *The Ruler's Imperative* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), 4.

[18] See *ibid.*, 91ff.; Nordlinger (fn. 4), 92-94, 111-12, 130-32.

[19] In Gramsci's distinction between consensus and coercion as means of state domination, "hegemony" relies primarily on consensual means (chiefly ideology), with coercion in the background. I use the term collaboration to include a state's alliance tactics with other forms of consensus. See Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from Prison Notebooks* (New York: International Publishers, 1971); Martin Carnoy (fn. 4), 65-88.

[20] Charles Tilly has emphasized the coercive roles of police, armies, and tax collection in the growth of strong European states: see his "War Making and State Making as Organized

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though recent studies have inquired into everyday forms of peasant resistance that constrain and shape policy implementation,[21] such behavior, and its consequences, is hardly limited to peasants. Noncooperative behavior throughout a society may passively and significantly undermine capacity by requiring a greater expenditure of coercive resources to attain given ends. Thus, while coercion may be as effective as collaboration for establishing order, it is not as efficient. Collaboration fosters more legitimacy for state policy than does coercion, and therefore increases capacity.[22]

The choice of social control strategies, and especially the balance between coercion and collaboration, is constrained by the composition of the dominant elite. Social elites representing broad groups provide channels to state elites for collaborative techniques such as coalition, bargaining, or co-opting (but not necessarily excluding coercion). A narrow elite structure with a shallow social base precludes these techniques, forcing state elites to substitute more coercive means. Thus, authoritarian states can coerce both social elites and the masses; but because coercive means of social control are more expensive than collaborative ones, they require greater state autonomy. With the same resource expenditure, a representative state that utilizes collaborative social control techniques yields more capacity than a narrow one that relies on coercion. The nature of a state's support influences the political resources the state controls, affecting its flexibility and capacity.

The structure of the dominant groups also affects the policy flexibility and capacity of state managers. In the context of a small range of important social elites, the demands for special consideration may be impossible to resist, resulting in constrained policy options, "policies" that simply legitimate the behavior of particular elites, or policies that are applied only in the breach. Narrow authoritarian states are therefore less able to design and implement policies independently of elite pressures; their independence from society may be considerable, but their independence from dominant groups is restricted, thus limiting their capacity. When state support is based on a range of socially important groups, state managers may balance such elements against each other in order to pursue their own preferred policies, insulating the state more effectively from control

Crime," in Evans et al. (fn. 2); and Tilly (fn. 4). Other authors posit superior performance to more democratic, collaborative states: see Atul Kohli, "Democracy and Development," in Lewis and Kallab (fn. 2); Robert Jackman, *Politics and Social Equality* (New York: John Wiley, 1975).

[21] James Scott and Benedict Kerkvliet, eds., *Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance in Southeast Asia* (London: Frank Cass, 1986).

[22] Katzenstein (fn. 5), 19, also links policy implementation to organized social support.

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by particular interests. They thereby increase their independence from dominant groups, giving the state greater capacity. A broader structure of dominant groups maximizes the state elites' capacity to design and implement policy, while a narrower structure is more likely to limit state capacity.

My argument may be summarized as follows. If state autonomy is defined as partial independence from some specified social group, and state capacity as the ability to formulate and implement policy along predictable lines, it follows that (1) the dominant means of social control vary with the nature of a state's social support. States with a deeper and broader social base can utilize collaborative means of social control; states with shallow bases will be constrained to adopt coercive social control. (2) Forms of social control affect capacity. Collaborative control is more efficient in resource expenditures than is coercive control, providing more capacity for states with constrained resources. (3) State capacity also varies with the structure of the elite coalitions underlying the state. Predictable, flexible capacity is characteristic of a broader coalition; contrived, limited capacity is characteristic of states with a narrower base. The pattern of social relations between the state and society helps to explain variations in capacity. State autonomy can be converted into state capacity, which in turn can be applied, among other goals, toward effective economic performance and political stability.

The Southeast Asian States

The industrializing Southeast Asian countries have experienced comparatively rapid economic change and substantial political stability for the past several decades, but the variations within this group are as significant as their variance from the general third-world experience. Growth in real terms has been strong and resilient in Singapore and Malaysia, somewhat less strong in Thailand, but slower and more fragile in Indonesia and especially in the Philippines, which recently suffered economic collapse;[23] equity performances have also varied substantially.[24] Positive performance does not correspond with laissez-faire economic policies or with government intervention, which is high in each country. It does follow state capacity rather closely, however.

[23] For overviews of economic performance, see Brian Wawn, *The Economies of the ASEAN Countries* (New York: St. Martin's, 1982); Ryokici Hirono, "Asian and Pacific Developing Economies: Performance and Issues," *Asian Development Review* 4 (No. 1, 1986), 1-26.

[24] For a survey, see Donald Crone, "The Growth and Equity Experience of Southeast Asia," Occasional Paper No. 8 (East Lansing, MI: Center for the Advanced Study of International Development, 1985), and the references cited there.

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The more difficult test of state capacity lies in maintaining stability. Social tensions have accompanied economic change in both urban and rural areas.[25] Each of the countries have had to deal with revolutionary movements in the past, and some still do.[26] Social diversity provides almost continuous, sometimes armed, communal challenges to their central governments.[27] While the political cultures of these countries have not provided stability, their political structures have generated different capacities to manage these pressures.

Southeast Asian political structures are partly historical products, but they are also heavily molded by state elites. The following necessarily schematic discussion draws attention to the most significant of these variations, relating characteristics of elite structures to economic and political capacity. The point is not to exaggerate state causation, but to draw out correspondences between political structure and state capacity.

Singapore and Malaysia are states that rest on broad-based coalitions and generally collaborative means of social control. Singapore has been firmly under the control of the People's Action Party (PAP) since independence; despite its strong, paternalistic demeanor, the state has maintained significant support from its social base largely through collaborative and co-optive means. The PAP and the national bureaucracy are based on the increasingly dominant middle class (Lee, in Scalapino et al., 212) to the extent that until recently it has been difficult for political opposition groups to find suitable candidates.[28] Consequently, the PAP has had large majorities in electoral returns since 1959 and enjoyed total control of Parliament until 1981 (Lee, in Scalapino et al., 205). The ruling elite was originally drawn from the Republic's union base, control of which was captured from the more radical socialist opposition by means of a combination of coercion and manuevering in the early 1960s.[29] The state has since incorporated and subordinated labor through what Deyo characterizes as a paternalistic, corporatist structure of collaborative but

[25] See Philip Hauser et al., eds., *Urbanization and Migration in ASEAN Development* (Tokyo: National Institute for Research Advancement, 1985); Carol Warren, "Class and Change in Rural Southeast Asia" (Higgott and Robison, 128-45).

[26] See Joo-Jock Lim and S. Vani, eds., *Armed Communist Movements in Southeast Asia* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1984).

[27] See Joo-Jock Lim and S. Vani, eds., *Armed Separatism in Southeast Asia* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1984).

[28] Poon Kim Shee, "Political Leadership and Succession in Singapore," in Peter Chen, ed., *Singapore Development Policies and Trends* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1983), 173-96; Eng Fong Pang,"Growth, Inequality and Race in Singapore," *International Labor Review* 111 (January 1975), 15-28.

[29] See Thomas Bellows, *The People's Action Party of Singapore: Emergence of a Dominant Party System* (New Haven: Yale University South-East Asian Studies Monographs, 1970); Heng Chee Chan, *The Dynamics of One Party Dominance: The PAP at the Grassroots* (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1976).

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authoritarian management with joint mechanisms, exemplified since 1972 by the National Wages Council.[30] After 1965, control over labor was central to Singapore's drive to attract and maintain a diverse base of foreign capital for industrialization (Rodan, in Higgott and Robison, 179-81). Because foreign capital has also virtually been incorporated into the regime through the International Chamber of Commerce, a precarious balance must be maintained between conflicting interests;[31] however, foreign capital adds to the diversity of dominant groups that has been exploited by state elites. Local capitalists, who have been gradually marginalized by foreign capital, are a minor element in Singapore's dominant elite.[32] This wide coalitional base with deep social roots protects the state from interference by any one specific group, including particular sources of foreign investment.[33] It provides the state with considerable capacity for paternalistic but generally noncoercive control.

Malaysia's elite coalition is similar to the Singaporean in breadth, but quite different in structure. Based on a multicommunal political "directorate" (Zakaria, in Scalapino et al., 229-31), the National Front (Alliance prior to 1974) has held power with little difficulty since independence in 1957 by means of fairly open electoral competition and thoroughly cooptive tactics. Brennan (in Higgott and Robison, 93-127) points to the intersection of race and class in the composition of the ruling elite, which includes Malay aristocrats and landlords, higher bureaucrats (mostly Malay), capitalists (mostly Chinese and Indian), and the urban petite bourgeoisie; race and class have become increasingly blurred in the past decade.[34] The ideology of "bumiputraism" (high salience of ethnic origin) may be, as Brennan argues, an element in the control strategy of the dominant class; but others point to the centrality of the multiethnic social base in determining issues (Zakaria, in Scalapino et al., 223).[35] The government's substantial support among each ethnic group derives from patronage and policy measures channelled through political party structures

[30] Frederic Deyo, *Dependent Development and Industrial Order* (New York: Praeger, 1981).

[31] Noeleen Heyzer, "International Production and Social Change: An Analysis of the State, Employment and Trade Unions in Singapore," in Chen (fn. 28), 105-28.

[32] Hafiz Mirza, *Multinationals and the Growth of the Singapore Economy* (London: Croom Helm, 1986), 104-9; Kunio Yoshihara, *Foreign Investment and Domestic Response* (Singapore: Eastern Universities Press, 1976).

[33] Donald Crone, *The ASEAN States: Coping with Dependence* (New York: Praeger, 1983), 110-12.

[34] For a class analysis, see Kwame Sundaram Jomo, *A Question of Class: Capital, the State, and Uneven Development in Malaya* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1986).

[35] Also see Judith Nagata, *Malaysian Mosaic* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia, 1979); R. S. Milne, *Politics in Ethnically Bipolar States* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia, 1981); James Ongkili, *Nation-building in Malaysia, 1946-1974* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1985).

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rather than from inclusion of groups such as unions and peasant associations in the dominant elite.[36] The necessity of simultaneously maintaining support among economically predominant groups (mostly Chinese) and politically predominant Malays mutes opposition to policies presented as necessary to national stability; it also increases the state's autonomy and flexibility. Since 1970 the government has been somewhat more authoritarian (Crouch, 27), increasingly relying on its hegemonic Malay base and exercising coercion more frequently.[37] Still, the basic mechanisms of control are co-optation and collaboration. The transition from the Alliance to the National Front (1970-1974) combined coercion (banning issues central to some party platforms) with co-optation (negotiating entry into the central political coalition for all willing parties).[38] At the same time, prominent opponents have regularly been co-opted into the highest levels of government.[39] The state's considerable autonomy derives from the breadth of the underlying elite support, as well as from structured mass support.

This autonomy has resulted in administrative independence and high state capacity in both Singapore and Malaysia. For example, it makes Singapore, by various accounts, the epitome of the "hard state,"[40] or an "administrative state,"[41] with great policy autonomy. State enterprises and statutory boards stimulate growth and manage capital formation (Rodan, in Higgott and Robison, 175),[42] build social infrastructure,[43] and mold a multiracial, multilingual national identity (Lee, in Scalapino, 203).[44] State-controlled firms and boards are managed by the same pool of indi-

[36] R. S. Milne and Diane K. Mauzy, *Politics and Government in Malaysia* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1978), 222ff.

[37] John Lent, "Human Rights in Malaysia: A 1986 Update," unpub., Association for Asian Studies, March 1986.

[38] See Milne and Mauzy (fn. 36), 177-91.

[39] Simon Barraclough, "Political Participation and Its Regulation in Malaysia: Opposition to the Societies (Amendment) Act of 1981," *Pacific Affairs* 57 (Fall 1984), 450-61; Diane Mauzy and R. S. Milne, "The Mahathir Administration in Malaysia: Discipline through Islam," *Pacific Affairs* 56 (Winter 1983-84), 617-48.

[40] Mirza (fn. 32), 49.

[41] Heng Chee Chan, "Politics in an Administrative State: Where Has the Politics Gone?" in Chee Meow Seah, ed., *Trends in Singapore* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1975), 51-68.

[42] Mirza (fn. 32), 110, cites figures estimating the contribution of state enterprise at one-third of Singapore's GNP; also see Linda Seah, "Public Enterprise and Economic Development," and Jon Quah, "Public Bureaucracy, Social Change and National Development," in Chen (fn. 28).

[43] Sheng Yi Lee, "Income Distribution, Taxation, and Social Benefits in Singapore," *Journal of the Developing Areas* 14 (October 1979), 71-98; V. V. Rao and M. K. Ramakrishnan, "Economic Growth, Structural Change and Income Inequality, Singapore, 1966-1975," *Malayan Economic Review* 22 (April 1977), 92-122.

[44] Seen Kong Chiew, "Ethnicity and National Integration: The Evolution of a Multiethnic Society," in Chen (fn. 28), 29-64.

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viduals who occupy high bureaucratic and political positions; they apply the same governmental criteria of control and efficiency to these quasi-governmental activities. A flexible, predictable policy-making style predominates; discussions are mostly confined to various state elites who take sectional interests into account selectively (Crouch, 10-19).

Malaysia has, especially since 1970, constructed a similarly strong, interventionist state (Brennan, in Higgott and Robinson, 111) that has extensively utilized public enterprise to accumulate and redistribute wealth.[45] The operational state ideology, intended to forge a new basis of national unity, is committed to raising living standards and income levels through managed growth. Results have been mixed, but generally positive.[46] The bureaucracy plays a central and effective role; some assert that it controls a state-dominated society,[47] supervising and "closely administering" state policy (Zakaria, in Scalapino et al., 224-25). This policy is generally flexible and responsive to pressures articulated through political channels (Crouch, 24-28). Although neither Singapore nor Malaysia have particularly "open" regimes, both have achieved substantial state capacity for economic management and political stability, built on the state's independence from one segment of the socioeconomic elite or another, and on a mix of collaborative and coercive means of control.

By contrast, the Thai and Indonesian states are ruled by narrowly based regimes with substantial degrees of coercion, although there have been significant changes in Thailand over the last decade. Since 1932, Thailand's "bureaucratic polity" has rested on the base of the military, particularly the army, in collaboration with the civilian bureaucracy.[48] Early attempts to control the largely ethnic Chinese economic elite through exclusion[49] were replaced in the 1950s by subordinate incorporation through "partnerships" that negotiated political protection for business in return for patronage resources for political elites.[50] Other social groups were simply excluded from politics and controlled through

[45] See Bruce Gale, *Politics and Public Enterprize in Malaysia* (Singapore: Eastern Universities Press, 1981); Loong-Hoe Tan, *The State and Economic Distribution in Malaysia* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1982); Milne and Mauzy (fn. 36), 321-52.

[46] Donald Snodgrass, *Inequality and Economic Development in Malaysia* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1980); Kevin Young et al., eds., *Malaysia: Growth and Equity in a Multiracial Society* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980).

[47] Milton Esman, *Administration and Development in Malaysia* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1972), 62. Milne and Mauzy (fn. 36), 276, maintain that political institutions predominate over bureaucratic ones.

[48] Fred Riggs, *Thailand: The Modernization of a Bureaucratic Polity* (Honolulu: East-West Center, 1966).

[49] Eliezer Ayal, "Thailand," in Frank Golay et al., *Underdevelopment and Economic Nationalism in Southeast Asia* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1969).

[50] See John Girling, *Thailand: Society and Politics* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1981), 76-81; William Skinner, *Leadership and Power in the Chinese Community of Thailand* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1958).

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coercion, with all significant political change resulting from intraregime coups. Serious internal divisions in the military regime provided an opening for a variety of excluded groups in the aftermath of the 1973 "revolution," and resulted in a broadened regime after the reassertion of military authority in 1976.[51] In *Thailand in Transition*, Prizzia surveys these emerging forces—particularly students, unions, parliamentary parties, and the Communist Party—and their struggle to play a permanent, significant role in the Thai regime; he concludes that, despite their substantial repression since 1976, the base of the regime has been permanently broadened, albeit within an authoritarian structure (p. 5). The major regime change has been the partial inclusion of political parties with links to growing Thai business groups but little mass base (Hewison, in Higgot and Robison);[52] but Prizzia points out that parliament has only a limited influence on policy (p. 87). Internal military divisions also allowed an "open arms" policy toward the Communist Party; combined with fortuitous reductions in external support, this reduced the strength of the armed opposition (Prizzia, 7-25). A shift toward collaborative control and policies aimed at satisfying mass demands have accompanied the present quasi-democracy. However, the state is still dependent on a narrow coalition dominated by military factions, and the role of civilians is limited (Crouch, 64-66).

Indonesia's "bureaucratic polity" has restricted power and participation to a small elite situated in the army officer corps and the administration since 1957, with the army assuming full power after 1965.[53] Robison (in Higgott and Robison, 295-335) attributes the military's dominance of the state to the weakness of social classes, particularly the national bourgeoisie,[54] while Anderson sees the creation of an autonomous state as a continous, major goal of the military,[55] achieved through forging internal coherence in the early 1960s while other political groups were fragmented or were being eliminated.[56] The army legitimates military control

[51] See Samudavanija Chai-Anan and Bunbongkarn Suchit, "Thailand," in Haji Ahmad Zakaria and Harold Crouch, eds., *Military-Civilian Relations in South-East Asia* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1985); Samudavanija Chai-Anan, *The Thai Young Turks* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1982).

[52] Also see Kevin Hewison, "The Financial Bourgeoisie in Thailand," *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 11 (No. 4, 1981), 395-412.

[53] Karl Jackson, "Bureaucratic Polity: A Theoretical Framework for the Analysis of Power and Communications in Indonesia," in Karl Jackson and Lucian Pye, eds., *Political Power and Communications in Indonesia* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978).

[54] See also Richard Robison, "Toward a Class Analysis of the Indonesian Military Bureaucratic State," *Indonesia* 25 (April 1978), 17-39.

[55] Benedict Anderson, "Old State, New Society: Indonesia's New Order in Comparative Historical Perspective," *Journal of Asian Studies* 43 (May 1983), 477-96.

[56] See Dwight King, *Interest Groups and Political Linkage in Indonesia, 1800-1965* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Center for Southeast Asian Studies, 1982).

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of critical national economic resources and policies, progressively gained after the late 1950s,[57] by its central role in the nationalist revolution[58] and its dual military and sociopolitical functions.[59] Jenkins's fascinating study, *Suharto and His Generals* (ill-received by current military leaders), documents that policy debate is confined to a small number of current and past officeholders, almost all within the military. Wanandi (in Scalapino et al., 195) points to government plans to make GOLKAR, the government's political vehicle, into a more independent center of power; the army stood aside somewhat more in the recent national elections. This change could widen the regime by increasing the role of bureaucrats. The control of the dominant groups over political resources is at present so complete, however, that challengers have few options, as illustrated by the 1976 "phantom coup," which relied primarily on mysticism as a vehicle to power.[60] The result is an extremely narrow elite, composed primarily of a small number of military officers; its dependent supporters are Chinese Indonesian business partners[61] and members of the administrative corps, but there is no extensive mass base.[62]

Social control in Indonesia relies heavily on coercion. Emmerson asserts that coercion is frequently the starting point for control exercised through the bureaucracy.[63] Crouch contends that the social base of the state is so narrow that there are really no non-authoritarian options for control (p. 79). At the same time, co-optation, patronage, and traditional consensus practices are also brought to bear. Among the dominant groups, patronage—much of it derived from external sources channelled directly to state elites—cements patrimonial authority and normally quiets dissent (Jenkins, 169). These external resources also reduce the necessity of relying on the general population for revenues (Robison, in Higgott and Robison, 326), and thus increase the state's independence

[57] Martin Rudner, "The Indonesian Military and Economic Policy," *Modern Asian Studies* 10 (April 1976), 249-84.

[58] For the diversity of the actual experience, however, see Audrey Kahin, ed., *Regional Dynamics of the Indonesian Revolution* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1985).

[59] For political analyses of the Indonesian military, see Ulf Sundhaussen, *The Road to Power: Indonesian Military Politics, 1945-1967* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1982), and Harold Crouch, *The Army and Politics in Indonesia* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1978).

[60] David Bourchier, *Dynamics of Dissent in Indonesia: Sawito and the Phantom Coup* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1984).

[61] Robison (Higgot and Robison, 324) argues that major business groups are becoming less dependent on military partnership for success as they accumulate capital; on the army's economic interests, see also Crouch (fn. 59), 273-303.

[62] Harold Crouch, "Indonesia," in Zakaria and Crouch (fn. 51), 60.

[63] Donald Emmerson, "The Bureaucracy in Political Context: Weakness in Strength," in Jackson and Pye (fn. 53), 82-136; see also Dwight King, "Human Rights Practices in Indonesia," paper presented to Association for Asian Studies, Chicago, 1986.

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from the social base. Co-optation of social groups through governmental manipulation of leaders and ideologies, as illustrated by the adoption of Panca Sila (the official, nonsecular ideology) by the Moslem party grouping, helps to maintain a coercively depoliticized "floating mass."[64]

The result of narrow coalitions and coercive control in both Thailand and Indonesia is that the state is dominated by powerful groups, which limits state capacity. In Thailand, state capacity has consistently been channelled toward private interests by interlocked business and bureaucratic groups, a practice that severely limits policy flexibility (Crouch, 67-70). State enterprises and favored companies serve primarily as revenue sources and as patronage bases for factions (Chai-Anan, in Scalapino et al., 244-46) rather than as bases of growth, while the patrimonial structure of administration limits the state's ability to respond to groups outside that structure.[65] Policy incoherence is a continuous problem,[66] and legal changes frequently reflect the interests of those who promoted the latest coup rather than addressing themselves to social norms (Chai-Anan, in Scalapino et al., 247ff.). Political stability has often been contingent on the power calculations of contending coup groups, rather than on state action.

The effects of the coalitional structure are quite similar in Indonesia. Elite business linkages and patronage considerations control the government's policies, even when initiated by technocrats (Crouch, 82-85). Administrative structures are frequently ineffective in pursuing their nominal objectives (as the experiment with PERTAMINA attests)[67] or in substantially improving contexts for population groups that had been exploited under colonial rule.[68] Policies requiring cooperation of the masses fail because the isolation of state elites prevents them from mobilizing wide support.[69] The state has been plagued with secession attempts and regional challenges aimed at displacing existing state elites.[70] Wanandi (in Scalapino et al., 181-201) argues that the "New Order" has moved toward

[64] R. William Liddle, in "Suharto's Indonesia: Personal Rule and Political Institutions," *Pacific Affairs* 58 (Spring 1985), 68-90, calls it a "political desert"; see also Crouch, in Zakaria and Crouch (fn. 51), 65ff.

[65] Girling (fn. 50), 129ff.

[66] John Girling, "Thailand in Gramscian Perspective," *Pacific Affairs* 57 (Fall 1984), 399.

[67] See Khong Cho Oon, *The Politics of Oil in Indonesia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), for a recent review of that agency. Bruce Glassburner, "Indonesia's New Economic Policy and Its Sociopolitical Implications," in Jackson and Pye (fn. 53), 137-70, offers a wider review of implementation problems.

[68] Ann Laura Stoler, *Capitalism and Confrontation in Sumatra's Plantation Belt, 1870-1979* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985).

[69] Jackson, in Jackson and Pye (fn. 53), 8.

[70] Leo Suryadinata, "Ethnicity and National Integration in Indonesia: An Analysis," *Asia Quarterly* 3 (1976), 209-34; Lim and Vani (fn. 27).

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greater institutionalization based on constitutionalism and the rule of law, and William Liddle considers the "New Order Pyramid" as stable enough to be seen as institutionalized.[71] If so, institutionalization has not had the positive effect on capacity that is generally assumed; nor has authoritarian rule. In both Indonesia and Thailand, state autonomy has been limited by the state's narrow elite base, and state capacity is constrained by its limited mass bases.

The case of the Philippine state is the most extreme one examined here, with a narrowing elite and increasing coercion during the course of the Marcos period bringing about the government's collapse in early 1986.[72] The declaration of martial law in 1972 signaled a decisive change from a regime based on democratic institutions which had been under political pressure,[73] including, as Stauffer points out, pressures to broaden and define a more nationalist path (Higgott and Robison, 248). One of Marcos's aims had been to break the power of the old landed "oligarchs"; however, many of the same families became the base of the commercial elite upon which the new dominant coalition was founded.[74] One theme of the May and Nemenzo volume is the continuous narrowing of the elite. First, economic control became concentrated in the hands of new oligarchs, cronies with close palace and foreign connections,[75] who alienated most business groups, old and new, from the regime.[76] A second aspect of the changing nature of the government was the transfer of authority from the old political elite, which had deep, patronage-based support, to technocrats—thus creating what Nemenzo terms a "Bonapartist state" (May and Nemenzo, 48-50) with little or no mass base. A new political party, the KBL (*Kilusang Bagong Lipunan*, or New Society Movement) was founded in 1978, but it was never institutionalized into the regime (Hernandez, in Scalapino et al., 269ff.).[77] In the end, the military, under direct presidential con-

[71] Liddle (fn. 64).

[72] For a survey of events prior to the "revolution," focusing on the role of the United States, see Gary Hawes, "United States Support for the Marcos Administration and the Pressures that Made for Change," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 8 (June 1986), 18-36.

[73] Kit Machado, "From Traditional Faction to Machine: Changing Patterns of Political Leadership and Organization in the Rural Philippines," *Journal of Asian Studies* 33 (August 1974), 523-47.

[74] See David Wurfel, "Elites of Wealth and Elites of Power," *Southeast Asian Affairs 1979* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1979).

[75] See Kunio Yoshihara, *Philippine Industrialization* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1985); also Stauffer, in Higgott and Robison, 241-65.

[76] See also Robert Snow, "Export-Oriented Industrialization, the International Division of Labor, and the Rise of the Subcontract Bourgeoisie in the Philippines," in Norman Owen, ed., *The Philippine Economy and the United States: Studies in Past and Present Interactions* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Center for South and Southeast Asian Studies, 1983), 77-108.

[77] See also Wilfrido Villacorta, "Contending Political Forces in the Philippines Today," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 5 (September 1983), 185-204.

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trol, became a primary member of the dominant coalition as well as the implementer of government policy and the local dispenser of patronage.[78] The Marcos state was extremely independent of Philippine society and increasingly exercised control through coercion.[79] Although some corporatist forms were also created (Stauffer, in Higgot and Robison, 252ff.), many were simply vehicles for Marcos's cronies.[80]

This high degree of insulation from a mass base did not result in increased state capacity because control by powerful interests sapped the state's autonomy. As Crouch (pp. 50-58) points out, technocrat-sponsored policy was consistently frustrated by Marcos's cronies. Authoritarian rule did not increase the consistency, cost-effectiveness, or development orientation of state policy in certain sectors, even though it was rationalized in these terms.[81] Hill and Jayasurina describe how the economy, which had started from a strong base, became a shambles (see May and Nemenzo, 130-51). Equity programs, including those supported by external sources, were disastrous.[82] The small insurgency that had "justified" martial law burgeoned into a firmly based, nationwide movement.[83] Even the coercive capacity of the Marcos state was insufficient to deflect popular protest against the assassination of Benigno Aquino, Marcos's "radical other" (Reynaldo Ileto, in May and Nemenzo, 7-16). Laudable rhetoric (even if one charitably assumes its sincerity) simply could not be converted into effective policy due to the role of powerful groups and a lack of ability to engage mass support. The narrow elite coalition and coercive control produced the wide-ranging incapacity of the Philippine state.

Conclusion

It is increasingly recognized that the state has been an important actor in Southeast Asian development. I have suggested that this issue can be

[78] Carolina Hernandez, "The Philippines," in Zakaria and Crouch (fn. 51), 157-96.

[79] For a recent review, see *"Salvaging" Democracy: Human Rights in the Philippines* (New York: Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, 1985).

[80] See Robert Stauffer, "Philippine Corporatism: A Note on the New Society," *Asian Survey* (April 1977), 393-407. R. S. Milne, "Corporatism in the ASEAN Countries," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 5 (September 1983), 172-84, disputes the applicability of the term "corporatism" to these structures.

[81] Linda Richter, *Land Reform and Tourism Development: Policy-Making in the Philippines* (Cambridge, MA: Schenkman, 1982); James Anderson, "Rapid Rural 'Development': Performance and Consequences in the Philippines," in Colin MacAndrews and Chia Lin Sien, eds., *Too Rapid Rural Development* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1982).

[82] Waldon Bello, David Kinley, and Elaine Elinson, *Development Debacle: The World Bank in the Philippines* (San Francisco: Institute for Food and Development Policy, 1982); Edberto Villegas, *Studies in Philippine Political Economy* (Manila: Silangan, 1983).

[83] See F. A. Mediansky, "The New People's Army: A Nation-Wide Insurgency in the Philippines," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 8 (June 1986), 1-17.

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productively investigated by examining the political structure of relations between states and their social bases, looking to circumstances that facilitate or constrain state capacity. This approach usefully synthesizes much of the recent literature on the region and facilitates comparative analysis of the role of states.

The focus here on the domestic determinants of state autonomy and capacity is not intended to deny the importance of external linkages. Indeed, each Southeast Asian country relies on external elements, especially trade and foreign investment, to a substantial degree.[84] This obviously affects each state and social elite, but in too complex a manner to be adequately addressed here.

When the scope of analysis is limited to the domestic arena, the Southeast Asian cases suggest that some widely accepted views of the role of the state in development should be challenged. First, the state in Southeast Asia has been vital to both economic growth and political stability. Despite some liberal economic policies, the weight of state intervention has been heavy and consistent. In addition, state elites have had to struggle to construct and maintain political stability, which is not simply a derivative of found cultural values. The state has been a central and essential actor in economic and political arenas.

Each of the Southeast Asian states is to some degree authoritarian, bureaucratized, and repressive. A bureaucratic authoritarian model conceals many significant variations of capacity, however. Authoritarian states may maximize their independence from society, but they lose capacity due to their inability to mobilize public support (as suggested by the Philippine, Indonesian, and Thai cases) through overreliance on coercive means of control. When a narrow elite base reduces some public pressures, it does so at the risk of extensive control by powerful interests, which severely constrains autonomy and capacity. This is particularly evident in the Indonesian and Philippine cases. The cases of Singapore and Malaysia suggest that a broader social elite reduces penetration and increases state autonomy; Thailand may also be moving in this direction. Combined with more mass-based support, reduced penetration yields greater state capacity. Capacity is further increased by a balance of social control that includes significant collaborative mechanisms. Bureaucratic authoritarian states that insulate state elites from both social elites and mass pressures perform relatively poorly. It is an irony of the state that maximizing insulation saps capacity, while moderation in the pursuit of authority increases the ability to achieve results.

[84] See Crone (fn. 33).

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A VIEW FROM ZAIRE

By PATRICK M. BOYLE*

Michael G. Schatzberg, *Politics and Class in Zaire: Bureaucracy, Business, and Beer in Lisala*. New York, Africana Publishing Company, 1980, 228 pp.
Thomas M. Callaghy, *The State-Society Struggle: Zaire in Comparative Perspective*. New York, Columbia University Press, 1984, 515 pp.
Crawford Young and Thomas Turner, *The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State*. Madison, The University of Wisconsin Press, 1985, 500 pp.

TWENTY years ago Aristide Zolberg wrote in these pages that students of African politics often find the Congo to be a "unique case that requires special explanation." Challenging assertions that the Congo was somehow a "deviant case"—a view not wholly implausible because of that country's singularly traumatic initial experiences with independence—Zolberg suggested that the political system of the Congo be viewed as a "model or type" of African polity in which the processes of change at the "level of regime" raise "the most interesting and important political questions" for scholars.[1] He argued that

> the Congo [now Zaire] reminds us that "the more fundamental problem among the new states is not authoritarianism but authority; not the effectiveness of political systems in mobilizing the surrounding society to achieve rapid economic growth but the sheer possibility of minimal political order."[2]

Questions about authority and political order have lost none of their relevance when directed at contemporary Zaire. Its political experience, moreover, continues to suggest the outlines of many of sub-Saharan Africa's most perplexing problems. Corruption, an extensive but "weak" state structure, and deep-seated social conflict—common afflictions in African countries—typify the Zairian situation. In this essay, I examine the mode and extent of the institutionalization of authority and political order in Zaire by reviewing several recent works on Zairian politics. While making important contributions to an increased understanding of the ways in which Zaire has changed since the mid-1960s, these books explore the relationships among three key elements in this process of institutionalization: ethnicity, class, and the state.

* I am indebted to Marilyn McMorrow for critical comments that helped to improve this review article.

[1] Zolberg, "A View from the Congo," *World Politics* 19 (October 1966), 137-49, at 140, 144.
[2] *Ibid.*, 137.

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Michael Schatzberg's analysis of the beer industry in northwestern Zaire utilizes his extensive field research to present an intelligent discussion of classes and class consciousness in Zaire. Thomas Callaghy, in probing the implications of the Mobutu regime's "attempted state formation," reveals the class-forming activities of local and national bureaucrats caught in a struggle of the state against society. Crawford Young and Thomas Turner offer a comprehensive political history of the Zairian state in an effort to demonstrate its crucial role in the country's contemporary problems.

These recent works also reflect changes in scholarly perceptions of Zaire over the years. Two important shifts in emphasis emerge when they are compared to books written during the decade immediately after independence. First, various forms of class analysis have, for the most part, replaced ethnic analyses of Zairian politics. As defined and limited by the authors under review, class analysis of Zairian society is a useful—and necessary—addition to the earlier emphasis on ethnic conflict and elite behavior in the literature on Zaire.[3] The emerging configuration of socioeconomic forces brought on by Mobutu's efforts at regime consolidation and designs for a Zairian version of African capitalism raises new questions for scholars. Has a capitalist class been taking shape in Zaire? Has it acquired control over the state? If so, how does it interact with other forces in Zairian society, and what has been the nature of its links to foreign capital? The volumes reviewed here incorporate critiques of "dependency" approaches; they also take account of exogenous determinants of change in Zaire while essentially pursuing domestic analyses of its politics. Within the framework of development studies, these works add support to the view "that class forces are critical for the fate of development in every African country, or that every development strategy has an inescapable class character."[4]

The attention these authors give to the question of the state reflects a related major shift in the literature. They share the view that the Zairian state has itself become the source and the locus of many of the country's problems. Schatzberg's and Callaghy's discussions of class consciousness and class formation suggest that in Zaire authority and political order have been institutionalized through increasingly visible patterns of in-

[3] For two schematic but helpful outlines of the changes in approaches to Zairian politics, see Wyatt MacGaffey, "The Policy of National Integration in Zaire," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 20 (March 1982), 87-105, at 88-89; Jean-Luc Vellut, "Développement et sous-développement au Zaïre," [Development and underdevelopment in Zaire], *Genève-Afrique* 17 (No. 1, 1979), 133-140, at 135.

[4] Colin Leys, "African Economic Development in Theory and Practice," *Daedalus* 111 (Spring 1982), 99-124, at 120.

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equality, corruption, and conflict within a situation of declining social mobility. Young and Turner go further by concentrating on the implications of such patterns. Analyzing the complex set of institutions and practices that make up the state, they argue that after the fall of copper prices in 1974, the Zairian state—suffering from the effects of years of poor decision making and enmeshed in a political context fraught with increasing class conflict—began a process of pervasive state decline, even decay.

The authors present readers with a disturbing portrait of Zaire. Young and Turner, for example, question whether the Zairian state any longer possesses the capacity to be effective in carrying out even minimal tasks. To cite just two examples: the Zairian military lacks the pay, discipline, and training that would curb abuses or make it more than a strong arm to be used against the population; there are few teachers for rural school children in a country of large numbers of educated unemployed. In more general ways, notable characteristics of contemporary Zaire run counter to received expectations. Because of its vast mineral resources, Zaire had been predicted to become one of the region's principal economic forces; yet concerted efforts at industrialization and exploitation of mineral deposits have failed to place the country's economy on a firm footing and to generate any real increase in the prosperity of its population. The Mobutu regime's policies of expanding the state's apparatus and scope of control have offered the country meager results in terms of bureaucratic efficiency and political development. Indeed, the contemporary Zairian state barely functions, and the society suffers from growing economic inequality and social conflict.

After a brief examination of what the authors say about ethnicity and class—related topics that have long interested students of African politics—this review will consider a topic of perhaps broader interest: the disturbing characteristics of one of Africa's largest modern states.

The changing context of politics in Zaire after Mobutu's coup of 1965 and the reorientation of scholarly perspectives on the dynamics of social behavior in Africa explain the shift from ethnic analyses of elite behavior in the 1960s to studies of class formation in the 1980s. Mobutu's rise to control over the military and the state set the stage for authoritarian rule and the unequal distribution of the fruits of independence. For a time, the seeming maintenance of political authority and order that accompanied and fostered bureaucratic centralization permitted, first, investment on the basis of foreign loans, and second, attempts to appropriate the economic resources held by Europeans and non-Africans living in Zaire.

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The struggle to appropriate resources combined with the growth of social stratification; both were evident in the widening gap between the urban and rural population in their relative access to employment, education, and the resources of the state. Thus, the period beginning with Mobutu's takeover raises important questions about how regimes—as processes or methods for ordering political relationships—can institutionalize patterns of social stratification.[5]

In his first (and now classic) work on the Congo, Crawford Young characterized the early years of independence as the slow emergence of an African political system out of "a decolonization which went awry."[6] Urban-based struggles of ethnic elites dominated Congolese politics between 1959 (starting with riots in Leopoldville that prompted Belgium to grant independence after seven months) and 1965 (when the Mobutu regime established itself). Ethnic groups and coalitions initially competed for control of national political offices and then for preeminence in an almost instantaneously Africanized state bureaucracy. Independence had turned political structures into battlefields of ethnic and regional conflict. Thus, the prospects of a young, educated person for employment or advancement often depended on his ethnic affiliations or links to a geographical region.

In this early period, the term "elite" generally referred to the "modern" status of those who mastered the language and some practices of the colonizer; it did not, in any strict sense, refer to traditional notions of social classes as conscious and organized structural elements in socioeconomic dynamics. It soon became evident, however, that elites who successfully used the colonizers' tools in the political sphere also prospered in the economic sphere. At the same time, Mobutu's patrimonial style of politics personalized ongoing struggles for the authority of the state and the control of its bureaucratic and local administrative structures. His "Zairianization" and "radicalization" policies of the 1970s sought to place control over the assets of commercial and agricultural concerns in the hands of favored local and regional leaders. This personalization of politics and attempted indigenization of economic resources tended to institutionalize patrimonial links and patronage networks; in effect, political elites were transformed into economic elites. Scholars consequently shifted their attention from elite analysis to social class analysis in the hope of better understanding nascent patterns of socioeconomic inequality.

[5] Zolberg (fn. 1), 144. Zolberg borrows this view of regimes from David Easton, *A Systems Analysis of Political Life* (New York: Wiley, 1965), 191.

[6] Young, *Politics in the Congo* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), 5.

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The international intervention that followed independence raised questions about the degree to which foreign political and economic interests controlled Zaire. In the chaos of abrupt decolonization, the international system sought to assure Zaire's territorial integrity as a political community by sending U.N. forces to the Congo in the early 1960s. International pressure may indeed have succeeded in maintaining incumbents. But the international system, says Zolberg, is less able to control the regime as a process: "Endogenous tendencies are likely to persist relatively undisturbed." Finding in 1966 that some analyses of Congolese politics "assume a degree of institutionalization which does not exist" in this "probable state," Zolberg set the agenda for subsequent studies.[7]

The three works under consideration analyze patterns of social stratification which have been institutionalized by years of political struggle. The authors attempt to establish connections between patterns and processes of class formation and state decline. Current research benefits from a degree of institutionalization that did not exist in the early years of independence. Instead of the earlier questioning of the existence of institutionalization, present conditions demand study of the kind and consequences of the institutionalization that has already taken place in Zaire.

Zaire under Mobutu provides an excellent case for "seeing political institutions and economy as interacting agents."[8] When one considers the consequences of the *de facto* centralization of formal institutions under Mobutu, it is doubtful whether this interaction produced the sort of effective government that can be included under the rubric of "political development." Even the gradual establishment of efficient practices for appropriating domestic and foreign economic resources lacked mechanisms for the equitable and effective distribution and investment of those resources.

The scope and interest of Michael Schatzberg's study extend far beyond the political economy of beer in Lisala, a small administrative center on the Zaire river. He attempts to show how the patrimonialist patterns established in the 1960s have become the basis of class formation as a consequence of Mobutu's extraordinary centralization of the bureaucracy, his creation of a single party—the MPR (*Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution*)—and his failure to assure an equitable distribution of resources. Schatzberg's analysis of the political dynamics of class formation discusses Zairian political interaction principally in terms of its economic

[7] Zolberg (fn. 1), 144, 145, 141.

[8] Henry Bienen, "What Does Political Development Mean in Africa?" *World Politics* 20 (October 1967), 128-41, at 134.

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consequences.[9] He sees the bureaucracy, for example, as not much more than a tool for personal gain: at high levels of administration, "occasions often arise to translate politico-administrative authority into commercial opportunity" (p. 82).

For Schatzberg, patrimonialism, patron-client networks, and appropriation of resources are evidence of a dynamic of class interaction prompted in part by the state's measures of 1973 to transfer foreign assets to domestic firms. These measures, called Zairianization, betray the extent to which the

> MPR—indeed the whole state apparatus—has been used to promote the interests of a small and restricted segment of the population. The result to date has been the increasing solidification of an indigenous politico-commercial bourgeoisie (p. 179).

In Schatzberg's view, the price paid by the population for at least apparent economic independence was a system of class domination.

But Schatzberg is critical of the rigidity imposed by earlier concepts of social class on social analysis for Zaire, including that of Nzongola-Ntalaja, whose study of the Zairian "national bourgeoisie" used Marx's social classes as an analytical framework.[10] Some classificatory schemes indiscriminately lump dissimilar groups together or mistakenly overestimate the importance of ownership of the means of production, when the real question concerns control of such means. Others resort to the mechanism of dichotomizing Zairian society into oppressors versus oppressed. Because the bureaucracy controls most of the means of production, distribution, and exchange, "and thus shapes the societal framework in which social relations occur" (p. 26), Schatzberg suggests that one should look principally to the bureaucracy for the signs of class formation and the development of class consciousness.

Schatzberg does not dispute Nzongola's assertion that a kind of national bourgeoisie, including top-level bureaucrats, businessmen, politi-

[9] By contrast, Jean-Claude Willame's description of the patrimonial politics of an emerging political class in the mid-1960s has a decidedly political emphasis. Willame focuses on the emergence of a political class of petty bureaucrats who, however unsuccessful in channeling resources because "decolonization left foreign resources unaccountable," did manage to concentrate the political resources available to them through the appropriation of offices according to a system of patrimonial links—starting with the highest posts. See Willame, *Patrimonialism and Political Change in the Congo* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1972), 86.

[10] Georges N. Nzongola(-Ntalaja), "Bourgeoisie and Revolution in the Congo," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 8 (No. 4, 1970), 511-30, at 511, 521. Nzongola-Ntalaja was among the first to develop a conceptual framework for class analysis in Zaire. Earlier classifications of social groups in Zaire include Christian Coméliau, *Fonctions économiques et pouvoir politique* [Economic functions and political power] (Kinshasa: Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales, 1965), and Jean Lacroix, *L'industrialisation au Congo* [Industrialization in the Congo] (Paris: Mouton, 1966).

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cians, and military officers, wields power in Zaire. He points out a fundamental ambiguity, however, when the term "class" is applied to various elements of Zairian society. Zairian class analysis can only be contextual, since specific situations strongly influence the class identification a person adopts (p. 31). A shift from ethnic to class analysis in the case of Zaire necessarily entails the "softening" of notions of class to fit African societies.[11]

A lengthy literature attests to the fact that the formulation of useful conceptions of ethnicity, class, and their interrelationship is a difficult task, especially for African politics.[12] Still, the ethnic factor—although complex whenever efforts are made to pinpoint its impact on specific situations—seems initially more understandable in the African context than do concepts of class. Ethnicity usually refers to particular configurations of cultural, linguistic, religious, and sometimes racial dimensions of human identity; in certain political circumstances, these influence political behavior, often in the direction of forming political groups on the basis of conscious collective identity.[13] As a political factor, however, ethnicity has come to be seen as a preeminently contextual and situational notion whose salience in some instances depends as much on the identity a person claims for himself at a given moment as on that attributed to a group of individuals by competitors, enemies, or observers. An event such as the assassination of a minority group's leader, for instance, may heighten the whole group's ethnic awareness. Political opportunities, too, may play a role in actually creating an ethnic identity where only a diffuse cultural identity had existed before, or in encouraging a group with a strong ethnic identity to claim political prerogatives such as rights to representation or even to rule.[14]

Schatzberg integrates the strengths of ethnic analysis into his method of class analysis. "Class" becomes "contextual consciousness." Like the salience of one's ethnic identity, it "is very likely to depend on the sociopolitical context of the moment" (p. 173). "An exploitative merchant who arbitrarily raises prices in the market," writes Schatzberg, "might well

[11] For a different view on the question of classes in Africa, see Dennis L. Cohen, "Class and the Analysis of African Politics: Problems and Prospects," in Dennis L. Cohen and John Daniel, eds., *Political Economy of Africa* (London: Longmans, 1981), 85-111.

[12] For a fuller review of positions on the role and meaning of class analysis in Africa, see *Review of African Political Economy* 19 (September-December 1980), special issue on Consciousness and Class.

[13] For a discussion of the varying roles of ethnicity in politics, with specific reference to the Zairian situation, see Crawford Young, *The Politics of Cultural Pluralism* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1976), 163-215.

[14] Nelson Kasfir offers an interesting treatment of the political uses of ethnic identity in *The Shrinking Political Arena* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975).

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find himself the victim of the exactions of the local school principal" (p. 161). Again, a local magistrate may privately admit the extent to which his salary places him with the privileged members of society, but in relation to the central administration he will clearly perceive himself as among the disadvantaged and abused. Thus, social context is essential for an understanding of the role of class in Zairian politics.

How does Schatzberg incorporate the ethnic factor into such dynamics? Although, like Nzongola, he places less emphasis on ethnic politics than some earlier authors, he does assert that it "seems to become particularly crucial when scarce resources are being allocated, appropriated, or competed for by members of the same class" (p. 182). While he does not advocate the removal of ethnicity from the analysis of Zairian politics, he suggests that "in the current context the explanatory power of social class is potentially greater" because the "success of patrimonial politics coupled with the failure of resources to trickle down to the villages actually tends to increase class consciousness" (p. 183). One merit of this contextual approach to class analysis is that it provides the reader with an explanation that goes beyond ethnicity. In Zaire, every person, given the appropriate situation, is potentially both an exploiter and a victim.

Schatzberg's suggestion that ethnicity sometimes determines distribution of resources among members of the same class offers clues about how centralization has modified the role of ethnicity and has encouraged practices contributing to class formation. Mobutu consolidated his power in the late 1960s by initially streamlining state structures and co-opting ethnic parties, unions, and student groups under the umbrella of the *Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution*. Crawford Young interpreted this thoroughgoing centralization by means of the "unitary legal framework of the colonial system" as a seeming eclipse and demobilization of cultural pluralism.[15] At the level of structures and public associations, the regime successfully eliminated formal societal mechanisms for collective ethnic mobilization. What it did not change was the long-established practice of political and economic clientelism in which ethnicity is a key factor enabling or preventing entrance into relationships that offer social and economic advancement. Because of centralization, open political conflict between ethnic groups was largely replaced by individual struggles for membership in powerful clientelist networks. Previous paths to social mobility—especially schools—still exist, but they have lost their effectiveness. Education alone no longer assures access to employment. In such a situation, ethnic distinctions do not disappear; rather, through the soli-

[15] Young (fn. 13), 211, 164.

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darity they lend to clientelist networks, these distinctions become key factors in gaining and maintaining access to state structures.

Building on Schatzberg's notion of contextual class consciousness, Callaghy as well as Young and Turner develop their own views on class formation in Zaire while at the same time highlighting the question of the state in the wake of centralization efforts. Centralization allowed individuals and groups to turn political favors into economic privilege. Certain transethnic groups—for example, local and regional officials who benefited from the 1973 Zairianization measures—increasingly resembled economic classes. One of the notable class activities that had negative consequences for the state's capacity to formulate and implement policy in the second decade of independence was the corrupt diversion of capital from production and investment.

In the early 1970s, the Mobutu regime pursued an ambitious (if unrealistic) program of industrialization through foreign investment and the construction of public works with foreign loans. These projects, however, seriously neglected the needs of the agricultural sector; they also encouraged continued population shifts to urban areas, where they fostered the development of large unemployed groups and further isolated the rural population. They were not successful in creating new wealth.

In the realm of law, the Mobutu regime made a substantial effort to homogenize the legal system by eliminating the customary courts. MacGaffey sees these homogenization measures as favoring the gradual division of Zairian society.[16] Those who hold political power have benefited particularly from the control over land tenure; the new system has placed them in the same privileged relation to the law that the Belgians enjoyed under the colonial dual legal system. By the subsequent elimination of local customary law, the regime has placed at a distinct disadvantage those who must now abide by procedures relatively unfamiliar to them (and to all but the few whose political power has given them control over the legal process).

Although the early stages of centralization created momentary increases in productivity and political order, the more striking and lasting result was the formation of serious social and economic cleavages, further exacerbated by accompanying struggles for authority and order. Despite Mobutu's adoption of national integration as an early priority, Zaire made only formal progress in the direction of creating what might have become "an integrated national community from a multitude of ethnic

[16] MacGaffey (fn. 3), 104.

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'selves.' "[17] The books by Callaghy and by Young and Turner show how these cleavages betray the regime's failure to penetrate all sectors, and reveal the limitations of its ability to maintain order. The evidence highlights problems in three related areas: first, the gap separating urban from rural; second, the lack of financial stability in the wake of the 1974 economic crisis; and third, the apparent division of Zairian society into two groups on the basis of their relation to political power. Callaghy defines these problems in terms of a struggle between state and society; Young and Turner expect them to result in a crisis of the state itself. Both analyses, while documenting distinctly Zairian patterns of institutionalized authority and political order, provide a suggestive glimpse at the politics of the state in contemporary sub-Saharan Africa.

In his laborious yet often enlightening search for the appropriate theoretical nomenclature to describe Zaire under Mobutu, Callaghy arrives at the conclusion that Zaire is an example of an authoritarian early modern state organized around a president who has adapted colonial structures and patrimonialized them, thereby creating an administrative monarchy (p. 5). He notes that "state formation efforts and class formation constitute the most salient characteristics of the contemporary African condition" (p. 32). Describing the regime's attempts to increase its power internally through a state-society struggle and externally through action in the international system, he tries to demonstrate the accuracy of this assertion in the case of the Zairian patrimonial state (p. 65).

Callaghy compares the administrative monarchy and patrimonial state created by Mobutu to absolutist France under Louis XIV—"a huge patron-client system with the king at the apex" (p. 125). This approach relates directly to the question of class formation and its relation, in turn, to the state. Callaghy finds Engels's notion of absolutism—used to describe "periods of history in which the dominant class does not control the state" (p. 20)—applicable to the case of Zaire. Because of Zaire's relatively undeveloped socioeconomic character and fluid class situation, Callaghy's emphasis is not on the inability of a dominant class to rule. Instead, he finds that the absolutism emerges from the simultaneous presence of a rising and consolidating (but not yet dominant) group that is protected and controlled by the state and the small (but growing) proletarian and bourgeois classes. In this situation, authoritarian rule results "from the tenuousness of authority and the search for it" (p. 32).

In Callaghy's view, three overlapping groups make up Zaire's "political aristocracy": upper-level administrative and military officers, territo-

[17] René Lemarchand, *Political Awakening in the Belgian Congo* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964), 1.

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rial prefects and middle-level military officers, and Mobutu's "brotherhood" constitute a "consolidating but still relatively fluid class held together by complex, partially interlocking, partially competitive patron-client networks and factions" (p. 185). Callaghy insists that this "class" does not constitute a bourgeoisie because it is nonproductive in character. He maintains that although ethnicity, region, education, politics, and personal contacts are criteria for entry into the aristocracy, loyalty to Mobutu is "the ultimate requirement for entry and continued membership" (*ibid.*). Members of the political aristocracy pursue a precarious existence in which their struggles to find more secure positions in the state can take priority over policy issues. In reacting to the challenge from other emerging classes, this political aristocracy turns to what Callaghy sees as its principal objective: consolidating its position and identity through the privileged access it has to education, jobs, intermarriage, and personal contacts "set up across ethnic boundaries" (p. 193).

Callaghy disputes the assertions of dependency-oriented scholars that Zaire's political and economic life is determined by foreign capitalist domination linking Zaire's ruling class to external forces through a system of corruption and irresponsibility.[18] He argues that the Mobutu regime and its political aristocracy have maintained an amazing degree of relative autonomy from external actors.

> This is possible because of the patrimonial nature of the Zairian state, the non-productive characteristics of its ruling class, the way various external actors define their interests, and their inability to coordinate their position sufficiently and over a long enough time span to make a real difference.[19]

Does Callaghy's evidence sustain this view of Zairian independence from foreign actors? In its struggle to assert itself in the international system, the political aristocracy Callaghy describes as transethnic and as lacking in unity and a sense of public purpose has managed—apparently intentionally—to limit the international system's control over Zaire. Going to great lengths to avoid paying debts, Mobutu and the political aristocracy "use their control of the state apparatus to sabotage change while manipulating the external actors' partially competing interests and fears ... to fend off effective ... cooperation between them" (p. 196). Zaire's strategy is to gain time by obtaining debt rescheduling and by wearing down international financial teams (p. 200).

Callaghy would not deny David Gould's assertion that corruption

[18] See David J. Gould, *Bureaucratic Corruption and Underdevelopment in the Third World: The Case of Zaire* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1980).

[19] Thomas Callaghy, "External Actors and the Relative Autonomy of the Political Aristocracy," *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics* 21 (November 1983), 61-83, at 62.

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links the ruling class to external actors, but he assigns a different role to corruption. In his view, it has "blocked all efforts by international leaders to control [Zaire's] financial practices." He does not suggest, however, that the political aristocracy possesses any particular acumen in managing Zaire's financial affairs. Rather, both it and Mobutu maintain an ambivalent stance toward the economic realities of finance.[20] In addition, corruption diverts investment from productive projects and falsifies state budgets.[21] Callaghy's description of the corruption, irresponsibility, and ambivalence of the political aristocracy in Zaire lends support to Zolberg's earlier remarks about the limited capacity of the international system to control the endogenous processes that characterize regimes. For Callaghy, the behavior of the political aristocracy challenges Nzongola's thesis[22] that the "neocolonial" Zairian state serves the interests of an international bourgeoisie (p. 56). As Callaghy puts it, "internal processes do have a life of their own."[23]

Callaghy does not turn his assertion of the relative autonomy of the political aristocracy into an argument that it is successful in the internal struggle between state and society. Nor does he maintain that this aristocracy is an organized and self-conscious group. It is able only to maintain minimal order and to extract resources; despite the streamlining of political and economic structures, the political aristocracy has failed to make the state into anything more than a lame "early modern Leviathan" (p. 409). The state bureaucracy is replete with the beneficiaries of patrimonial favor who assume the status and wealth, but not the duties, of their administrative posts. Role performance is crippled and ritualistic (p. 188).

Although the local administration must submit to centralized decision making, local administrators enjoy much discretion in applying policy (p. 105). Limitations on the regime's efforts to expand the state's interest by using the administration against ethnic, religious, and regional groups have shown up in the difficulties the Mobutu regime has encountered in controlling the staff in the rural periphery. Local ethnic ties can disrupt activities that are intended to strengthen the identity and domination of the ruling class and to increase the regime's penetration of the periphery. The regime has yet to integrate the centralized bureaucratic structures it has extended over a multiplicity of earlier authority patterns (p. 149). In

[20] *Ibid.*, 74, 73.

[21] Gould offers impressive statistics to document his thesis of corruption. See, for example, his allegation that in 1979 over half of the employees on the state's civil service payroll were fictitious (fn. 18), 71-72.

[22] Nzongola-Ntalaja, *Class Struggles and National Liberation* (Roxbury, MA: Omenana, 1982), 41, 71.

[23] Callaghy (fn. 19), 79.

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rural areas especially, the state struggles for domination against powerful local forces. As Callaghy notes,

> The continuity of tradition remains powerful. The stubborn survival of traditional authority patterns and the deeply rooted local and regional particularisms are major obstacles for the centralizing absolutist state (p. 144).

Attempts to transfer local administrators from one region to another on a regular basis have further compounded the regime's problems in implementing a uniform policy; such transfers disrupt the local and regional ties upon which administrators usually depend. Callaghy's description of the strained relationship between the state and the rural areas shows the extent to which ethnicity can serve different purposes. Paradoxically, ethnic considerations are usually the basis for the patron-client linkages that "permeate all levels and all aspects of administration" (p. 250); on one hand, they seem to hold the state system together; on the other, they represent a powerful force that local populations can use in order to resist unwanted centralizing measures.

Callaghy's account of the regime's failures in the periphery indicates not only the presence of lively internal processes in Zaire, but also the probability that the regime (as well as the international system) is limited in its capacity to control those processes. It is not so much a matter of dividing Zairian society into oppressors versus oppressed, or of concluding that the country's ills derive from international capitalist exploitation; it is a matter of recognizing the price that the state's struggle against society exacts from all: ineffective government and the institutionalization of mechanisms for extracting resources for personal gain. Callaghy resists the temptation of dividing Zairian society into a highly coordinated class of exploiters against the rest.

Other observers do see the situation in Zaire as polarized—with conflicts that pit the center against the periphery, the privileged against the rest of the population. Benoît Verhaegen notes that a significant urban-rural gap, resulting both from the regime's failure to integrate its authority vertically in spite of repeated modification of structures and from its systematic withholding of substantial economic allocations for agricultural development, has divided Zairian society. He argues that a conflictual social structure has characterized Zaire ever since the military and technological imperialism of the ruling bourgeoisie (defined as those whose diplomas and business or ethnic ties give them places of privilege) established itself in the late 1970s.[24] The diffuse opposition that permeates

[24] Verhaegen, "Les mouvements de libération en Afrique: Le cas du Zaïre en 1978" [Liberation movements in Africa: The case of Zaire in 1978], *Genève-Afrique* 17 (No. 1, 1979), 173-81, at 176.

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Zaire in the wake of failed insurrection movements in 1977 and 1978 (Shaba I and II) separates those who hold the power and privileges of the state from all the rest.[25]

Verhaegen finds that a person's ethnic group and political clientelist links determine his degree of privilege, but not his relationship to the means of production. He thus reestablishes ethnicity as an explanatory device for social stratification in Zaire while at the same time joining it to other considerations. In describing the precarious status of every Zairian under the domination of the privileged holders of state power, Verhaegen notes:

> Peasants, salaried workers, minor functionaries, mere soldiers, or even the unemployed can find themselves in the camp of the privileged if they belong to the right region, the right ethnic group, and if they have some kind of connection with those who have access to the prebends and the protection of the state. Their economic situation is less important than their relations with the sphere of political power.[26]

The same, he says, may be true for a professor, an army officer, or even a deputy in the legislature: the key to survival in Zaire has become maintaining oneself on the good side of the *ligne des privilèges*. As Willame describes it, in order to survive, one must find access to the pyramid of power in a society Mobutu himself depicted as one where "*tout se vend et tout s'achète*" (all can be sold and all can be bought).[27]

Crawford Young and Thomas Turner, in *The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State*, analyze the current decay of that state, using a broad historical perspective that incorporates much previous research. Their comprehensive portrait of Zaire examines Mobutu's early efforts to patrimonialize the decomposing shell of the colonial state, his attempts to create something of a unified Leviathan state, and finally the most recent period characterized by ubiquitous corruption, economic disaster, and general decay. Like Callaghy, they believe that the key issues in Zaire are the state and, with the rise of a politico-commercial class, class conflict. Before presenting their central thesis, Young and Turner comment on three interacting processes: centralization, class, and ethnicity. They consider the last two to be the most persistent and salient cleavages in Zaire.

[25] *Ibid.*, 177. Jean-Claude Willame and others describe Zairian social stratification in similar terms. According to Willame, Mobutu is at the top of a patrimonial state governed by his "presidential clan." At the next level, there are the businessmen, bureaucrats, and courtesans who owe their privilege to their ethnicity, region, or directly to Mobutu. Just above the masses at the bottom of the pyramid is a large number of elites who are both applauded and abused. See Willame, "Zaïre: Système de survie et fiction d'Etat" [Zaire: survival system and fiction of state], *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 18 (No. 1, 1984), 83-89.

[26] Verhaegen (fn. 24), 180. All translations are by the present author.

[27] Willame (fn. 25), 84.

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Young and Turner hold that Mobutu's struggle to consolidate power in the late 1960s initially consisted of the streamlining of state structures and co-optation of parties, unions, and student groups under a patrimonial system headed by a personalistic ruler. "But over time the corrupt exchanges which were the essential lubricant of patrimonial power became increasingly pervasive and visible" (p. 183). Corruption had become, as Gould already noted, "the system."[28] Nevertheless, the regime pursued its expansion of the state's apparatus in the 1970s. It attempted to strengthen the New Leviathan's fragile political authority through increased control of the Zairian economy. With the abrupt measures of Zairianization in 1973, the state suddenly became "either the parastatal manager or the patrimonial dispenser of nearly all of the economic structures built up before 1969" (p. 66). During the economic crisis of 1974, the centralizing processes in Zaire clearly revealed their more damaging consequences for the country. Underneath the ubiquitous corruption of the patrimonial regime was a process of social stratification that played into the hands of a politico-commercial class, dependent on the state and the use of political power for economic expansion (p. 115). This group derived its wealth not only from the benefits of corruption and patron-client linkages, but also from the substantial assets it captured in the Zairianization measures of 1973.

Ethnicity, too, played an important role in the growing stratification of Zairian society, even though the Mobutu regime sought to suppress the means of collective ethnic mobilization in parties, groups, and regional assemblies (p. 149). By 1970, when the effectiveness of familiar paths to social mobility (especially education) had clearly declined, patterns of turning to patrons and sponsors as sources of employment had become well established (p. 135). Ethnicity offered a tie or affinity beyond that of mutual advantage. Because the principal links of patronage networks are between individuals, they provide vertical integration for the social system. This is essential in a political context in which "collective demands, be they ethnic or in the name of some other social principle, are not legitimate" (p. 159). If, in 1960, Zaire was indeed "a political environment saturated with ethnicity" (p. 145), the situation has changed greatly in twenty years. Despite general resentment of presidential favors for persons from the Equatorial Region, ethnicity is not an open political issue of conflict over formal political predominance of clearly defined ethnic groups in the 1980s. Rather, it is a key factor governing the employment and advancement of individuals. It has real but not readily identifiable benefits for particular groups.

[28] Gould (fn. 18), xiii.

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Young and Turner do not underestimate, however, the importance of the regime's tendency toward ethno-regional favoritism or the degree to which popular perceptions of this tendency intensify notions of a Zaire divided into oppressor versus oppressed. Ethnicity, among other factors, has blocked, or at least constrained, development of class consciousness in all but a minority of Zairians; the majority, therefore, faced with their pauperization in the 1970s and the obvious privilege of the few, have developed a keen dislike for an unequal and dominating "they." Even though the identity of the opposing "we" is never fully articulated because it includes very dissimilar groups, most Zairians sense that they have been victims of a privileged group's self-aggrandizing use of the state.

Does this situation foreshadow a social explosion? Young and Turner do not discount the possibility that open political competition could well draw ethnic issues back into the center of conflict, or that the right configuration of circumstances could stimulate serious social disturbances. They suggest, however, that "three primary constraining factors have at least delayed its advent: the educational mobility myth, the perception that external forces guarantee the state, and the survival alternative through informal-sector activities" (p. 137). In their view, the problem of class conflict is best understood as an integral component of the more general dynamic or process they describe as a full-scale crisis of the state itself.

Young has elsewhere expressed his belief that the analytical dilemmas posed by Zaire are solved neither by Gould's dependency approach nor by Verhaegen's thesis about technological imperialism.[29] Twentieth-century political theory provides no help in studying the decline of the state, Zaire's most striking feature. Existing theoretical approaches fail to capture Zaire's pathology of decay as evidenced in "shrinkage in the competence, credibility, and probity of the state" (p. 45). The crucial question leading the authors' analysis, therefore, is the uneven corrosion of the state.

The state is no longer competent because of venality, demoralization, and lack of resources. It cannot "relate material means to policy ends."[30] The shrinkage of resources that caused the 1974 crisis brought to light the limitations of the regime and demonstrated how poor management and administrative corruption have disabled the very functioning of the state. The disparity between the resources available and the tasks required—within a system where functionaries enriched themselves while extract-

[29] Crawford Young, "Zaire: Is There a State?" *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 18 (No. 1, 1984), 80-83, at 80.
[30] *Ibid.*, 81.

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ing taxes for the state—has hindered the state's effective political penetration of regional administration (p. 244). The limits on the state's competence are manifest in its instinctive turn to the "habits of force and coercion which characterized the Buli Matari state" (p. 244).[31] Not only are the resources extracted inadequate to the ends sought, but the means of extraction are faulty. The state thus "risks becoming an irrelevancy, as well as a mechanism of predatory accumulation by those associated with its eroding power" (p. 45).

Moreover, the regime has proved itself incapable of implementing policy. In a measure that apparently combined social welfare concerns with those of trying to increase agricultural productivity, the state began a village relocation program in 1971—inspired, perhaps, by the *ujamaa* efforts in neighboring Tanzania. But here, as in many other cases, the regime was defeated by its "short span of attention to policy" (p. 242). Orders were confused, hastily changed, eventually abandoned. The whole movement for villagization lost its momentum before it even got started.

The state's credibility and probity have been undermined by the kind of development projects it has pursued: barely completed industrial installations that have no discernible economic benefits, create little employment, and enrich only a few. Citizens simply no longer believe that the state can perform its functions. Attitudes of cynicism and demoralization, deepened by disappointment—especially in the peripheral areas where development needs have all but been ignored in spite of repeated promises—have come "to shape the basic assumptions and expectations of society."[32]

At present, Zaire is a country in which a decayed state does not disappear; it continues to consume, it occasionally makes payments on its debts, and it maintains an international image. The true victim of the crisis of the state, say Young and Turner, is civil society. Because of the state's incompetence, the ordinary citizen often has to struggle to find employment in the parallel or underground economy, which Willame has described as a system of survival within a fictitious state—"a system of government functioning on the basis of clientelism and resting on the pillage . . . of human and material resources." The state plays at being a state because it has become the "product of a dynamic of civil society" whose substratum consists only of the clientelist activities of its ruling class.[33]

What kind of future does all this spell for Zaire? In a situation in

[31] The brutality of the colonial administration's relations with the Congolese earned for it the African nickname, *Buli Matari*, "one who crushes rocks."

[32] Young (fn. 29), 81.

[33] Willame (fn. 25), 83, 87, 88.

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which the key phrase is *débrouillex-vous* (survive), the potential for violent confrontation is always present. Extraction from the periphery will continue because the center has the mechanisms for it. Young is doubtful that the state can be restored within the present political formulation:[34] without elaborating, however, he and Turner see some potential for economic regeneration in the informal sector (p. 405).

Any conclusions to be drawn from these recent books and their authors' perceptions of salient national issues in Zaire over the past thirty years must focus on the continuing struggle for resources in a situation where the state functions only partially and its rulers hold a tenuous grasp on political authority and order. Given the kinds of conflicts described in the books under review, is it possible to see Zaire today as something more than an "almost institutionless arena with conflict and disorder as its most prominent features"?[35]

The case of contemporary Zaire challenges the meaning of our notions of institutionalization. By African standards, the Mobutu regime has enjoyed an unusual longevity, now over twenty years. This longevity, however, has not increased bureaucratic efficiency or contributed to political development. Nor has it provided Zaire with a desirable form of stability. Minimum political order has been assured at the price of open political participation. The regime has maintained its fragile authority through periodic suppressions of opposition movements and through making deals for the sake of expediency. This mode of order and authority has contributed to Zaire's economic regression. It does not, however, indicate a lack of institutionalization.

The sort of institutionalization taking place in Zaire has much more to do with establishing behavior patterns in which individuals seek to appropriate the power associated with institutions than with initiating measures for increasing the effectiveness of the state structures themselves. The most clearly identifiable practices arising in postcolonial Zaire center on finding the most efficient means for appropriating whatever political and economic resources are at hand. Efforts at structural reform have often masked an internal process of using the state for personal gain. Patterns of corruption, clientelism, and patrimonialism do not signify an absence of institutions; rather, they denote the presence of political relationships that favor neither political and economic development nor social mobility. To the extent that such patterns and political relationships resemble those occurring elsewhere in the region, Zaire in the 1980s, like

[34] Young (fn. 29), 82.

[35] Aristide Zolberg, "The Structure of Political Conflict in the New States of Africa," *American Political Science Review* 62 (March 1968), 70-87, at 70.

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the Congo in 1966, remains an accurate, if disturbing, model of politics in sub-Saharan Africa.

The picture is equally dismal with regard to political and national integration in Zaire—unless we are content to abandon the generally positive normative sense in which these terms are used. Integration has indeed occurred in Zaire; an emerging social stratification has ensured that structures do not hinder the corrupt clientelist and patrimonialist interests that use them. But this kind of integration has a truly negative normative value. It institutionalizes patterns of social inequality and immobility which, because of the kinds of relationships that sustain them, resist efforts for gradual improvement or change, and lead in the direction of violent confrontation. The books under review correctly stress the importance of internal processes that have lives of their own. The state has not been the only victim of such processes. What is really at stake in Zaire is the life of civil society. If the endogenous tendencies have not destroyed civil life in Zaire, they have certainly made it more precarious.

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

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

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

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